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http://www.archive.org/details/outlineofsirwillOOmurr 



LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT EXAMINED. Lectures, delivered in the 
Oxford University Pulpit, on the " Bampton Foundation." By Kev. H. Lon- 
gueville Mansel. With Copious Notes translated for the American 
edition. 12mo, cloth, 1.50. 

" This is incomparably the ablest contribution to the cause of sound learning and treasures of exact 
thought, which has recently been added to the common stock. In clear and simple terms, with strong 
sense and abundant learning, positions are laid down which will affect the science of thinking for a long 
future, and which administer a strong and wholesome corrective tc the flippant materialism of lie 
times." — Congregationalist. 

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES OF THE TRUTH OF THE SCRIPTURE Rec- 
ords, stated anew, with Special reference to the Doubts and Discoveries 
of Modern times. Lectures delivered in the Oxford University Pulpit, on the 
Bampton Foundation. By Geo. Rawlinson, M.A. With the Copious Notes 
translated for the American edition. 12mo, cloth, 1.75 

" Theconsumate learning, judgment, and general ability displayed by Mr. Rawlinson in his edition 
»f Herodotus are exhibited in this work also." — North American Review. 

11 In its special application of secular history to the illustration of the sacred record ; it possesses an 
Interest and value for Biblical students, which can hardly be expressed in words. We Bee not how 
any man of candor can read this volume and retain a doubt as to the authenticity of the historical books 
of the Old Testament." — N. Y. Independent. 

PROGRESS OF DOCTRINE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT; Lectures on 
the Bampton Foundation. By Thomas Dehany Bernard, Exeter College. 
12mo, cloth, 1.50. 

"A book of remarkablo ability aud interest. No production within the present century has appeared 
more fresh in matter, original In style, or of more permanent value to the cause of truth, than this." 



bis can l^rtas. 



LIFE OF CHRIST HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED. The Hulsean Lectures 
with Notes Critical, Historical, and Explanatory. By C. J. Ellicott, B.D. 
Royal 12mo, cloth, 1.75 

" Prof. Ellicott has shown himself to be a true scholar. He is doubtless among the very first of all 
English speaking scholars of the present generation." — New Englander. 

" Every page seems to be the result of deep thoug'jt and careful investigation." — Evang. Review. 

" This is no common book. It is evidently the production of a master mind." — United Presbyterian. 

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS. With Historical and 
Explanatory notes. By Brooke Foss Westcott, Trinity College, Cam- 
bridge. With an Introduction by Prof. H. B. Hackett, D.D. Royal 12mo, 
cloth, 2.00. 

'-The work is a striking combination of originality with erudition, its argument Is masterlv."- 
Philadelphii Lutheran. 



OUTLINE OF 
SIE WILLIAM HAMILTON'S 

PHILOSOPHY. 



OUTLINE 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S 
PHILOSOPHY. 

A TEXT-BOOK FOR STUDENTS. 



BY THE 

REV. J. CLARK MURRAY, 

PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, CANADA. 



* 

©BEttfj an Entroljucti0n, 



BY THE 

REV. JAMES McCOSH, LL.D, 

PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON COLLEGE, NEW JERSEY. 




BOSTON: 

GOULD .A. N D LINCOLN, 

69 WASHINGTON STREET. 

NEW YORK: SHELDON AND COMPANY. 

CINCINNATI : G. S. BLANCHAliD & CO. 

TOENOTO, ONT. : ADAM, STEVENSON & CO. 

18 70. 






Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1870, by 

GOULD AND LINCOLN, 

In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



Rockwell & CrjURcniLL, Printers, Boston. 



&o tfje fHcmorg 

O F 

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, 
THIS ESSAY 

IN THE EXPOSITION OF HIS PHILOSOPHY 

Is Inscribed 
BY 

A GBATEFUL PUPIL. 



'On Earth there is nothing great but Man: 
In Man there is nothing great but Mind." 



PREFACE. 



°X«c 



The primary object of this work is to provide a convenient 
text-book in philosophy. The labors of Sir William Hamilton 
as a professor formed generally the most powerful influence 
in the philosophical education of those who came within their 
reach ; and a similar influence has extended into wider circles 
through his writings. It seemed to me, therefore, that his 
philosophy might still be made a valuable instrument of 
philosophical culture. 

The chief difficulty, in the way of this lay in the selection 
of one of his works, suitable for use as a text-book. A very 
slight acquaintance with these is sufficient to show that none 
of them by itself presents a complete view of his philosophical 
opinions in systematic order. 1 The Lectures on Metaphysics, 

1 For many readers it may not be unnecessary to enumerate the works of 
Sir William Hamilton. (1.) His edition of lieicVs Works (1846) contains, besides 
many valuable footnotes, a number of supplementary dissertations on various 
philosophical subjects. Only a few of the intended dissertations were ever 
completed; but since his death his editors have published the fragmentary 
materials he had collected for the dissertations which had been left unfinished. 
(2.) The articles which he had contributed to the Edinburgh Review were col- 
lected into one volume, with numerous additions, under the title of Discussions 
in Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform (1852). 
(3.) The lectures, which he had been in the habit of delivering to his classes, 
were published posthumously; the Lectures on Metaphysics, in 1859; the 

Lectures on Logic, in 1860. 

IX 



X PREFACE. 

which contain the fullest account of his philosophy, and from 
which, therefore, the largest extracts have been drawn for the 
present work, besides being devoted mainly to one subdivision 
of his system, fail to give his matured views, or the matured 
expression of his views, on some subjects, while the discussion 
of many points is overladen with a mass of extraneous matter, 
which is generally confusing to the beginner and unnecessary 
for the comprehension of Hamilton's own system. I have, 
therefore, thought it advisable to attempt the systematic ex- 
hibition of his philosophical opinions without regard to the 
order or the mode of treatment which he has followed in any 
of his writings. 

In doing so, however, it was necessary to adopt some 
order ; and it seemed to me that I had no right to adopt any 
other than that which the philosopher has himself suggested 
in his distribution of the philosophical sciences, 1 though he 
has nowhere been able to carry it out. This distribution 
may possess comparatively little merit, and has certainly 
exerted no influence in directing the course of speculative 
thought in Europe or America, such as has flowed from 
Hegel's or from Comte's classification of the sciences ; but the 
system of Hamilton would be inadequately represented by 
following any other course than that which I have adopted. 

With regard to the liberties which I have taken in the 
composition of this Outline, I may remark, in the first place, 
that it has frequently been necessary to transfer passages 
from their original contexts, and that, in doing so, I have 
introduced them into their new contexts by such connecting 
particles and phrases as seemed most appropriate. I have 

l See Lectures on Metaphysics, VII. 



PREFACE. XI 

also frequently left out of a passage a feAv words which were 
not essential to its meaning, especially when they appeared 
to be intended rather for an audience than for readers. Such 
slight liberties I have not considered it necessary to indicate. 
Occasionally, moreover, where Hamilton's editors intimate 
that he has adopted the language of another writer for the 
expression of his views, I have not preserved the marks of 
quotation, as these might have been confusing to a student. 
In one or two instances, however, I have ventured on an 
independent or abridged statement of Hamilton's doctrine ; 
but such passages have been uniformly pointed out in the 
footnotes. It may also be added that I am responsible for the 
tabular classifications at pages 83 and 88, as well as for some 
slight alterations of expression in the others. With these ex- 
planations it may be said that the text is wholly Hamilton's. 

As an exposition of Hamilton's Philosophy, the Outline con- 
tains some imperfections which were unavoidable. Even in the 
language these may at times be traced : for, while the volume 
is in the form of a text-book for private study, the largest 
portion of it is extracted from lectures which were intended 
to be delivered to a class ; and though I have endeavored to 
leave out all the most obtrusive expressions of direct address, 
it was impossible to destroy the general form of phraseology. 
Some passages, moreover, undoubtedly suffer from being 
used as an exposition of a doctrine in a different connection 
and in a different point of view from that in which they were 
originally written. I believe, however, that no liberty which 
I have taken in the composition of the book has originated 
a single misrepresentation of Hamilton's opinions, while the 
whole volume offers a fair representation of his complete 



XII PREFACE. 

philosophical system. At the same time I do not take the 
responsibility of recommending that my book should be ac- 
cepted as a final authority in any important question concerning 
Hamilton's doctrine, without referring to the works of the 
philosopher himself. I have, therefore, uniformly subjoined, 
within parentheses, a distinct reference to the place in his 
works from which each passage of the Outline is extracted; 
and, to prevent mistake, I may observe that each reference 
embraces the whole passage between it and the previous 
reference. I am not without hope, therefore, that, while the 
Outline may serve the purpose for which it is primarily 
designed, it may also be of some use to those who desire an 
acquaintance with Sir "William Hamilton's system of philosophy, 
and have found the state of his writings a formidable obstacle 
in their way. 

I have only to add that the work is merely expository, and 
that, therefore, while I have avoided any criticism of Hamilton's 
doctrines, I do not always undertake the responsibility of their 
defence. I believe, however, that the teaching of philosophy 
must still, at least, be conducted by helping the student to 
master the varying points of view from which the different 
representative systems look out on the field of speculation. 
For this reason, I trust that a slight service has been rendered 
to the cause of philosophical education by presenting, with a 
completeness which has never before been attempted, the 
system of Sir William Hamilton. 

J. CLARK MURRAY. 
Queen's College, Ont., October, 1870. 



CONTENTS. 



PAOB 

Introductory Note, by Dr. James McCosh . .' . . xxiii 



INTRODUCTION. 

§ 1. The General Nature of Philosophy ...... 19 

(A) Nominal Definition of Philosophy 19 

(B) Real Definition of Philosophy 20 

I. Historical or Empirical Knowledge . . . .21 

II. Philosophical or Scientific Knowledge ... 22 
Philosophy, strictly so called, is the Science of Mind . 24 

§ 2. Classification of the Philosophical Sciences ..... 25 

Tabular View of tho Classification 27 



FIRST DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

CHAPTER I. 

DEFINITION OF THE SCIENCE, AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS 
IN THE DEFINITION. 

Phenomenal Psychology defined 31 

Terms of tho definition explained 31 

* XIII 



XIV CONTENTS. 

(A) Terms expressing the Manifestations of Mind . . .32 

(B) Terms expressing the Unknown Basis of Mental Manifesta- 

tions 34 



CHAPTER II. 

CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL. 

§ 1. Consciousness: Its General Nature ....... 37 

§ 2. Consciousness: Its Special Conditions ...... 40 

(A) Undisputed Conditions : — I. It is an actual knowledge. 

II. It is an immediate knowledge. III. It supposes dis- 
crimination. IV. It involves judgment. V. It implies 
memory .......... 40 

(B) Disputed, whether consciousness is & particular faculty, or the 

universal condition, of intelligence . . . .42 

I. It cannot be discriminated from the other faculties . 43 

II. It is cognizant of their objects, as well as of their 

operations 45 

§ 3. Consciousness : Its Evidence and Authority ..... 46 

(A) It is the principal source from which all knowledge of mental 

phenomena must be obtained. — Phrenology ... 47 

(B) Authority of its Testimony. — Two points of view, under 

which its deliverances may be considered . . . .48 

Rules for applying its Testimony . . ■ . . . .53 

§4. Consciousness: Classification of its Phenomena . . . .53 

I. Knowledges; II. Feelings; III. Conations . . 54 

Criticism of Objections to the Classification: I. That the three 

classes are not co-ordinate; II. That there can be only 

two fundamental powers of mind 56 



CONTENTS. XV 

FIRST PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 

INTRODUCTION. 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 

What is meant by a mental power ........ 61 

Distribution of the Faculties of Knowledge 63 

Tabular View of the Distribution 66 

CHAPTER I. 

THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY. 

§ 1. External Perception ......... 67 

(A) Distinction between Sensation and Perception ... 68 

Law : Sensation and Perception are always in the inverse 
ratio of each jther 69 

Illustration of the Law: I. From a comparison of the dif- 
ferent senses ; II. From comparing different impressions 
of the same sense, as different (1) in degree, (2) in kind 69 

(B) Distinction in the Qualities of Matter 73 

The qualities as contemplated from the point of view of 

Sense and from that of the Understanding ... 74 

I. Deduction of the Primary Qualities .... 75 

II. Induction of the Secundo-Primary Qualities ... 78 

III. Induction of the Secondary Qualities .... 81 
Tabular Classification of the Qualities of Matter ... 83 
The Object in Perception is either a primary quality or the 

quasi-primary phasis of a secundo-primary ... 84 
In Perception, therefore, two facts are always given, that I 

am, and that something different from me exists . . 86 
Theories of Perception, which arise from the acceptance or 

non-acceptance of these facts in their integrity . . 87 



XVI CONTENTS. 

Tabular Classification of these theories .... 88 

§2. Self- Consciousness . . . . . . . . . ^ 90 

Self-consciousness contrasted with Perception . . . .90 

The fundamental forms of Self-Consciousness are Time and Self, 
as those of Perception are Time and Space. Two difficulties 
removed 91 



CHAPTER II. 

THE CONSERVATIVE FACULTY. 

The relation of the Conservative Faculty to the Presentative on the one 

hand, and to the Reproductive and Representative on the other . 94 
§ 1. The fact of Retention ......... 96 

That Cognitions, in the interval between acquisition and repro- 
duction, continue to subsist in the mind, though out of con- 
sciousness, is proved 

I. From External Perception, by (1} the Sense of Sight, (2) 

the Sense of Hearing, (3) the other Senses . . . .96 

II. From the Association of Ideas 99 

III. From our Acquired Habits and Dexterities. Three 
theories to account for these 100 

1. That of Hartley and Reid criticised . . .101 

2. That of Stewart criticised 102 

3. Hamilton's own theory explained . . . . 103 
§ 2. Explanation of Retention ........ 104 

Retention is explained by the self-activity of the mind, the real 
difficulty being, not how a mental activity endures, but how it 
ever vanishes 105 

Inferences. 

1. That Retention extends to all the mental phenomena . . 107 

2. That to explain Retention, physiological hypotheses are un- 

necessary. Dependence of memory on the state of the 
brain 107 



CONTENTS. XVII 



CHAPTER III. 

THE REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY. 

Reproduction governed by Laws 110 

Distinction between the primary and the secondary Laws of Reproduction 111 

§ 1. Primary Laws of Reproduction 112 

(A) General. 

I. Law of Possible Reproduction .112 

II. Laws of Actual Reproduction 112 

1. Law of Repetition . . . . . . .114 

2. Law of Redintegration 114 

(B) Special. 

I. Law of Similars 115 

II. Law of Contrast 116 

III. Law of Coadjacency 117 

§ 2. Secondary Laws of Reproduction ....... 117 

' General Law of Preference acts 117 

(A) By relation to the thought suggesting, giving . . . 118 

I. Law of Immediacy 118 

II. Law of Homogeneity .118 

(B) By relation to the mind, giving the Law of Facility. What 

thoughts are more easily suggested 118 

§ 3. Distinction of Suggestion and Reminiscence . . . . .120 
Reminiscence explained 120 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE REPRESENTATIVE FACULTY. 



This faculty is determined to represent by (1) the Reproductive Faculty, 
(2) the Faculty of Comparison. Imagination 

Productive Imagination is therefore Representation plus Comparison 
Representation is not limited to sensible objects 

Dreaming, Somnambulism, Reverie 

The Organs of Imagination the same as those of Sense . 



126 
127 
128 
128 
131 



XVIH CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER V. 

THE ELABORATIVB FACULTY. 

§ 1. Primary Acts of Comparison ....... 134 

1. Affirmation of Existence 134 

2. Discrimination of the Ego and the Non-ego .... 134 

3. Judgment of Agreement or Dissimilarity .... 135 

4. Recognition of Substance . . . . . . .135 

5. Recognition of Cause 135 

§ 2. Classification . . . . . • . . . .136 

(A) Collective Notions 136 

(B) Abstraction, poetical and scientific . . . . .138 

(C) Generalization; General Notions; Their Extension and Com- 

' prehension 140 

What is the object of Consciousness, when we employ a gen- 
eral term ? Antagonistic doctrines of the Nominalists and 

the Conceptualists 142 

Conceptualism originates in ambiguity of terms . . 144 

Theories on the question of the Primum Cognitum . . 145 

1. That terms are first expressive of individual objects . 145 

2. That they first expross classes ..... 146 

3. That they first express neither the precisely general nor 

the determinately particular, but the vague and con- 
fused. (Hamilton's theory) 147 

§ 3. Judgment . 150 

§ 4. Reasoning ........... 153 

I. Deductive Reasoning, 1. In Comprehension; 2. In Extension . 153 

II. Inductive Reasoning, 1. In Comprehension; 2. In Extension 158 
Reasoning, which is synthetic in Extension, is analytic in 

Comprehension. Confused application of the terms Analysis 

and Synthesis 160 



CONTENTS. XIX 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE REGULATIVE FACULTY. 
This faculty is the source of necessary or a priori cognitions . . . 162 
Criteria of such cognitions: 1. Incomprehensibility; 2. Simplicity; 

3. Necessity and Universality; 4. Certainty .... 164 
The conditions of positive thought are: 1. Non-contradiction, and 

2. Relativity 165 

§ 1. Non-contradiction involves the three laws of : 1. Identity; 2. Con- 
tradiction; 3. Excluded Middle 166 

§ 2. Relativity implies that we can know neither the unconditionally 
limited (the Absolute) nor the unconditionally unlimited (tho 
Infinite), but only the limited, and the conditionally limited. This 
condition is brought to bear under two relations : . . . 167 

(A) The Relation of Knowledge ....... 169 

(B) The Relations of Existence, which are either 

I. Intrinsic, of Substance and Quality, or . . . 169 

II. Extrinsic, comprehending Time, Space, and Degree . 170 
Tabular view of the Conditions of Thought 174 

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI. 

LAW OF THE CONDITIONED IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE PRIN- 
CIPLE OF CAUSALITY. 

Statement and Illustration of the principle 173 

Theories to explain the principle explained and criticised . . . 177 
Tabular view of these theories 180 

SECOND PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 

INTRODUCTION. 

Relation of the Feelings to the Cognitions on the one hand, and the 

Conations on the other 193 



XX CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

ABSTRACT THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 

Definition of Pleasure and Pain 198 

Their different kinds : 1. Positive and Negative Pleasure and Pain ; 

2. Pain of Restraint and that of Over-exertion .... 199 



CHAPTER II. 

THE ABSTRACT THEORY APPLIED TO THE CONCRETE 
PHENOMENA. 

§ 1. The Feelings as 'Causes . . . 200 

As Causes the feelings are divided into the pleasurable and the 

painful 200 

I. The apparent contradictions to the theory in actual life are 

really confirmations 200 

II. The theory is confirmed by the affections called painful : 

(1) Grief; (2) Fear; (3) Pity; (4) Enjoyment of tragedies 202 
Four general causes which affect the intensity of our Feelings : 
I. Novelty; II. Contrast; III. Harmony or Discord between 

coexistent activities; IV. Association 203 

§ 2. The Feelings as Effects . . ... . . . 20G 

As effects of the different energies of life, the feelings may be 
classified in accordance with the different classes of energies. 

(A) The Sensations, or feelings which accompany the exercise of 

bodily powers, are divided into (I.) those of Sensus Fixus, 
and (II.) those of Se?isus Vagus 206 

(B) The Sentiments, or feelings which accompany the exercise of 

the higher mental powers, comprehend 
I. The contemplative, the concomitants of our cognitive 
powers, which are divided into (1) those of the sub- 
sidiary faculties; (a) Self-consciousness and (b) Im- 
agination, and (2) those of the elaborative faculty, 



CONTENTS. XXI 

(a) by itself, (b) in conjunction with imagination. 
The last include : i. the Beautiful; ii. the Sublime; 
iii. the Picturesque ....... 208 

II. The practical, the concomitants of our conative powers, 
comprehending those that relate to (1) self-preserva- 
tion, (2) enjoyment of existence, (3) preservation of 
the species, (4) our tendency to perfection, (5) the 
moral law 219 



THIRD PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONATIONS. 

Terms to express these phenomena 225 

They are divided into 

(A) Desires, blind and fatal tendencies to action .... 226 

(B) Volitions, free tendencies to action. The freedom of will is 

proved (1) directly, (2) indirectly, though it is incon- 
ceivable (1) because of the Law of the Conditioned, (2) 
because motiveless volition is morally unaccountable. But 
the inconceivability does not invalidate the fact, (1) be- 
cause the causal judgment is merely a mental impotence, 
(2) because fatalism is equally inconceivable . . . 226 



SECOND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

(A) Homology of the Cognitions 231 

(B) Homology of the Feelings 232 

(C) Nomology of the Conative Powers 233 



XXII CONTENTS. 

THIRD DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
CHAPTER I. 

EXISTENCE IN GENERAL. 

The axiom, that we have no knowledge of existence itself, but merely 
of its phenomena, explained in reference to I. Matter, and II. 
Mind 237 

This axiom is divided into two : 

I. That the properties of existence are not necessarily of the same 

number as our faculties of apprehending them . . . 240 

II. That the properties known are not necessarily known in their 

native purity . . . . . . . . .242 

Certain inferences, however, regarding existence itself may be necessi- 
tated by its phenomena 244 



CHAPTER II. 

EXISTENCE OF GOD AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 

The notion of a God implies not only Omnipotence, but Intelligence and 

Virtue ; and Virtue involves Freedom 247 

The proof of God's existence, therefore, requires the proof of two prop- 
ositions : 

I. That the universe is the creation of a free original intelligence 250 

II. That the universe is governed not merely by physical, but by 

moral, laws 252 

Value of mental science to theology 253 

Evil influences of the exclusive study of physical science . . . 254 
Consequences which would result from referring everything to the 

mechanism of nature 256 



INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 

— »o»io« — 

Sir William Hamilton was the greatest metaphysician 
of his age, and his metaphysics will be studied by thinking 
minds in all coming ages. But his system was not drawn 
out in a compendious form by himself. In order to find it, 
students have to search a number of treatises in the shape 
of reviews, dissertations, class-lectures, notes, and notes 
upon notes. The stablished metaphysician delights in all 
this as an exhibition of the working of Hamilton's pene- 
trating intellect, and because of the value of the seeds 
which, in the exuberance of his learning, he scatters in his 
progress. But as he often moves with great rapidity, and 
turns off at sharp angles into collateral discussions, the 
younger student is apt to be left behind and to become per- 
plexed, and he longs to have some guide who may furnish 
him with a clear and combined view of the philosophy as a 
whole. This felt want has been supplied in Professor 
Murray's " Outline of Hamilton's Philosophy." 

I have carefully read the work in proof, and I am able to 
say that it furnishes an admirable summary, — clear, cor- 



XXIV INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 

rect, and readily intelligible, of the leading doctrines and 
connections of Hamilton's Philosophy. The account is ren- 
dered mainly in Hamilton's own language, by one who un- 
derstands his philosophy, and who has the higher merit of 
entering thoroughly into the spirit of his great teacher. I 
have observed that in points in regard to which there have 
been disputes as to Hamilton's meaning, Professor Murray 
seems to me to give the proper version. 

Those who are led by this brief exposition to take a gen- 
eral view, as from a height to which Professor Murray has 
conducted them, of the country spread out before them, will 
be allured, when he has left them, to enter upon a more par- 
ticular exploration for themselves, when they will find in- 
numerable scattered ore which could not have a place in a 
mere Outline. 

The testimony now given will not be esteemed of less 
value because it comes from one who feels that Hamilton 
has often followed Kant's Critical Method too implicitly, 
and who dissents from his doctrines of Causality, of the 
Relativity of Knowledge, and of the negative nature of our 
Idea of the Infinite. 

JAMES McCOSH. 
Princeton, New Jersey, U. S., Oct. 1, 1870. 



INTRODUCTION. 



THE GENERAL NATURE AND DIVISIONS OF 
PHILOSOPHY. 



§ 1. THE GENERAL NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

In commencing a course of philosophical discipline, 
it is important to obtain, at least, a general notion of 
what philosophy is. In order to this, there are two 
questions to be answered : (A) What is the mean- 
ing of the name? and (£) What is the meaning of 
the thing? 

(A) Nominal Definition of Philosophy. Philoso- 
phy is a term of Greek origin, — it is a compound 
of <p(Xo<;, a lover or friend, and ao<p(a-, wisdom — specu- 
lative wisdom. Philosophy is thus, literally, a love 
of wisdom. But if the grammatical meaning of the 
word be unambiguous, the history of its application 
is involved in considerable doubt. According to the 
commonly received account, the designation of phi- 
losopher was first assumed and applied by Pythag- 
oras ; but this rests on very slender authority. It 
is probable, I think, that Socrates was the first who 
adopted, or, at least, the first who familiarized, the 

19 



20 AN OUTLINE OF 

expression. It was natural that he should be anxious 
to contradistinguish himself from the Sophists (of 
ao<poi\ ol <ro<pH7Tou) , literally, the wise men; and no 
term could more appropriately ridicule the arrogance 
of these pretenders, or afford a happier contrast to 
their haughty designation, than that of philosopher 
(i. e., the lover of wisdom) ; and at the same time it is 
certain that the substantives <pdo<jo<p[a and <pd6ao<po<; first 
appear in the writings of the Socratic school. It is 
true, indeed, that the verb <pdoao<peTv is found in Herod- 
otus (I. 30) ; and that, too, in a participial form, to 
designate a man who had travelled abroad for the 
purpose of acquiring knowledge. It is, therefore, 
not impossible that, before the time of Socrates, 
those who devoted themselves to the pursuit of the 
higher branches of knowledge were occasionally 
designated philosophers ; but it is far more probable 
that Socrates and his school first appropriated the 
term as a distinctive appellation ; and that the word 
philosophy, in consequence of this appropriation, 
came to be employed for the complement of all 
higher knowledge, and more especially to denote the 
science conversant about the principles or causes of 
existence. 

(B) Heal Definition of Philosophy. It is, per- 
haps, impossible adequately to define philosophy. 
For what is to be defined comprises what cannot be 
included in a single definition. For philosophy is 
not regarded from a single point of view ; it is some- 
times considered as theoretical, that is, in relation to 
man as a thinking and cognitive intelligence ; some- 
times as practical, that is, in relation to man as a 



Sill WILLIAM HAMILTON 'S PHILOSOPHY. 21 

moral agent ; and sometimes as comprehending both 
theory and practice. Again, philosophy may either 
be regarded objectively, that is, as a complement of 
truth known ; or subjectively, that is, as a habit or 
quality of the mind knowing. In these circumstances 
I shall not attempt a definition of philosophy, but 
shall endeavor to accomplish the end which every 
definition proposes, — make you understand, as pre- 
cisely as the unprecise nature of the object-matter 
permits, what is meant by philosophy, and what are 
the sciences it properly comprehends within its 
sphere. 

All philosophy is knowledge, but all knowledge 
is not philosophy. Philosophy is, therefore, a kind 
of knowledge. What, then, is philosophical knowl- 
edge, and how is it discriminated from knowledge 
in general ? 

I. We are endowed by our Creator with certain 
faculties of observation, which enable us to become 
aware of certain appearances or phenomena. These 
faculties may be stated as two, — Sense or External 
Perception, and Self-Consciousness or Internal Per- 
ception ; and these faculties severally afford us the 
knowledge of a different series of phenomena. (1.) 
Through our senses we apprehend what exists or 
what occurs in the external or material world ; (2.) 
By our self-consciousness, what is or what occurs in 
the internal world or world of thought. The infor- 
mation which we thus receive is called Historical or 
Empirical knowledge'. 

1. It is called historical, because, in this knowl- 
edge, we know only the fact, only that the phenome- 



22 AN OUTLINE OF 

noil is ; for history is properly only the narration of a 
consecutive series of phenomena in time, or the 
description of a coexistent series of phenomena in 
space. Civil history is an example of the one ; 
natural history, of the other. 

2. It is called empirical or experiential, if we 
might use that term, because it is given us by experi- 
ence or observation, and not obtained as the result of 
inference or reasoning. 

Historical or empirical knowledge is, therefore, 
simply the knowledge that something is. Were we 
to use the expression, the knowledge that, it would 
sound awkward and unusual in our modern lan- 
guages. In Greek, the most philosophical of all 
tongues, its parallel, however, was familiarly em- 
ployed. It Was Called to oti, that is, i) yvwaiq or: ecFTtv. I 

should notice, that with us the knowledge that, is com- 
monly called the knowledge of the fact. As examples 
of empirical knowledge, take the facts, whether known 
in our own experience or on the testified experience 
of others, that a stone falls, — that smoke ascends, — 
that the leaves bud in spring, and fall in autumn, — 
that such a book contains such a passage, — that such 
a passage contains such an opinion, — that Csesar, that 
Charlemagne, that Napoleon existed. 

II. But things do not exist, events do not occur, 
isolated — apart — by themselves ; they occur, and are 
conceived by us, only in connection. Our observation 
affords us no example of a phenomenon which is not 
an effect ; nay, our thought cannot even realize to it- 
self the possibility of a phenomenon without a cause. 
We do not at present inquire into the nature of the 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 23 

connection of effect and cause, either in reality or in 
thought. It is sufficient for our present purpose to 
observe that, while, by the constitution of our nature, 
we are unable to conceive anything to begin to be 
without referring it to some cause, — still the knowl- 
edge of its particular cause is not involved in the 
knowledge of any particular effect. By this necessity, 
which we are under, of thinking some cause for every 
phenomenon ; and by our original ignorance of what 
particular causes belong to what particular effects, — 
it is rendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the 
mere knowledge of the fact of a phenomenon ; on 
the contrary, we are determined, we are necessi- 
tated, to regard each phenomenon as only partially 
known, until we discover the causes on which it de- 
pends for its existence. For example, we are struck 
with the appearance in the heavens called a rainbow. 
Think we cannot that this phenomenon has no cause, 
though we may be wholly ignorant of what that cause 
is. Now, our knowledge of the phenomenon as a 
mere fact — as a mere isolated event — does not 
content us ; we therefore set about an inquiry into the 
cause, — which the constitution of our mind compels 
us to suppose, — and at length discover that the rain- 
bow is the effect of the refraction of the solar rays by 
the watery particles of a cloud. Having ascertained 
the cause, but not till then, we are satisfied that we 
fully know the effect. 

Now, this knowledge of the cause of a phenomenon 
is different from, is something more than, the knowl- 
edge of that phenomenon simply as a fact ; and these 
two cognitions or knowledges have, accordingly, re- 



24 AN OUTLINE OF 

ceived different names. The latter, we have seen, is 
called historical or empirical knowledge ; the former 
is called philosophical or scientific or rational knowl- 
edge. Historical, is the knowledge that a thing is ; 
philosophical, the knowledge why or hoio it is. The 
Greek language well expresses philosophical knowl- 
edge as the Stove, — the yvataiq dcort Man. 

Such is philosophical knowledge in its most exten- 
sive signification ; and in this signification all the sci- 
ences occupied in the research of causes may be 
viewed as so many branches of philosophy. There is, 
however, one section of these sciences which is de- 
nominated philosophical by pre-eminence, — sciences 
which the term philosophy exclusively denotes, when 
employed in propriety and rigor. What these sci- 
ences are, and why the term philosophy has been spe- 
cially limited to them, I shall now endeavor to make 
you understand. 

" Man," says Protagoras, " is the measure of the 
universe : " and in so far as the universe is an object 
of knowledge, the paradox is a truth. Whatever we 
know, or endeavor to know, we know and can know 
only in so far as we possess a faculty of knowing in 
general ; and we can only exercise that faculty under 
the laws which control and limit its operations. How- 
ever great and infinite and various, therefore, may be 
the universe and its contents, these are known, not as 
they exist, but as our mind is capable of knowing 
them. 

1. In the first place, therefore, as philosophy is a 
knowledge, and as all knowledge is only possible 
under the conditions to which our faculties are sub- 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 25 

jected, the grand, the primary problem of philosophy 
must be to investigate and determine these conditions 
as the necessary conditions of its own possibility. 

2. In the second place, as philosophy is not merely 
a knowledge, but a knowledge of causes, and as the 
mind itself is the universal and principal concurrent 
cause in every act of knowledge ; philosophy is, con- 
sequently, bound to make the mind its first and para- 
mount object of consideration. The study of mind 
is thus the philosophical study by pre-eminence. 
There is no branch of philosophy which does not sup- 
pose this as its preliminary, which does not borrow 
from this its light. In short, the science of mind, 
whether considered in itself or in relation to the 
other branches of knowledge, constitutes the princi- 
pal and most important object of philosophy, — con- 
stitutes in propriety, with its suite of dependent 
sciences, philosophy itself. 

From what has been said, you will, without a 
definition, be able to form at least a general notion 
of what is meant by philosophy. In its more exten- 
sive signification, it is equivalent to a knowledge of 
things by their causes; while, in its stricter meaning, 
it is confined to the sciences which constitute, or hold 
immediately of , the science of mind. {3Ietaph., Lec- 
ture III.) 

§ 2. classification of the philosophical sciences. 

The whole of philosophy is an answer to three 
questions : (1.) What are the Facts or Phenomena to 
be observed? (2.) What are the Laws which regu- 



26 AN OUTLINE OF 

late these facts, or under which these phenomena 
appear? (3.) What are the real Results, not imme- 
diately manifested, which these facts or phenomena 
warrant us in drawing ? 

I. If we consider the mind merely with the view 
of observing and generalizing the various phenomena 
it reveals, we have one mental science or one depart- 
ment of mental science ; and this we may call the 
Phenomenology of Mind. It is commonly called 
Psychology, — Empirical Psychology, or the Induc- 
tive Philosophy of Mind : we might call it Phenome- 
nal Psychology. It is evident that the divisions of 
this Science will be determined by the classes into 
which the phenomena of mind are distributed. I shall 
hereafter show you that there are three great classes 
of these phenomena, — -namely, (1.) the phenomena 
of our Cognitive faculties, or faculties of Knowl- 
edge; (2.) the phenomena of our Feelings, or of 
Pleasure and Pain ; (3.) the phenomena of our Cona- 
tive powers, or of Will and Desire. 

II. If, again, we analyze the mental phenomena 
with the view of discovering and considering, not 
contingent appearances, but the necessary and univer- 
sal facts, that is, the Laws, by which our faculties 
are governed, to the end that we may obtain a crite- 
rion by which to judge or to explain their proced- 
ures and manifestations , we have a science which we 
may call the JSTomology of Mind, or Nomological Psy- 
chology. Now, there will be as many distinct 
classes of Nomological Psychology as there are distinct 
classes of mental phenomena under the Phenomeno- 
logical division. 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON' S PHILOSOPHY. 27 

III. The third great branch of philosophy is that 
which is engaged in the deduction of Inferences or 
Results. In the first branch philosophy is properly 
limited to the facts afforded in consciousness, con- 
sidered exclusively in themselves. But these facts 
may be such as not only to be objects of knowledge 
in themselves, but likewise to furnish us with grounds 
of inference to something out of themselves. As 
effects, and effects of a certain character, they may ena- 
ble us to infer the analogous character of their unknown 
causes ; as phenomena, and phenomena of peculiar 
qualities, they may warrant us in drawing many con- 
clusions regarding the distinctive character of that 
unknown substance, of which they are the manifesta- 
tions. Now, the science conversant about all such 
inference of unknown being from its manifestations, is 
called Ontology, or Metaphysics Proper. We might 
call it Inferential Psychology. 

The following is a tabular view of the distribution 
of philosophy as here proposed : — 

!I. Cognitions. 
II. Feelings. 
III. Conations. 
Mind or I /I- Cognitions, of which the sciences 

Consciousness < (B) Laws, of which I are Logic, etc. 

n,„ „„:„..„„ ,-„ w,™„ 1 II. Feelings, of which the science 
i the science is JNomo- J J ' 

affords < is JEsthetic. 

1 logical Psycholo- \ m Cona/ions> of wh i c h the sciences 
gy, embracing I are (1 .) Ethics and (2.) 

\ • Politics. 

(C) Results, of which the science is Inferential 
Psychology. 



FIRST DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 



PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENAL PYSCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER I. 

DEFINITION OF THE SCIENCE AND EXPLANATION OF 
TERMS IN THE DEFINITION. 

Phenomenal Psychology — Psychology, strictly 
so denominated — is the science conversant about the 
'phenomena or modifications or states of the Mind or 
Conscious Subject or Soul or Spirit or Self or Ego. 

In this definition I have purposely accumulated a 
variety of expressions, in order that I might have the 
earliest opportunity of making you accurately ac- 
quainted with their meaning. Before, therefore, 
proceeding further, I shall pause a moment in expla- 
nation of the terms in which this definition is ex- 
pressed. 

The term Psychology itself is a Greek compound, 
its elements being 4'°z^ signifying soul or mind, and 
Myos, signifying discourse or doctrine. Psychology 
is, therefore, the discourse or doctrine treating of the 
human mind. 

The above definition of psychology contains two 
correlative sets of terms, — the one designating the 
phenomena of knowing, willing, feeling, desiring, etc., 

31 



32 AN OUTLINE OF 

in which the mind becomes known ; the other des- 
ignating the mind, considered as the unknown sub- 
stance to which these phenomena belong. Of the 
former class are the words phenomenon, mode, modifi- 
cation, state; and to these may be added the analogous 
terms quality, property, attribute, accident. Of the 
latter class are subject, mind, soul, spirit, self, ego. 

(A) Terms expressing the Manifestations of 
the Mind. 

I. Phenomenon is the Greek word for that which 
appears, and may therefore be translated by appearance. 
There is, however, a distinction to be noticed. (1.) In 
the first place, the employment of a Greek term shows 
that it is used in a strict and philosophical applica- 
tion. (2.) In the second place, the term appearance is 
used to denote not only that which reveals itself to 
our observation, as existent, but also that which only 
seems to be, in contrast to that which truly is. There 
is thus not merely a certain vagueness in the word, 
but it even involves a kind of contradiction to the 
sense in which it is used when employed for phenome- 
non. In consequence of this, the term phenomenon 
has been naturalized in our language as a philosoph- 
ical substitute for the term appearance. The terms 
phenomenon and appearance are employed in reference 
to a substance, as known; the remaining terms, in 
reference to a substance, as existing. 

II. A mode is the manner of the existence of any- 
thing. Take, for example, a piece of wax. The wax 
may be round, or square, or of any other definite fig- 
ure ; it may also be solid or fluid. Its existence in 
any of these modes is not essential ; it may change 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 33 

from one to the other without any substantial altera- 
tion. As the mode cannot exist without a substance, 
we can accord to it only a secondary or precarious 
existence in relation to the substance, to which we ac- 
cord the privilege of existing by itself, per se existere; 
but though the substance be not restricted to any par- 
ticular mode of existence, we must not suppose that 
it can exist, or at least be conceived by us to exist, in 
none. All modes are, therefore, variable states; and 
though some mode is necessary for the existence of a 
thing, any individual mode is accidental. 

III. Modification is properly the bringing a thino- 
into a certain mode of existence ; but it is very com^ 
monly employed for the mode of existence itself. 

IV. State is a term nearly synonymous with mode, 
but of a meaning more extensive, as not exclusively 
limited to the mutable and contingent. 

Y- Quality is, likewise, a word of a wider signifi- 
cation, for there are essential and accidental qualities. 
(1.) The essential qualities of a thing are those apti- 
tudes, those manners of existence and action, which it 
cannot lose without ceasing to be. For example, in man, 
the faculties of sense and intelligence ; in body, the di- 
mensions of length, breadth, and thickness ; in God, 
the attributes of eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, 
etc. (2.) By accidental qualities are meant those apti- 
tudes and manners of existence and action which sub- 
stances have at one time and not at another, or which 
they have always, but may lose without ceasing to be. 
(a) For example, of the transitory class are the 
whiteness of a wall, the health which we enjoy, the 
fineness of the weather, etc. (b) Of the permanent 



34 AN OUTLINE OF 

class are the gravity of bodies, the periodical move- 
ment of the planets, etc. 

VI. Attribute is a word properly convertible with 
quality, for every quality is an attribute, and every 
attribute is a quality ; but in our language, custom 
has introduced a certain distinction in their application. 
Attribute is considered as a word of loftier signifi- 
cance, and is, therefore, conventionally limited to qual- 
ities of a higher application. Thus, for example, it 
would be felt as indecorous to speak of the qualities 
of God, and as ridiculous to talk of the attributes of 
matter. 

VII. Property is correctly a synonym for peculiar 
quality ; but it is frequently used as coextensive with 
quality in general. 

VIII. Accident, on the contrary, is an abbreviated 
expression for accidental or contingent quality. 

(B) Terms expressing the unknown Basis of 
mental Phenomena. 

I. The word mind is of a more limited application 
than the term soul. In the Greek Philosophy the 
term 4>u%yj, soul, comprehends, besides the sensitive 
and rational principle in man, the principle of organic 
life both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms. 

Since Descartes limited psychology to the domain 
of consciousness, the term mind has been rigidly em- 
ployed for the self-knowing principle alone. Mind, 
therefore, is to be understood as the subject of the 
various internal phenomena of which we are con- 
scious. 

II. The term subject (subjectum, ^itdaraatq,' dnoxefaevov) 

is used to denote the unknown basis which lies 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 35 

under the phenomena of which we become aware, 
whether in our external or internal experience. But 
the philosophers of mind have, in a manner, usurped 
and appropriated this expression to themselves. Ac- 
cordingly in their hands the phrases, conscious or 
thinking subject, and subject simply, mean precisely 
the same thing ; and custom has prevailed so far that, 
in psychological discussions, the subject is a term now 
currently employed throughout Europe for the mind 
or thinking principle. The utility of this expression 
is founded on two circumstances. The first is that it 
affords an adjective ; the second, that the terms sub- 
ject and subjective have opposing relatives in the terms 
object and objective, so that the two pairs of words to- 
gether enable us to designate the primary and most 
important analysis and antithesis of philosophy in a 
more precise and emphatic manner than can be done 
by any other technical expressions. Subject, we have 
seen, is a term for that in which the phenomena, re- 
vealed to our observation, inhere, — what the school- 
men have designated the materia in qua. Limited to 
the mental phenomena, subject, therefore, denotes the 
mind itself; and subjective, that which belongs to, or 
proceeds from, the thinking subject. Object, on the 
other hand, is a term for that about which the know- 
ing subject is conversant, — what the schoolmen have 
styled the materia circa quam ; while objective means 
that which belongs to, or proceeds from, the object 
known ; and thus denotes what is real in opposition to 
what is ideal, — what exists in nature in contrast to 
what exists merely in the thought of the individual. 
III. The terms self and ego we shall take together, as 



36 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 

they are absolutely convertible. The self, the I, is 
recognized in every act of intelligence, as the sub- 
ject to which that act belongs. It is I that perceive, 
I that imagine, I that remember, I that attend, I that 
compare, I that feel, I that desire, I that will, I that 
am conscious. The I, indeed, is only manifested in 
one or other of these special modes ; but it is mani- 
fested in them all ; they are all only the phenomena 
of the I, and, therefore, the science conversant about 
the phenomena of mind is, most simply and unam- 
biguously, said to be conversant about the phenom- 
ena of the I or Ego. This expression, as that 
which, in many relations, best marks and discrimi- 
nates the conscious mind, has now become familiar 
in every country, with the exception of our own. 
Why it has not been naturalized with us is not unap- 
parent. In English the I could not be tolerated ; 
because, in sound, it would not be distinguished from 
the word significant of the organ of sight. We 
must, therefore, either renounce the term, or resort 
to the Latin Ego; and this is perhaps no disadvan- 
tage, for, as the word is only employed in a strictly 
philosophical relation, it is better that this should be 
distinctly marked, by its being used in that relation 
alone. The term self is more allowable ; yet still the 
expressions Ego and Non-Ego are felt to be less awk- 
ward than those of Self and Not-Self. (Lectures on 
Metaphysics, VIII. and IX.) 



CHAPTER II. 

CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL. 

In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental 
phenomena, these are all seen to comprise one essen- 
tial element, or to be possible only under one 
necessary condition. This element or condition is 
consciousness, or the knowledge that I, — that the 
Ego exists, in some determinate state. In this 
knowledge they appear or are realized as phenomena, 
and with this knowledge they likewise disappear, or 
have no longer a phenomenal existence ; so that con- 
sciousness may be compared to an internal light, by 
means of which, and which alone, what passes in the 
mind is rendered visible. It follows, therefore, that 
consciousness must form the first object of our con- 
sideration. 

§ 1. consciousness: its general nature. 

Nothing has contributed more to spread obscurity 
over a very transparent matter than the attempts of 
philosophers to define consciousness. Consciousness 
cannot be defined ; we may be ourselves fully aware 
what consciousness is, but we cannot, without confu- 
sion, convey to others a definition of what we our- 
selves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain. 

37 



38 AN OUTLINE OF 

Consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge. 
Consciousness is itself the one highest source of all 
comprehensibility and illustration ; how, then, can 
we find aught else by which consciousness may be 
illustrated or comprehended? To accomplish this, it 
would be necessary to have a second consciousness, 
through which we might be conscious of the mode in 
which the first consciousness was possible. In short, 
the notion of consciousness is so elementary, that it 
cannot possibly be resolved into others more simple. 
It cannot, therefore, be brought under any genus, — 
any more general conception; and, consequently, it 
cannot be defined. But though consciousness cannot 
be logically defined, it may, however, be philosophi- 
cally analyzed. This analysis is effected by observing 
and holding fast the phenomena or facts of conscious- 
ness, comparing these, and, from this comparison, 
evolving the universal conditions under which alone 
an act of consciousness is possible. 

But before proceeding to show you in detail Avhat 
the act of consciousness comprises, it may be proper, 
in the first place, to recall to you, in general, what 
kind of act the word is employed to denote. I 
know, I feel, I desire, etc. What is it that is neces- 
sarily involved in all these ? It requires only to be 
stated to be admitted, that when I know, I must 
know that I know, — when I feel, I must know that 
I feel, — when I desire, I must know that I desire. 
The knowledge, the feeling, the desire, are possible 
only under the condition of being known, and being 
known by me. For if I did not know that I knew, 
I would not know ; if I did not know that I felt, I 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY. 39 

would not feel ; if I did not know that I desired, I 
would not desire. Now, this knowledge, which I, 
the subject, have of these modifications of my being, 
and through which knowledge alone these modifica- 
tions are possible, is what we call consciousness. The 
expressions I know that I knoio; I know that I /eel; 
I know that I desire ; are thus translated by, 
I am conscious that I know ; I am conscious that I 
feel; I am conscious that I desire. Consciousness is 
thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the mind 
or ego of its acts and affections; — in other words, 
the self-affirmation that certain modifications are 
known by me, and that these modifications are mine. 
But, on the other hand, consciousness is not to be 
viewed as anything different from these modifications 
themselves, but is, in fact, the general condition of 
their existence, or of their existence within the 
sphere of intelligence. Though the simplest act of 
mind, consciousness thus expresses a relation subsist- 
ing between two terms. These terms are, on the one 
hand, an I or Self, as the subject of a certain modi- 
fication ; and, on the other hand, some modifi- 
cation, state, quality, affection, or operation belong- 
ing to the subject. Consciousness, thus, in its 
simplicity, necessarily involves three things, — (1.) a 
recognizing or knowing subject; (2.) a recognized or 
known modification ; and (3.) a recognition or knowl- 
edge by the subject of the modification. 

We may, therefore, lay it down as the most general 
characteristic of consciousness, that it is the recogni- 
tion by the thinking subject of its own acts or affec- 
tions. 



40 AN OUTLINE OF 



§ 2. CONSCIOUSNESS .' ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS. 

In this, the most general characteristic of con- 
sciousness, all philosophers are agreed. The more 
arduous task remains of determining its special con- 
ditions. Of these, likewise, some are almost too 
palpable to admit of controversy. 

(A) Before proceeding to those in regard to which 
there is any doubt or difficulty, it will be proper, in 
the first place, to state and to dispose of such deter- 
minations as are too palpable to be called in question. 
Of these admitted limitations, 

I. The first is, that consciousness is an actual and 
not a potential knowledge. Thus a man is said to 
know, that is, is able to know, that 7 -f- 9 are — 16, 
though that equation be not, at the moment, the 
object of thought ; but we cannot say that he is con- 
scious of this truth unless while it is actually present 
to his mind. 

II. The second limitation is, that consciousness is 
an immediate, not a mediate knowledge. We are said, 
for example, to know a past occurrence when we 
represent it to the mind in an act of memory. We 
know the mental representation, and this we do im- 
mediately and in itself, and are also said to know the 
past occurrence, as mediately knowing it through the 
mental modification which represents it. Now, we 
are conscious of the representation as immediately 
known ; but we cannot be said to be conscious of the 
thing represented, which, if known, is only known 
through its representation. 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 41 

III. The third condition of consciousness, which 
may be held as universally admitted, is, that it sup- 
poses a contrast, — a discrimination; for we can be 
conscious only inasmuch as we are conscious of some- 
thing ; and we are conscious of something only inas- 
much as Ave are conscious of .what that something 
is, — that is, distinguish it from what it is not. This 
discrimination is of different kinds and degrees. (1.) 
In the first place, there is the contrast between the 
two grand opposites, self and not-self, — ego and 
non-ego, — mind and matter. We are conscious 
of self only in and by its contradistinction from 
not-self; and are conscious of not-self only in 
and by its contradistinction from self. (2.) In 
the second place, there is the discrimination of 
the states or modifications of the internal subject 
or self from each other. We are conscious of one 
mental state only ns we contradistinguish it from 
another ; where two, three, or more such states are 
confounded, we are conscious of them as one ; and 
were we to note no difference in our mental modifica- 
tions, we might be said to be absolutely unconscious. 
(3.) In the third place, there is the distinction 
between the parts and qualities of the outer world. 
We are conscious of an external object only as we 
are conscious of it as distinct from others ; where 
several distinguishable objects are confounded, we 
are conscious of them as one ; where no object is dis- 
criminated, we are not conscious of any. 1 

IV. The fourth condition of consciousness, which 

1 See this subject treated more fully under Phenomenology of the 
Cognitions, Chap. V., § 1. 



42 AN OUTLINE OF 

may be assumed as very generally acknowledged, is, 
that it involves judgment. 1 A judgment is the men- 
tal act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of 
another. This fourth condition is in truth only a 
necessary consequence of the third, — for it is im- 
possible to discriminate without judging, discrimi- 
nation or contradistinction being, in fact, only the 
denying one thing of another. 

V. The fifth undeniable condition of consciousness 
is memory. This condition also is a corollary of the 
third. For without memory our mental states could 
not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each 
other, and referred to self. Without memory, each 
indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental 
succession would stand isolated from each other, — 
would constitute, in fact, a separate existence. The 
notion of the ego, or self, arises from the recognized 
permanence and identity of the thinking subject in 
contrast to the recognized succession and variety of 
its modifications. But this recognition is possible only 
through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, 
the result of memory. But the notion of self is in- 
volved in consciousness, so consequently is memory. 
(Led. on Metaph., XL Compare Reid's Works, pp. 
932-7.) 

(.B) We are now about to enter on a more disputed 
territory. Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, and philoso- 
phers in general, have regarded consciousness, not as 
a particular faculty, but as the universal condition of 
intelligence. Reid, on the contrary, following, prob- 
ably, Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, Royer- 

1 See note on preceding page. 



sm william Hamilton's philosophy. 43 

Collard, and others, has classed consciousness as a co- 
ordinate faculty with the other intellectual powers ; 
distinguished from them, not as the species from the 
individual, bitt as the individual from the individual. 
And as the particular faculties have each their peculiar 
object, so the peculiar object of consciousness is the 
operations of the other faculties themselves, to the ex- 
clusion of the objects about which these operations are 
conversant. 

This analysis we regard as false. 1 For it is impos- 
sible, in the first place, to discriminate consciousness 
from all the other cognitive faculties, or to discrimi- 
nate any one of these from consciousness ; and, in the 
second, to conceive a faculty cognizant of the various 
mental operations, without being also cognizant of 
their several objects. 

I. We know, and We know that we know: — these 
propositions, logically distinct, are really identical ; 
each implies the other. We know (i. e., feel, per- 
ceive, imagine, remember, etc.) only as we know that 
we thus know ; and we know that we know, only as we 
know in some particular manner (i. e. , feel, perceive, 
etc.). So true is the scholastic brocard : " Non senti- 
mus nisi sentiamus nos sentire; non sentimus nos sen- 
tire nisi sentiamus." The attempt to analyze the 

1 This is described by Hamilton as " the first contested position," 
which he intends to maintain, with regard to consciousness (Led. on 
Metaph., p. 143, Am. ed.); but it leads him into a long digression 
(Ibid., pp. 1*3-182), at the close of which there is no mention of any 
other contested positions. Did this digression cause him to forget 
his apparent intention to continue the subject from which he started? 
His editors give no indication that they have observed this 
omission. — J. C. M. 



44 AN OUTLINE OF 

cognition I know, and the cognition / know that I 
know, into the separate energies of distinct faculties, 
is therefore vain. But this is the analysis of Reid. 
Consciousness, which the formula I know that I know 
adequately expresses, he views as a power specifically 
distinct from the various cognitive faculties compre- 
hended under the formula / know, precisely as these 
faculties are severally contradistinguished from each 
other. But here the parallel does not hold. I can 
feel without perceiving ; I can perceive without imag- 
ining ; I can imagine without remembering ; I can 
remember without judging (in the emphatic significa- 
tion) ; I can judge without willing. One of these acts 
does not immediately suppose the other. Though 
modes merely of the same indivisible subject, they are 
modes in relation to each other, really distinct, and ad- 
mit, therefore, of psychological discrimination. But 
can I feel without being conscious that I feel ? — can 
I remember without being conscious that I remember ? 
or, can I be conscious without being conscious that I 
perceive, or imagine, or reason, — that I energize, in 
short, in some determinate mode, which Eeid would 
view as the act of a faculty specifically different from 
consciousness ? That this is impossible Reid himself 
admits. But if, on the one hand, consciousness be 
only realized under specific modes, and cannot there- 
fore exist apart from the several faculties in cumulo; 
and if, on the other, these faculties can all and each 
only be exerted under the condition of consciousness ; 
consciousness, consequently, is not one of the special 
modes into which our mental activity may be resolved, 
but the fundamental form, — the generic condition of 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 45 

them all. Every intelligent act is thus a modified 
consciousness ; and consciousness a comprehensive 
term for the complement of our cognitive energies. 

II. But the vice of Reid's analysis is further mani- 
fested in his arbitrary limitation of the sphere of con- 
sciousness ; proposing to it the various intellectual 
operations, but excluding their objects. "I am con- 
scious," he says, "of perception, but not of the object 
I perceive ; I am conscious of memory, but not of the 
object I remember." 

The reduction of consciousness to a particular fac- 
ulty entailed this limitation.-. For, once admitting 
consciousness to be cognizant of objects as of operations, 
Reid could not, without absurdity, degrade it to the 
level of a special power. For thus, in the^rs^ place, 
consciousness, coextensive with all our cognitive fac- 
ulties, would yet be made co-ordinate with each; and 
in the second, two faculties would be supposed to be 
simultaneously exercised about the same object, to 
the same extent. 

But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at 
least, equally untenable. The assertion that we can 
be conscious of an act of knowledge without being 
conscious of its object, is virtually suicidal. A men- 
tal operation is only what it is by relation to its ob- 
ject; the object at once determining its existence, and 
specifying the character of its existence. But if a 
relation cannot be comprehended in one of its terms, 
so we cannot be conscious of an operation without 
being conscious of the object to which it exists only 
as correlative. For example, We are conscious of a 
perception, says Reid, but are not conscious of its 



46 AN OUTLINE OF 

object. Yet how can we be conscious of a perception, 
that is, how can we know that a perception exists, — 
that it is a perception, and not another mental state, 
— and that it is the perception of a rose, and of noth- 
ing but a rose ; unless this consciousness involve a 
knowledge (or consciousness) of the object which at 
once determines the existence of an act, specifies 
its kind, and distinguishes its individuality? An- 
nihilate the object, you annihilate the operation ; an- 
nihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate 
the consciousness of the operation. In the greater 
number indeed of our cognitive energies, the two 
terms of the relation of knowledge exist only as iden- 
tical ; the object admitting only of a logical discrimi- 
nation from the subject. I imagine a Hippogryph. 
The Hippogryph is at once the object of the act and 
the act itself. Abstract the one, the other has no ex- 
istence ; deny me the consciousness of the Hippo- 
gryph, you deny me the consciousness of the imagina- 
tion ; I am conscious of zero ; I am not conscious at 
all. (Discussions, pp. 47-49. Compare Led. on 
Metaph., XII.) 

§ 3. CONSCIOUSNESS : ITS EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITY. 

I now proceed to consider consciousness as the 
source from whence we must derive every fact in the 
Philosophy of Mind. And in prosecution of this 
purpose I shall, in the first place, endeavor to show 
you that it really is the principal, if not the only, 
source from which all knowledge of the mental 
phenomena must be obtained ; and, in the second 



SIB WILLIAM HAMILTON* 'S PHILOSOPHY. 47 

place, I shall consider the character of its evidence, 
and what, under different relations, are the degrees 
of its authority. 

(A) As consciousness has been shown to be the 
condition of all the mental phenomena, it is mainly, 
if not solely, to consciousness, that we must resort 
for an acquaintance with these phenomena. Accord- 
ing to the doctrine of phrenology, indeed, an ac- 
quaintance with the various mental powers may be 
obtained by observation of the various parts of the 
brain, which that science maintains that it has dis- 
covered to be their several organs. But though the 
mind, in its lower energies and affections, is imme- 
diately dependent on the conditions of the nervous 
system, and, in general, .the development of the 
brain in different species of animals is correspondent 
to their intelligence, still it is impossible to connect 
the mind or its faculties with particular parts of the 
nervous system. For I have proved, by the most 
extensive induction, that the alleged physiological 
facts on which phrenology professes to be based, 
such as its assertion of the correspondence between 
the development of the cerebellum and the function 
which it ascribes to it, are often not only unfounded, 
but the very reverse of the truth. 1 

1 In the above paragraph I have endeavored to embody the teach- 
ing of Sir William Hamilton on the subject of which it treats. His 
editors have relegated this portion of his lectures, so far as it seemed 
worthy of preservation, to an appendix (Led. on Metaph., Appendix 
II.), where it may be consulted. I have thought it unnecessary to go 
into detail, both because the position of phrenology has changed 
since Hamilton's time, and because it is unnecessary to digress into 
the question concerning the function of the various organs in the 



48 AN OUTLINE OF 

(B) We proceed to consider, in the next place, 
the authority, the certainty, of this instrument. 

Now, it is at once evident, that philosophy, as it 
affirms its own possibility, must affirm the veracity of 
consciousness ; for, as philosophy is only a scientific 
development of the facts which consciousness reveals , 
it follows, that philosophy, in denying or doubting 
the testimony of consciousness, would deny or doubt 
its own existence. (Lect. on Metaph.,lLV.) How, 
then, do the facts of consciousness certify us of their 
own veracity? To this the only possible answer is, 
that as elements of our mental constitution, as 
the essential conditions of our knowledge, they 
must by us be accepted as true. To suppose their 
falsehood, is to suppose thai we are created capable 
of intelligence, in order to be made the victims of 
delusion ; that God is a deceiver, and the root of our 
nature a lie. But such a supposition, if gratuitous, 
is manifestly illegitimate. For, on the contrary, the 
data of our original consciousness must, it is evident, 
in the first instance, be presumed true. It is only if 
proved false, that their authority can, in consequence 
of that proof, be, in the second instance, disal- 
lowed. 

Here, however, at the outset, it is proper to take a 
distinction, the neglect of which has been produc- 
tive of considerable error and confusion. It is the 
distinction between the data or deliverances of con- 
sciousness considered simply in themselves, as appre- 



encephalon, in order to vindicate, not only the value, but the neces- 
sity, of reflection in the study of mind. — J. C. M. 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 49 

hended facts or actual manifestations, and those 
deliverances considered as testimonies to the truth of 
facts beyond their own phenomenal reality. 

I. Viewed under the former limitation, they are 
above all scepticism. For as doubt is itself only a 
manifestation of consciousness, it is impossible to 
doubt that, when consciousness manifests, it does 
manifest, without, in thus doubting, doubting that 
we actually doubt; that is, without the doubt con- 
tradicting and therefore annihilating itself. Hence 
it is that the facts of consciousness, as mere phenom- 
ena, are by the unanimous confession of all sceptics 
and idealists, ancient and modern, placed high above 
the reach of question. 

II. Viewed under the latter limitation, the deliver- 
ances of consciousness do not thus peremptorily 
repel even the possibility of doubt. I am conscious, 
for example, in an act of sensible perception, (1.) of 
myself, the subject knowing; and, (2.) of something 
given as different from myself, the object known. To 
take the second term of this relation : that I am 
conscious in this act of an object given, as a non-ego, 
— that is, as not a modification of my mind, — of 
this, as a phenomenon, doubt is impossible. For, as 
has been seen, we cannot doubt the actuality of a fact 
of consciousness without doubting, that is subverting, 
our doubt itself. To this extent, therefore, all scep- 
ticism is precluded. But though it cannot but be 
admitted that the object of which we are conscious in 
this cognition is given, not as a mode of -self, but 
as a mode of something different from self, it is, how- 
ever, possible for us to suppose, without our supposi- 

4 



50 AN OUTLINE OF 

tion, at least, being felo-de-se, that, though given as 
a non-ego, this object may, in reality, he only a repre- 
sentation of a non-ego, in and by the ego. Let this, 
therefore, be maintained ; let the fact of the testimony 
be admitted, but the truth of the testimony, to aught 
beyond its own ideal existence, be doubted or denied. 
How in this case are we to proceed ? It is evident 
that the doubt does not in this, as in the former case, 
refute itself. It is not suicidal by self-contradiction. 
The Idealist, therefore, in denying the existence of 
an external world, as more than a subjective phenom- 
enon of the internal, does not advance a doctrine ab 
initio null, as a scepticism would be which denied the 
phenomena of the internal world itself. 

It is, therefore, manifest that we may throw wholly 
out of account the phenomena of consciousness, con- 
sidered merely in themselves ; seeing that scepticism 
in regard to them, under this limitation, is confess- 
edly impossible ; and that it is only requisite to vin- 
dicate the truth of these phenomena, viewed as 
attestations of more than their own existence, seeing 
that they are not, in this respect, placed beyond the 
possibility of doubt. 

When, for example, consciousness assures us that, 
in perception, we are immediately cognizant of an ex- 
ternal and extended non-ego ; or that, in remembrance, 
through the imagination, of which we are immediately 
cognizant, we obtain a mediate knowledge of a real 
past ; how shall we repel the doubt, — in the former 
case, that what is given as the extended reality itself is 
not merely a representation of matter by mind ; in the 
latter, that what is given as a mediate knowledge of 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 51 

the past, is not a mere phantasm, containing an illu- 
sive reference to an unreal past? We can do this 
only in one way. The legitimacy of such gratuitous 
doubt necessarily supposes that the deliverance of 
consciousness is not to be presumed true. If, there- 
fore, it can be shown, on the one hand, that the de- 
liverances of consciousness must philosophically be 
accepted, until their certain or probable falsehood has 
been positively evinced ; and if, on the other hand, 
it cannot be shown that any attempt to discredit the 
veracity of consciousness has ever yet succeeded ; it 
follows that, as philosophy now stands, the testimony 
of consciousness must be viewed as high above sus- 
picion, and its declarations entitled to demand prompt 
and unconditional assent. 

I. In the first place, as has been said, it cannot but 
be acknowledged that the veracity of consciousness 
must, at least iu the first instance, be conceded. 
" Neganti incumbit probatio." Nature is not gratui- 
tously to be assumed to work, not only in vain, but 
in counteraction of herself ; our faculty of knowledge 
is not without a ground to be supposed an instrument 
of illusion ; man, unless the melancholy fact be proved, 
is not to be held organized for the attainment, and 
actuated by the love of truth, only to become the 
dupe and victim of a perfidious creator. 

II. But, in the second place, though the veracity 
of the primary convictions of consciousness must, in 
the outset, be admitted, it still remains competent to 
lead a proof that they are undeserving of credit. But 
how is this to be done ? As the ultimate grounds of 
knowledge, these convictions cannot be redargued 



52 " AN OUTLINE OF 

from any higher knowledge ; and as original beliefs, 
they are paramount in certainty to every derivative 
assurance. But they are many ; they are, in author- 
ity, co-ordinate ; and their testimony is clear and 
precise. It is therefore competent for us to view them 
in correlation; to compare their declarations, and to 
consider whether they contradict,- and, by contradict- 
ing, invalidate each other. This mutual contradiction 
is possible in two ways. (1.) It may be that the 
primary data themselves are directly or immediately 
contradictory of each other ; (2.) It may be that they 
are mediately or indirectly contradictory, inasmuch 
as the consequences to which they necessarily lead, and 
for the truth or falsehood of which they are therefore 
responsible, are mutually repugnant. By evincing 
either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be 
disproved ; for in either case consciousness is shown 
to be inconsistent with itself, and consequently incon- 
sistent with the unity of truth. But by no other 
process of demonstration is this possible. (Meid's 
Works, pp. 743-5.) 

Before we are entitled to accuse consciousness of 
being a false witness, we are bound, first of all, to see 
whether there be any rules by which, in employing 
the testimony of consciousness, we must be governed ; 
and whether philosophers have evolved their systems 
out of consciousness in obedience to these rules. For 
if there be rules under which alone the evidence of 
consciousness can be fairly and fully given, and, 
consequently, under which alone consciousness can 
serve as an infallible standard of certainty and truth, 
and if philosophers have despised or neglected these, 



sir jvilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 53 

then must we remove the reproach from the instru- 
ment, and affix it to those blundering workmen who 
have not known how to handle and apply it. Now, 
in attempting a scientific deduction of the philosophy 
of mind from the facts of consciousness, there are, in 
all, if I generalize correctly, three laws which afford 
the exclusive conditions of psychological legitimacy. 

I. The Law of Parcimony : That we admit nothing 
which is not either an original datum of consciousness 
or the legitimate consequence of such a datum. 

II. The Law of Integrity: That we embrace all 
the original data of consciousness and all their legiti- 
mate consequences. 

III. The Law of Harmony : That we exhibit each 
of these in its individual integrity, neither distorted 
nor mutilated, and in its relative placje, whether of 
pre-eminence or subordination. (Lect. on Metaph., 
XV., and ReicVs Works, p. 747.) 

§ 4. consciousness : CLASSIFICATION of its phe- 
nomena. 

On taking a survey of the mental modifications or 
phenomena of which we are conscious, these are seen 
to divide themselves into three great classes. (1.) In 
the first place, there are the phenomena of Knowledge ; 
(2.) In the second place, there are the phenomena of 
Feeling, or the phenomena of pleasure and pain ; and 
(3.) In the third place, there are the phenomena of 
Conation, or of will and desire. Let me illustrate 
this by an example. I see a picture. Now, first of 
all, I am conscious of perceiving a certain com- 



54 AN OUTLINE OF 

plement of colors and figures ; I recognize what the ob- 
ject is. This is the phenomenon of Cognition or Knowl- 
edge. But this is not the only phenomenon of which 
I may be here conscious. I may experience certain 
affections in the contemplation of this object. If the 
picture be a masterpiece, the gratification will be un- 
alloyed ; but if it be an unequal production, I shall 
be conscious, perhaps of enjoyment, but of enjoyment 
alloyed with dissatisfaction. This is the phenomenon 
of Feeling, or of Pleasure and Pain. But these two 
phenomena do not yet exhaust all of which I may be 
conscious on the occasion. I may desire to see the 
picture long, — to see it often, — to make it my own, 
and, perhaps, I may will, resolve, or determine so 
to do. This is the complex phenomenon of Will and 
Desire. The characters by which these three classes 
are reciprocally discriminated, are the following : — 

I. In the phenomena of cognition, consciousness 
distinguishes an object known from the subject know- 
ing. This object may be of two kinds : it may either 
be the quality of something different from the ego ; or 
it may be a modification of the ego or subject itself. 
In the former case, the object, which may be called 
for the sake of discrimination the object-object, is given 
as something different from the percipient subject. 
In the latter case, the object, which may be called the 
subject-object, is given as really identical with the 
conscious ego ; but still consciousness distinguishes 
it, as an accident, from the ego. As the subject 
of that accident, it projects, as it were, this subjective 
phenomenon from itself, — views it at a distance, 
— in a word, objectifies it. This discrimination of 



sir wizliam Hamilton's philosophy. 55 

self from self — this objectification — is the quality 
which constitutes the essential peculiarity of cog- 
nition. 

II. In the phenomena of feeling, on the contrary, 
consciousness does not place the mental modification 
or state beyond itself; it does not contemplate it 
apart, — as separate from itself, — but is, as it were, 
fused into one. The peculiarity of feeling, there- 
fore, is that there is nothing but what is subjectively 
subjective ; there is no object different from self, — 
no objectification of any mode of self. We are, 
indeed, able to constitute our states of pain and 
pleasure into objects of reflection ; but in so far as 
they are objects of reflection, they are not feelings, 
but only reflex cognitions of feelings. 

III. In the phenomena of conation, there is, as in 
those of cognition, an object, and this object is also 
an object of knowledge. Will and desire are only 
possible through knowledge, — " Ignoti nulla cupido." 
But though both cooniition and conation bear relation 
to an object, they are discriminated by the difference 
of this relation itself. In cognition, there exists no 
want ; and the object, whether objective or subject- 
ive, is not sought for, nor avoided ; whereas in cona- 
tion there is a want, and a tendency supposed, which 
results in an endeavor, either to obtain the object, 
when the cognitive faculties represent it as fitted to 
afford the fruition of the want ; or to ward off the 
object, if these faculties represent it as calculated to 
frustrate the tendency of its accomplishment. (Led. 
on Metaph., XLII.) 



56 AN OUTLINE OF 

To the above classification of the mental phenom- 
ena objections have been taken. 

I. It has been objected, that the three classes are 
co-ordinate. It is evident that every mental phenom- 
enon is either an act of knowledge, or only possible 
through an act of knowledge, for consciousness is a 
knowledge, and, on this principle, many philoso- 
phers, as Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Wolf, Plat- 
ner, and others, have been led to regard the 
faculty of cognition as the fundamental power of 
mind, from which all others are derivative. To this 
the answer is easy. These philosophers did not 
observe that, although pleasure and pain, although 
desire and volition, are only as they are known to be ; 
yet, in these modifications, a quality, a phenomenon 
of mind, absolutely new, has been superadded, which 
was never involved in, and could, therefore, never 
have been evolved out of, the mere faculty of knowl- 
edge. The faculty of knowledge is certainly the first 
in order, inasmuch as it is the conditio sine qua non 
of the others ; and we are able to conceive a being 
possessed of the power of recognizing existence, and 
yet wholly void of all feeling of pain and pleasure, 
and of all powers of desire and volition. On the 
other hand, we are wholly unable to conceive a being 
possessed of feeling and desire, and, at the same 
time, without a knowledge of any object upon which 
his affections may be employed, and without a con- 
sciousness of these affections themselves. 

We can farther conceive a being possessed of 
knowledge and feeling alone, — a being endowed with 
a power of recognizing objects, of enjoying the exer- 



sir jvilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 57 

cise, and of grieving at the restraint of his activity, 
— and yet devoid of voluntary agency — of that 
conation which is possessed by man. To such a 
being would belong feelings of pain and pleasure, 
but neither desire nor will, properly so called. On 
the other hand, however, we cannot possibly conceive 
the existence of a voluntary activity independently 
of all feeling ; for voluntary conation is a faculty 
which can only be determined to energy through a 
pain or pleasure, — through an estimate of the rela- 
tive worth of objects. 

In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and cona- 
tions, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these 
phenomena are possible independently of each other. 
In our philosophical systems, they may stand sepa- 
rated from each other in books and chapters ; in 
nature, they are ever interwoven. In every, the 
simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, 
and desire or will, go to constitute the mental state ; 
and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are 
able to analyze the state into elements, which are 
never really existent but in mutual combination. 
These elements are found, indeed, in very various pro- 
portions in different states ; sometimes one prepon- 
derates, sometimes another ; but there is no state in 
which they are not all coexistent. (Led. on Metap7i., 
XI.) 

II. A second objection is urged by Krug, a distin- 
guished champion of the Kantian system, who goes 
so far as to maintain, not only that what have ob- 
tained the name of feelings constitute no distincf class 
of mental functions, but that the very supposition is 



58 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 

absurd, and even impossible. The power of cogni- 
tion and the power of conation, he holds, are in pro- 
priety to be regarded as two different fundamental 
powers, only because the operation of our mind ex- 
hibits a twofold direction of its whole activity, — one 
inwards, another outwards ; in consequence of which 
we are constrained to distinguish, on the one hand, 
an immanent ideal or theoretical, and, on the other, 
a transeunt real or practical, activity. Hence it is 
argued that, if we interpolate a third species of ac- 
tivity, its direction must be either immanent or 
transeunt, or both, or neither ^of these ; but on the 
first three suppositions there are still only two kinds 
of mental activity, and on the fourth there is merely 
an additional activity, in no direction, which is no 
activity at all. In answer to this it may be said, (1.) 
That, in place of two forms of mental activity, we may 
competently suppose three, ineunt, immanent, and 
transeunt. (2.) That directions are properly ascribed 
only to the movements of external things. (Abridged 
from Lecture XLI. of the Led. on Metaph.) 

The order of these phenomena is determined by 
their relative consecution. Feeling and appetency 
suppose knowledge. The cognitive faculties, there- 
fore, stand first. But as will, and desire, and aver- 
sion suppose a knowledge of the pleasurable and 
painful, the feelings will stand second as intermediate 
between the other two. (Led. on Metaph., XL) 
The phenomena of knowledge come, therefore, first 
under consideration, and philosophy is principally 
and primarily the Science of Knowledge. (Reid's 
Works, p. 808, note.) 



FIRST PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF TEE COGNITIONS. 



FIRST PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 



INTRODUCTION. 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES. 

I now proceed to the particular investigation of the 
first class of the mental phenomena, and shall com- 
mence by delineating to you the distribution of the 
cognitive faculties which I shall adopt, — a distribution 
different from any other with which I am acquainted. 
But I would first premise an observation in regard to 
psychological powers. 

As to mental powers, you are not to suppose them 
entities really distinguishable from the thinking prin- 
ciple, or really different from each other. Mental 
powers are not like bodily organs. It is the same 
simple substance which exerts every energy of every 
faculty, however various, and which is affected in 
every mode of every capacity, however opposite. 

It is a fact, too notorious to be denied, that the mind 
is capable of different modifications ; that is, can exert 
different actions, and can be affected by different pas- 
sions. But these actions and passions are not all dis- 

61 



62 AN OUTLINE OF 

similar ; every action and passion is not different from 
every other. On the contrary, they are like, and they 
are unlike. Those, therefore, that are like, we group 
or assort together in thought, and bestow on them a 
common name ; nor are these groups or assortments 
manifold, — they are, in fact, few and simple. Again, 
every action is an effect ; every action and passion a 
modification. But every effect supposes a cause ; 
every modification supposes a subject. When we say 
that the mind exerts an energy, we virtually say that 
the mind is the cause of the energy ; when we say 
that the mind acts or suffers, we say, in other words, 
that the mind is the subject of a modification. But 
the modifications, that is, the actions and passions, of 
the mind, as we stated, all fall into a few resembling 
groups, which we designate by a peculiar name ; and 
as the mind is the common cause and subject of all 
these, we are surely entitled to say, in general, that the 
mind has the faculty of exerting such and such a class 
of energies, or has the capacity of being modified 
by such and such an order of affections. On this doc- 
trine, a faculty is nothing more than a general term 
for the causality the mind has of originating a certain 
class of energies ; a capacity, only a general term for 
the susceptibility the mind has of being affected by a 
particular class of emotions. 

From what I have now said, you will be better pre- 
pared for what I am about to state in regard to the 
classification of the first great order of mental phe- 
nomena, and the distribution of the faculties of knowl- 
edge founded thereon. I formerly told you that the 
mental phenomena are never presented to us sepa- 



sm William Hamilton's philosophy. 63 

rately ; they are always in conjunction, and it is only 
by an ideal analysis and abstraction that, for the pur- 
poses of science, they can be discriminated and con- 
sidered apart. The problem, proposed in such an 
analysis, is to find the primary threads which, in their 
composition, form the complex tissue of thought. In 
what ought to be accomplished by such an analysis, 
all philosophers are agreed, however different may 
have been the result of their attempts. I shall not 
state and criticise the various classifications pro- 
pounded of the cognitive faculties. I shall only de- 
lineate the distribution of the faculties of knowledge 
which I have adopted, and endeavor to afford you 
some general insight into its principles. 

I again repeat that consciousness constitutes, or is 
coextensive with, all our faculties of knowledge, — 
these faculties being only special modifications under 
which consciousness is manifested. It being, there- 
fore, understood that consciousness is not a special 
faculty of knowledge, but the general faculty out of 
which the special faculties of knowledge are evolved, 
I proceed to this evolution. 

I. In the first place, as we are endowed with a fac- 
ulty of Cognition, or Consciousness in general, and 
since it cannot be maintained that we have always 
possessed the knowledge which we now possess, it 
will be admitted that we must have a faculty of ac- 
quiring knowledge. But this acquisition of knowl- 
edge can only be accomplished by the immediate 
presentation of a new object to consciousness ; in other 
words, by the reception of a new object within the 
sphere of our cognition. We have thus a faculty 



64 AN OUTLINE OF 

which may be called the Acquisitive, or the Presenta- 
tive, or the Receptive. 

Now, new or adventitious knowledge may be either 
of things external or of things internal. If the ob- 
ject of knowledge be external, the faculty receptive 
or presentative of the qualities of such object will be 
a consciousness of the non-ego. This has obtained 
the name of External Perception, or of Perception sim- 
ply. If, on the other hand, the object be internal, 
the faculty receptive or presentative of the qualities 
of such subject-object, will be a consciousness of the 
ego. This faculty obtains the name of Internal or 
Reflex Perception, or of Self -consciousness. By the 
foreign psychologists this faculty is termed also the 
Internal Sense. 

II. In the second place, inasmuch as we are capa- 
ble of knowledge, we must be endowed not only with 
a faculty of acquiring, but with a faculty of retaining 
or conserving it when acquired. We have thus, as a 
second necessary faculty, one that may be called the 
Conservative or Retentive. This is Memory, strictly 
so denominated. 

III. But, in the third place, if we are capable of 
knowledge, it is not enough that we possess a faculty 
of acquiring, and a faculty of retaining it in the mind, 
but out of consciousness ; we must further be endowed 
with a faculty of recalling it out of unconsciousness 
into consciousness ; in short, a reproductive power. 
This Reproductive faculty is governed by the laws 
which regulate the succession of our thoughts, — the 
laws, as they are called, of Mental Association. If 
these laws are allowed to operate without the inter- 



sip william Hamilton's philosophy. 65 

veution of the will, this faculty maybe called Sugges- 
tion, or Spontaneous Suggestion; — whereas, if applied 
under the influence of the will, it will properly obtain 
the name of Reminiscence, or Recollection. By repro- 
duction, it should be observed, that I strictly mean 
the process of recovering the absent thought from un- 
consciousness, and not its representation in conscious- 
ness. 

IV. In the fourth place, as capable of knowledge, 
we must not only be endowed with a presentative, a 
conservative, and a reproductive faculty ; there is re- 
quired for their consummation a faculty of represent- 
ing in consciousness, and of keeping before the mind 
the knowledge presented, retained, and reproduced. 
We have thus a Representative faculty ; and this ob- 
tains the name of Imagination or Phantasy. 

V. In the fifth place, all the faculties we have con- 
sidered are only subsidiary. They acquire, preserve, 
call out, and hold up, the materials, for the use of a 
higher faculty which operates upon these materials, 
and which we may call the Elaborative or Discursive 
faculty. This faculty has only one operation, — it only 
compares. It may startle you to hear that the high- 
est function of mind is nothing higher than compari- 
son ; but, in the end, I am confident of convincing 
you of the paradox. 

VI. But, in the sixth and last place, the mind is not 
altogether indebted to experience for the whole appa- 
ratus of its knowledge. What we know by experi- 
ence, without experience we should not have known ; 
and as all our experience is contingent, all the knowl- 
edge derived from experience is contingent also. But 



66 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'' 8 PHILOSOPHY. 

there are cognitions in the mind which are not con- 
tingent, — which are necessary, — which we cannot 
but think, — which thought supposes as its fundamen- 
tal condition. These cognitions, therefore, are not 
mere generalizations from experience. But if not de- 
rived from experience, they must be native to the 
mind. These native cognitions are the laws by which 
the mind is governed in its operations, and which af- 
ford the conditions of its capacity of knowledge. 
These necessary laws, or primary conditions of intel- 
ligence, are phenomena of a similar character; and 
we must, therefore, generalize or collect them into a 
class ; and on the power possessed by the mind of 
manifesting these phenomena we may bestow the 
name of the Regulative faculty. (Lect. on Metwph., 
XX.) 

The following is a tabular view of the distribution 
of the Special Faculties of Knowledge. 

C 1. External — Perception. 
I. Presentative < 

C 2. Internal — Self-Consciousness. 
II. Conservative — Memory. 

C 1. Without will — Suggestion. 
[SJ J III. Reproductive < 

c 2. With will — Reminiscence. 



t> 



IV. Representative — Imagination or Phantasy. 
V. Elaborative — Comparison, or the Faculty of Relations. 
VI. Regulative — Reason or Common Sense. 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE PRESENTATIVE FACULTY. 

This faculty is subdivided into External Perception 
and Internal Perception, or Self-cousciousuess. I 
commence with the former of these. 

§ 1. EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 

External or Sensitive Perception, or Perception sim- 
ply, 1 is that act of consciousness whereby we appre- 
hend in our body, (1.) certain special affections, 
whereof, as an animated organism, it is contingently 
susceptible ; and (2.) those general relations of exten- 
sion, under which, as a material organism, it necessa- 
rily exists. Of these perceptions the former is sen- 
sation proper ; the latter, 'perception proper, (field's 
Works, pp. 876-7.) This distinction it is necessary 
to explain, as well as a correlative distinction in the 
qualities of matter ; and we shall thus be the better 

'For a sketch of the various meanings of the word Perception, see 
Reid's Works, p. 876, note. — J. C. M. 

07 



68 AN OUTLINE OF 

prepared for understanding the true theory of percep- 
tion. 

(A) Sensation and Perception. Before pro- 
ceeding to state the great law which regulates the 
mutual relation of these phenomena, it is proper to 
say a few words illustrative of the nature of the phe- 
nomena themselves. Perception is a special kind of 
knowledge ; sensation a special kind of feeling ; and 
Knowledge and Feeling, it will be remembered, are two 
out of the three great classes, into which we divided 
the phenomena of mind. Now, as Perception is only a 
special mode of Knowledge, and Sensation only a spe- 
cial mode of Feeling, so the contrast of Perception and 
Sensation is only the special manifestation of a con- 
trast, which universally divides the generic phenom- 
ena themselves. It ought, therefore, in the first 
place, to have been noticed, that the generic phenom- 
ena of Knowledge and Feeling are always found 
coexistent, and yet always distinct ; and the oppo- 
sition of Perception and Sensation should have been 
stated as an obtrusive, but still only a particular, ex- 
ample of the general law. But not only is the dis- 
tinction of Perception and Sensation not generalized 
by our psychologists ; it is not concisely and precisely 
stated. A Cognition is objective, that is, our con- 
sciousness is then relative to something different from 
the present state of the mind itself; a Feeling, on the 
contrary, is subjective, that is, our consciousness is 
exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experi- 
enced by the thinking subject. Cognition and feeling 
are always coexistent. The purest act of knowledge 
is always colored by some feeling of pleasure or pain ; 



SIR 1PTLLIAM HAMILTON 3 S PHILOSOPHY. 69 

for no energy is absolutely indifferent, and the gross- 
est feeling exists only as it is known in consciousness. 
This being the case of cognition and feeling in general, 
the same is true of perception and sensation in par- 
ticular. Perception proper is the consciousness, 
through the senses, of the qualities of an object 
known as different from self; Sensation proper is the 
consciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure 
or pain, which accompanies that act of knowledge. 
Perception is thus the objective element in the com- 
plex state, — the element of Cognition; Sensation is 
the subjective element, — the element of Feeling. 

The most remarkable defect, however, in the pres- 
ent doctrine upon this point, is the ignorance of our 
psychologists in regard to the law by which the phe- 
nomena of cognition and feeling, — of perception and 
sensation, — are governed, in their reciprocal relation. 
This law is simple and universal ; and, once enounced, 
its proof is found in every mental manifestation. It 
is this : Knowledge and Feeling, — Perception and 
Sensation, — though always coexistent, are always in 
the inverse ratio of each other. That these two ele- 
ments are always found in coexistence, as it is an old 
and a notorious truth, it is not requisite for me to 
prove. But that these elements are always found to 
coexist in an inverse proportion, — in support of this 
universal fact, it will be requisite to adduce proof 
and illustration. 

In doing this I shall, however, confine myself to 
the relation of Perception and Sensation. 

I. The first proof I shall take from a comparison 
of the several senses; and it will be found that, pre- 



70 AN OUTLINE OF 

cisely as a sense has more of the one element, it has 
less of the other. Laying Touch aside for the moment, 
as this requires a special explanation, the other four 
senses divide themselves into two classes, according 
as Perception or Sensation predominates. The two 
in which the former element prevails, are Sight and 
Hearing ; the two in which the latter, are Taste and 
Smell. 

1. Taking the first two, it will be at once admitted 
that 

(a) /Sight at the same instant presents to us a greater 
number and a greater variety of objects and qualities 
than any other of the senses. In this sense, therefore, 
Perception is at its maximum. But Sensation is here at 
its minimum ; for in the eye we experience less organic 
pleasure or pain from the impressions of its appro- 
priate objects (colors), than we do in any other 
sense. 

(b) Next to Sight, Hearing affords us, in the 
shortest interval, the greatest variety and multitude 
of cognitions ; and as sight divides space almost to 
infinity, through color, so hearing does the same to 
time, through sound. Hearing is, however, much 
less extensive in its sphere of Knowledge or Percep- 
tion than sight ; but in the same proportion is its 
capacity of Feeling or Sensation more intensive. 
We have greater pleasure and greater pain from 
single sounds than from single colors ; and, in like man- 
ner, concords and discords, in the one sense, affect us 
more agreeably or disagreeably, than any modifications 
of light in the other. 

2. In Taste and Smell the degree of Sensation, 



sir William Hamilton's philosophy. 71 

that is, of pleasure or pain, is great in proportion as 
the perception, that is, the information they afford, is 
small. 

3. In regard to Touch, without entering on dis- 
puted questions, it is sufficient to know, that in those 
parts of the body where sensation predominates, per- 
ception is feeble ; and in those where perception is 
lively, sensation is obtuse. In the finger-points 
tactile perception is at its height ; but there is hardly 
any other part of the body in which sensation is not 
more acute. Touch, therefore, if viewed as a single 
sense, belongs to both classes, — the objective and 
the subjective. But it is more correct to regard it as 
a plurality of senses, in which case touch, properly 
so called, having a principal organ in the finger- 
points, will belong to the class in which perception 
proper predominates. 

II. The analogy, which we have thus seen to hold 
good in the several senses in relation to each other, 
prevails likewise among the several impressions of the 
same sense. Impressions in the same sense differ 
both (1.) in degree and (2.) in quality or kind. 

1. Taking their difference in degree, and supposing 
that the degree of the impression determines the 
degree of the sensation, it cannot certainly be said, 
that the minimum of Sensation infers the maximum 
of Perception ; for Perception always supposes a cer- 
tain quantum of Sensation : but this is undeniable, 
that, above a certain limit, Perception declines, in 
proportion as Sensation rises. Thus, in the sense of 
sight, if the impression be strong we are dazzled, 
blinded, and consciousness is limited to the pain or 



72 AN OUTLINE OF 

pleasure of the Sensation, in the intensity of which 
Perception has been lost. 

2. Take now the difference, in kind, of impres- 
sions in the same sense. Of the senses, take again 
that of Sight. Sight, as will hereafter be shown, is 
cognizant of color, and of figure. But though figure is 
known only through color, a very imperfect cognizance 
of color is necessary, as is shown in the case (and it 
is not a rare one) of those individuals who have not 
the faculty of discriminating colors. These persons, 
who probably perceive only a certain difference of 
light and shade, have as clear and distinct a cog- 
nizance of figure, as others who enjoy the sense of 
sight in absolute perfection. This being understood, 
you will observe, that, in the vision of color, there is 
more of Sensation; in that of figure, more of Per- 
ception. Color affords our faculties of knowledge 
a far smaller number of differences and relations than 
figure ; but, at the same time, yields our capacity of 
feeling a far more sensual enjoyment. But if the 
pleasure we derive from color be more gross and 
vivid, that from figure is more refined and permanent. 
It is a law of our nature, that the more intense a 
pleasure, the shorter is its duration. The pleasures 
of sense are grosser and more intense than those of 
intellect ; but, while the former alternate speedily 
with disgust, with the latter we are never satiated. 
The same analogy holds among the senses themselves. 
Those in which Sensation predominates, in which 
pleasure is most intense, soon pall upon, us ; whereas 
those in which Perception predominates, and which 
hold more immediately of intelligence, afford us a less 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 73 

exclusive but a more enduring gratification. How soon 
are we cloyed with the pleasures of the palate, com- 
pared with those of the eye ; and, among the objects 
of the former, the meats that please the most are 
soonest objects of disgust. This is too notorious in 
regard to taste to stand in need of proof. But it is 
no less certain in the case of vision. In painting, 
there is a pleasure derived from a vivid and harmo- 
nious coloring, and a pleasure from the drawing and 
grouping of the figures. The two pleasures are dis- 
tinct, and even, to a certain extent, incompatible. 
For if we attempt to combine them, the grosser and 
more obtrusive gratification, which we find in the col- 
oring, distracts us from the more refined and intellect- 
ual enjoyment we derive from the relation of figure ; 
while, at the same time, the disgust we soon expe- 
rience from the one tends to render us insensible to the 
other. {Led. on Ifetaph, XXIV. 1 ) 

(B) Distinction in the Qualities of Matter. 

The qualities of body I divide into three classes. 
Adopting and adapting, as far as possible, the previ- 
ous nomenclature, 2 the first of these I would denomi- 
nate the class of Primary, or Objective, Qualities ; the 
second, the class of Secundo-Primary, or Subjectivo- 
Objective, Qualities ; the third, the class of Secondary, 
or Subjective, Qualities. 

The general point of view from which the Qualities 
of Matter are here considered is not the Physical, but 

1 See also Reid's Works, Note D *. This note contains a history of 
the recognition of the distinction between sensation and perception. 

2 For a historj' of this distinction, consult Reid's Works, note D. 
-J. C. M. 



74 AN OUTLINE OF 

the Psychological. But, under this, the ground of 
principle on which these qualities are divided and des- 
ignated is, again, twofold. There are, in fact, within 
the psychological, two special points of view; (1.) 
that of Sense, and (2.) that of Understanding. 

1. The point of view chronologically prior, or first 
to us, is that of Sense. The principle of division is 
here the different circumstances under which the qual- 
ities are originally and immediately apprehended. On 
this ground, as apprehensions or immediate cognitions 
through Sense, the Primary are distinguished as ob- 
jective, not subjective, as percepts proper, not sensa- 
tions proper ; the Secundo-primary, as objective and 
subjective, as percepts proper and sensations proper; 
the Secondary, as subjective, not objective, cognitions, 
as sensations proper, not percepts proper. 

2. The other point of view, chronologically poste- 
rior, but first in nature, is that of Understanding. 
The principle of division is here the different charac- 
ter under which the qualities, already apprehended, 
are conceived or construed to the mind in thought. 
On this ground, the Primary, being thought as essen- 
tial to the notion of Body, are distinguished from the 
Secundo-primary and Secondary, as accidental; while 
the Primary and Secundo-primary, being thought as 
manifest or conceivable in their own nature, are distin- 
guished from the Secondary, as in their own nature oc- 
cult and inconceivable. For the notion of Matter hav- 
ing been once acquired, by reference to that notion, 
the Primary Qualities are recognized as its a priori or 
necessary constituents ; and we clearly conceive how 
they must exist in bodies in knowing what they are 



sir jvilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 75 

objectively in themselves ; the Secundo-primary Qual- 
ities, again, are -recognized as a posteriori or contin- 
gent modifications of the Primary, and we clearly con- 
ceive how they do exist in bodies in knowing what 
they are objectively in their conditions ; finally, the 
Secondary Qualities are recognized as a posteriori or 
contingent accidents of matter, but we obscurely sur- 
mise how they may exist in bodies only as knowing 
what they are subjectively in their effects. 

It is thus apparent that the Primary Qualities may 
be deduced a priori, the bare notion of matter being 
given ; they being, in fact, only evolutions of the con- 
ditions which that notion necessarily implies ; whereas 
the Secundo-primary and Secondary must be induced 
a posteriori ; both being attributes contingently super- 
added to the naked notion of matter. The Primary 
Qualities thus fall more under the point of view of 
Understanding, the Secundo-primary and Secondary 
more under the point of view of Sense. 

I. Deduction of the Primary Qualities. — Space or 
extension is a necessary form of thought. We cannot 
think it as non-existent ; we cannot but think it as 
existent. But we are not so necessitated to imagine 
the reality of aught occupying space ; for while unable 
to conceive as null the space in which the material 
universe exists, the material universe itself we can, 
without difficulty, annihilate in thought. All that ex- 
ists in, all that occupies, space, becomes, therefore, 
known to us by experience ; we acquire, we con- 
struct, its notion. The notion of space is thus native, 
or a priori; the notion of what space contains, ad- 



76 AN OUTLINE OF 

ventitious, or a posteriori. Of this latter class is that 
of Body or Matter. 

Now, we ask, what are the necessary or essential, 
in contrast to the contingent or accidental, properties 
of Body, as apprehended and conceived by us? The 
answer to this question affords the class of Primary, 
as contradistinguished from the two classes of Secun- 
do-primary and Secondary Qualities. 

It will be admitted that we are able to conceive 
body only as that which (1.) occupies space, and (2.) 
is contained in space. But these catholic conditions 
of body, though really simple, are logically complex. 
We may view them in different aspects or relations. 

1. The property of filling space (Solidity in its 
unexclusive signification, Solidity Simple) implies 
two correlative conditions : {a) the necessity of tri- 
nal extension, in length, breadth, and thickness (Solid- 
ity Geometrical) ; (b) the corresponding impossibility 
of being reduced from what is to what is not thus ex- 
tended (Solidity Physical, Impenetrability.) 

(a) Out of the absolute attribute of trinal exten- 
sion may be again explicated three attributes under 
the form of necessary relations : (i.) Number or Di- 
visibility ; (ii.) Size, Bulk, or Magnitude; (iii.) 
Shape or Figure. 

i. Body necessarily exists, and is necessarily 
known, either as one body or as many bodies. Num- 
ber, i.e., the alternative attribution of unity or plu- 
ralty, is thus, in a first respect, a primary attribute 
of matter. But, again, every single body is also, in 
different points of view, at the same time one and 
many. Considered as a whole, it is, and is appre- 



SIR )V1LLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 77 

bended as actually one ; considered as an extended 
whole, it is, and is conceived, potentially many. 
Body being thus necessarily known, if not as already 
divided, still as always capable of division, Divisibil- 
ity or Number is thus likewise, in a second respect, a 
primary attribute of matter. 

ii. Body (invito majus, this or that body) is not 
infinitely extended. Each body must, therefore, have 
a certain finite extension, which, by comparison with 
that of other bodies, must be less or greater or equal ; 
in other words, it must by relation have a certain 
Size, Bulk, or Magnitude; and this again, as esti- 
mated both (a) by the quantity of space occupied 
aud (/$) by the quantity of matter occupying, affords 
likewise the relative attributes of Dense and Rare. 

iii. Finally, bodies, as not infinitely extended, 
have consequently their extension bounded. But 
bounded extension is necessarily of a certain Shape or 
Figure. 

(b) The negative notion, the impossibility of con- 
ceiving the compression of body from an extended to 
an unextended, its elimination from space, affords the 
positive notion of an insuperable power in body of 
resisting such compression or elimination. This 
force, which, as absolute, is a conception of the un- 
derstanding, not an apprehension through sense, has 
received no precise or unambiguous name. We might 
call it Ultimate or Absolute Incompressibility . 

2. The other most general attribute of matter, that 
of being contained in space, in like manner affords, by 
explication, an absolute and a relative attribute : (a) 
the Mobility, that is, the possible motion, and conse- 



78 AN OUTLINE OF 

quently the possible rest, of a body ; and (5) the 
Situation, Position, Ubication, that is, the local cor- 
relation of bodies in space. For 

(a) Space being conceived as infinite (or rather 
being inconceivable as not infinite) , and the place oc- 
cupied by body as finite, body in general, and of 
course each body in particular, is conceived capable 
either of remaining in the place it now holds, or of 
being translated from that to any then unoccupied 
part of space. And 

(b) As every part of space, i.e., every potential 
place, holds a certain position relative to every other, 
so, consequently, must bodies, in so far as they are 
all contained in space, and as each occupies at one 
time one determinate space. 

II. Induction of the Secundo- Primary Qualities. 
These qualities are modifications, but contingent mod- 
ifications, of the primary. They suppose the pri- 
mary ; the primary do not suppose them. They have 
all relation to space, and motion in space ; and are 
all contained under the category of Resistance or 
Pressure. For they are all only various forms of a 
relative or superable resistance to displacement, 
which, we learn by experience, bodies oppose to other 
bodies, and, among these, to our organism moving 
through space, — a resistance similar in kind (and 
therefore clearly conceived) to that absolute or in- 
superable resistance, which we are compelled, inde- 
pendently of experience, to think that every part of 
matter would oppose to any attempt to deprive it of 
its space, by compressing it into an inextended. 

In so far, therefore, as they suppose the Primary, 



sib william Hamilton's philosophy. 79 

which are necessary, while they themselves are only 
accidental, they exhibit, on the one side, what may 
be called a quasi-primary quality ; and, in this re- 
spect they are to be recognized as percepts, not sen- 
sations, as objective affections of things, and not as 
subjective affections of us. But, on the other side, 
this objective element is always found accompanied 
by a Secondary quality or sensorial passion. The 
Secundo-primary qualities have thus always two 
phases, both immediately apprehended. On their 
primary or objective phasis, they manifest themselves 
as degrees of resistance opposed to our locomotive en- 
ergy ; on their secondary or subjective phasis, as 
modes of resistance or pressure affecting our sentient 
organism. Thus standing between, and, in a certain 
sort, made up of, the two classes of Primary and Sec- 
ondary qualities, to neither of which, however, can 
they be reduced ; this their partly common, partly 
peculiar nature, vindicates to them the dignity of a 
class apart from both the others, and this under the 
appropriate appellation of the Secundo-primary Qual- 
ities. 

They admit of a classification from two different 
points of view. They may be (1.) physically, they 
may be (2.) psychologically, distributed. 

1. Considered physically, or in an objective rela- 
tion, they are to be reduced to classes corresponding 
to the different sources in external nature from which 
the resistance or pressure springs. And these sources 
are, in all, three : (a) that of Go-attraction ; (b) 
that of Repulsion; (c) that of Inertia. 

(a) Of the resistance of Co-attraction there may 



80 AN" OUTLINE OF 

be distinguished, on the same objective principle, two 
subaltern genera: (i.) that of Gravity, or the co-at- 
traction of the particles of body in general; and (ii.) 
that of Cohesion, or the co-attraction of the particles of" 
this and that body in particular. 

i. The resistance of Gravity or Weight, according to 
its degree (which, again, is in proportion to the Bulk 
and Density of ponderable matter), affords, under if, 
the relative qualities of Heavy and Light (absolute and 
specific) . 

ii. The resistance of Cohesion (using that term in 
its most unexclusive universality) contains many spe- 
cies and counter-species. Without proposing an ex- 
haustive, or accurately subordinated, list, of these 
there may be enumerated (a) the Hard and Soft; (/?) 
the Firm (Fixed, Stable, Concrete, Solid,) and Fluid 
(Liquid) , the Fluid being again subdivided into the 
Thick and Thin ; (r)the Viscid and Friable ; with (5) 
the Tough and Brittle (Ruptile and Irruptile) ; (e) the 
Rigid and Flexible; (o-) the Fissile and Injissile; (£) 
the Ductile and Inductile (Extensible and Inextensi- 
ble) ; (yj) the Retractile and Irretractile (Elastic and 
Inelastic) ; (0) (combined with Figure) the Rough 
and Smooth; (c) the Slippery and Tenacious. 

(5) The resistance from Repulsion is divided into 
the counter-qualities of (i.) the (relatively) Compress- 
ible and Incompressible (ii.) the Resilient and Irre- 
silient (Elastic and Inelastic) . 

(c) The resistance from Inertia (combined with 
Bulk and Cohesion) comprises the counter-qualities of 
the (relatively) Movable and Immovable. 

There are thus at least fifteen pairs of counterat- 



SIP WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 81 

tributes which we may refer to the secundo-primary 
qualities of body ; — all obtained by the division and 
subdivision of the resisting forces of matter, consid- 
ered in an objective or physical point of view. 

2. Considered psychologically, or in a subjective 
relation, they are to be discriminated, under the genus 
of the Relatively resisting, (a) according to the de- 
gree in which the resisting force might counteract our 
locomotive faculty or muscular force, and (6) accord- 
ing to the mode in which it might affect our capacity 
of feeling or sentient organism. Of these species, the 
former would contain under it the gradations of the 
quasi-primary quality, the latter the varieties of the 
secondary quality — these constituting the two ele- 
ments of which, in combination, every secundo-pri- 
mary quality is made up. 

III. Induction of the Secondary Qualities. — The 
secondary, as manifested to us, are not, in propriety, 
qualities of body at all. As apprehended, they are 
only subjective affections, and belong only to bodies 
in so far as these are supposed furnished with the pow- 
ers capable of specifically determining the various 
parts of our nervous apparatus to the peculiar action, 
or rather passion, of which they are susceptible ; which 
determined action or passion is the quality of which 
alone we are immediately cognizant, the external con- 
cause of that internal effect remaining to perception 
altogether unknown. Thus, the secondary qualities 
(and the same is to be said, mutatis mutandis, of the 
secundo-primary) are, considered subjectively, and 
considered objectively, affections or qualities of things 
diametrically opposed in nature, — of the organic and 
6 



82 AN OUTLINE OF 

inorganic, of the sentient and insentient, of mind and 
matter ; and though, as mutually correlative, and their 
several pairs rarely obtaining in common language 
more than a single name, they cannot well be con- 
sidered, except in conjunction, under the same cate- 
gory or general class : still their essential contrast of 
character must be ever carefully borne in mind. And 
in speaking of these qualities, as we are here chiefly 
concerned with them on their subjective side, I re- 
quest it may be observed, that I shall employ the ex- 
pression Secondary qualities to denote those phenome- 
nal affections determined in our sentient organism by 
the agency of external bodies, and not, unless when 
otherwise stated, the occult powers themselves from 
which that agency proceeds. 

Of the secondary qualities, in this relation, there 
are various kinds ; the variety principally depending 
on the differences of the different parts of our nervous 
apparatus. Such are the proper sensibles, the idio- 
pathic affections of our several organs of sense, as 
Color, Sound, Flavor, Savor, and Tactual Sensation ; 
such are the feelings from Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, 
etc. ; nor need it be added, such are the muscular and 
cutaneous sensations which accompany the perception 
of the secundo-primary qualities. Such, though less 
directly the result of foreign causes, are Titillation, 
Sneezing, Horripilation, Shuddering, the feeling of 
what is called Setting-the-teeth-on-edge, etc., etc.; 
such, in fine, are all the various sensations of bodily 
pleasure and pain determined by the action of external 
stimuli. (jReid's Works, Note D.) 

From the above account of the distinction between 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 



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84 AN OUTLINE OF 

sensation and perception, and of the distinction in the 
qualities of matter, it will be seen (1.) that in percep- 
tion proper the object perceived is always either (a) 
a primary quality, or (6) the quasi-primary phasis 
of a secundo-primary, (2.) that the primary qualities 
are perceived as in our organism, the quasi-primary 
phasis of the secundo-primary as in correlation to our 
organism. Thus a perception of the primary qualities 
does not, originally and in itself, reveal to us the ex- 
istence, and qualitative existence, of aught beyond 
the organism, apprehended by us as extended, fig- 
ured, divided, etc. The primary qualities of things 
external to our organism we do not perceive, i.e., 
immediately know. For these we only learn to infer, 
from the affections which we come to find that they 
determine in our organs ; — affections which, yielding 
us a perception of organic extension, we at length dis- 
cover, by observation and induction, to imply a cor- 
responding extension in the extra-organic agents. 

Farther, in no part of the organism have we any 
apprehension, any immediate knowledge, of extension 
in its true and absolute magnitude ; perception noting 
only the fact given in sensation, and sensation afford- 
ing no standard, by which to measure the dimensions 
given in one sentient part with those given in another. 
For, as perceived, extension is only the recognition 
of one organic affection in its outness from another ; — 
as a minimum of extension is thus to perception the 
smallest extent of organism in which sensations can 
be discriminated as plural ; — and as in one part of the 
organism the smallest extent is perhaps some million, 
certainly some myriad, times smaller than in others, — 



sin tvilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 85 

it follows that, to perception, the same veal extension 
will appear in this place of the body some million or 
myriad times greater than in that. Nor does this 
difference subsist only as between sense and sense ; 
for in the same sense, and even in that sense which 
has very commonly been held exclusively to afford a 
knowledge of absolute extension, I mean touch proper, 
the minimum, at one part of the body, is fifty times 
greater than it is at another. 

The existence of an extra-organic world is appre- 
hended, not in a perception of the primary qualities, 
but in a perception of the quasi-primary phasis of the 
secundo-primary, that is, in the consciousness that 
our locomotive energy is resisted, and not resisted by 
aught in our organism itself. For in the conscious- 
ness of being thus resisted is involved, as a correla- 
tive, the consciousness of a resisting something ex- 
ternal to our organism. Both are, therefore, conjunctly 
apprehended. This experience presupposes indeed 
a possession of the notions of space and motion in 
space. But on the doctrine that space, as a necessary 
condition, is a native element of thought; and since 
the notion of any one of its dimensions, as correlative 
to, must inevitably imply, the others, — it is evident 
that every perception of sensations out of sensations 
will afford the occasion, in apprehending any one, of 
conceiving all the three extensions, that is, of con- 
ceiving space. On the doctrine, and in the language, 
of Reid, our original cognitions of space, motion, etc., 
are instinctive, — a view which is confirmed by the anal- 
ogy of those of the lower animals which have the 
power of locomotion at birth. It is truly an idle 



86 AN OUTLINE OF 

problem to attempt imagining the steps by which we 
may be supposed to have acquired the notion of exten- 
sion, when in fact we are unable to imagine to our- 
selves the possibility of that notion not being always 
in our possession. "We have, therefore, a twofold cog- 
nition of space ; (1.) an a priori or native imagination 
of it, in general, as a necessary condition of the pos- 
sibility of thought; and (2.) under that, an a 
posteriori or adventitious percept of it, in particular, 
as contingently apprehended in this or that actual 
complexus of sensations. (Reid's Works, pp. 881 
-2.) 

When, therefore, I concentrate my attention in the 
simplest act of Perception, I return from my observa- 
tion with the most irresistible conviction of two facts, 
or rather two branches of the same fact, that I am, 
and that something different from me exists. In this 
act, I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, 
and of an external reality as the object perceived ; and 
I am conscious of both existences in the same indivis- 
ible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the sub- 
ject does not precede or follow the knowledge of the 
object ; neither determines, neither is determined by, 
the other. The two terms of correlation stand in 
mutual counterpoise and equal independence ; they 
are given as connected in the synthesis of knowledge, 
but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence. 

Such is the fact of Perception revealed in conscious- 
ness, and as it determines mankind in general in their 
equal assurance of the reality of an external world, 
and of the existence of their own minds. Conscious- 
ness declares our knowledge of material qualities to 



sip william Hamilton's philosophy. 87 

be intuitive. Nor is the fact, as given, denied even 
by those who disallow its truth. So clear is the de- 
liverance, that even the philosophers who reject an 
intuitive perception find it impossible not to admit 
that their doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the 
voice of consciousness and the natural conviction of 
mankind. 1 

The contents of the fact of perception, as given in 
consciousness, being thus established, what are the 
consequences to philosophy, according as the truth of 
its testimony (I.) is, or (II.) is not, admitted? 

(I.) If the veracity of consciousness be uncondition- 
ally admitted ; if the intuitive knowledge of mind 
and matter, and the consequent reality of their antith- 
esis be taken as truths, to be explained if possible, 
but in themselves to be held as paramount to all doubt, 
— the doctrine is established which we would call the 
scheme of Natural Realism, or Natural Dualism. 

(II.) But, on the other alternative, five great varia- 
tions from truth and nature may be conceived ; and 
all of these have actually found their advocates, ac- 
cording as the testimony of consciousness, in the fact 
of perception (1.), is wholly, or (2.) is partially, re- 
jected. 

1. If wholly rejected, that is, if nothing but the 
phenomenal reality of the fact itself be allowed, the 
result is Nihilism. 

2. If partially rejected, four schemes emerge, ac- 
cording to the way in which the fact is tampered with. 



1 For admissions to this effect, see Beid's Works, pp. 747-8. — 
J. C. M. 



AN OUTLINE OF 







< 5> § § 

O -2 C) Oh 



« 60 

fc .2 



ft S a 

Ed O 

2 S « 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 89 

(i.) If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to 
the equipoise of the object and subject in the act, but 
rejected as to the reality of their antithesis, the system 
of Absolute Identity emerges, which reduces both mind 
and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same 
common substance. 

(ii.) and (iii.) If the testimony of consciousness be 
refused to the co-originality and reciprocal indepen- 
dence of the subject and object, two schemes are de- 
termined, according as the one or the other of the 
terms is placed as the original and genetic. Is the 
object educed from the subject, Idealism; is the sub- 
ject educed from the object, Materialism, is the result. 

These systems are all conclusions from an original 
interpretation of the fact of consciousness in per- 
ception, carried intrepidly forth to its legitimate 
issue. But there is one scheme, which, violating the 
integrity of this fact, and, with the complete idealist, 
regarding the object of consciousness in perception 
as only a modification of the percipient subject, or, at 
least, a phenomenon numerically different from the 
object it represents, — endeavors, however, to stop 
short of the negation of an external world, the reality 
of which, and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks 
by various hypotheses to establish and explain. This 
scheme, — which we would term Cosmothetic Idealism, 
Hypothetical Realism, or Hypothetical Dualism, — 
although the most inconsequent of all systems, has 
been embraced, under various forms, by the immense 
majority of philosophers. (Reid's Works, pp. 748-9. ) J 

1 See also Discussions, pp. 55-6 ; and Led. on Metaph. (XVI.) 
Keid's Works, Note C, contain a more elaborate classification of the 



90 AN OUTLINE OF 



§ 2. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 



This faculty will not occupy us long, as the princi- 
pal questions regarding its nature and operation have 
been already considered, in treating of Consciousness 
in general. 

I formerly showed that it is impossible to distin- 
guish Perception, or the other Special Faculties, from 
Consciousness, — in other words, to reduce Conscious- 
ness itself to a special faculty. I stated, however, 
that though it be incompetent to establish a faculty 
for the immediate knowledge of the external world, 
and a faculty for the immediate knowledge of the in- 
ternal, as two ultimate powers, exclusive of each 
other, and not merely subordinate forms of a higher 
immediate knowledge, under which they are compre- 
hended or carried up into one, — I stated, I say, that 
though the immediate knowledges of matter and of 
mind are still only modifications of Consciousness, yet 
that their discrimination, as subaltern faculties, is 
both allowable and convenient. 

The sphere and character of this faculty of acquisi- 
tion will be best illustrated by contrasting it with the 
other. Perception is the power by which we are 
made aware of the phenomena of the external world ; 
Self-consciousness, the power by which we apprehend 
the phenomena of the internal. The objects of the 

various theories of perception. In the Led. on MetapJi. (Lect. 
XXV.) will be found a vindication of Natural Realism; and in the 
following lecture, a polemic against Hypothetical Eealism. — 
J. C. M. 



SIB WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 91 

former are all presented to us in space and time ; 
space and time are thus the two conditions, — the 
two fundamental forms of external perception. The 
objects of the latter are all apprehended by us in time 
and in self; time and self are thus the two conditions, 
— the two fundamental forms, — of Internal Perception 
or Self-consciousness. Time is thus a form or condi- 
tion common to both faculties ; while space is a form 
peculiar to the one, self a form peculiar to the other. 
What I mean by the form or condition of a faculty, 
is that frame, that setting (if I may so speak), out 
of which no object can be known. Thus, we only 
know, through Self-consciousness, the phenomena of 
the Internal world, as modifications of the indivisible 
Ego or conscious unit ; we only know, through per- 
ception, the phenomena of the External world, under 
space, or as modifications of the extended and divisible 
Non-ego or known plurality. Two difficulties, how- 
ever, may here be suggested : — 

1. It may be asked, if self, or Ego, be the form of 
Self-consciousness, why is the not-self, the Non-ego, 
not in like maimer called the form of Perception ? To 
this I reply, that the not-self is only a negation, and, 
though it discriminates the objects of the external cog- 
nition from those of the internal, it does not afford to 
the former any positive bond of union among them- 
selves. This, on the contrary, is supplied to them by 
the form of Space, out of which they can neither be 
perceived, nor imagined by the mind. Space, there- 
fore, as the positive condition under which the Non- 
ego is necessarily known and imagined, and through 



92 ■ AN OUTLINE OF 

which it receives its unity in Consciousness, is'properly 
said to afford the condition, or form, of External Per- 
ception. 

2. But a more important question may be started. 
If Space, if extension, be a necessary form of 
thought, this, it may be argued, proves that the mind 
itself is extended. The reasoning here proceeds upon 
the assumption that the qualities of the subject know- 
ing must be similar to the qualities of the object 
known. This, as I have already stated, is a mere 
philosophical crotchet, — an assumption without a 
shadow even of probability in its favor. That the 
mind has the power of perceiving extended objects 
is no ground for holding that it is itself extended. 
Still less can it be maintained, that because it has 
ideally a native or necessary conception of Space, it 
must really occupy Space. Nothing can be more ab- 
surd. On this doctrine, to exist as extended is sup- 
posed necessary in order to think extension. But if 
this analogy hold» good, the sphere of ideal Space, 
which the mind can imagine, ought to be limited to 
the sphere of real Space which the mind actually fills. 
This is not, however, the case ; for though the mind 
be not absolutely unlimited in its power of conceiving 
Space, still the compass of thought may be viewed as 
infinite in this respect, as contrasted with the petty 
point of extension, which the advocates of the doc- 
trine in question allow it to occupy in its corporeal 
domicile. 

The faculty of Self-consciousness affords us a knowl- 
edge of the phenomena of our minds. It is the source 
of Internal experience. You will, therefore, observe, 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 93 

that, like External Perception, it only furnishes us 
with facts ; and that the use we make of these facts 
— that is, what we find in them, what we deduce 
from them — belongs to a different process of intelli- 
gence. Self-consciousness affords the materials equally 
to all systems of philosophy ; all equally admit it, and 
all elaborate the materials which this faculty supplies, 
according to their fashion. (Led. on Metaph., 
XXIX.) 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE CONSERVATIVE FACULTY. MEMORY PROPER. 

Through the powers of External and Internal Per- 
ception, we are enabled to acquire information, — 
experience ; but this acquisition is not of itself inde- 
pendent and complete ; it supposes that we are also 
able to retain knowledge acquired, for we cannot be 
said to get what we are unable to keep. The faculty 
of Acquisition is, therefore, only realized through an- 
other faculty, — the faculty of Retention or Conserva- 
tion. Here we have another example of what I have 
already frequently had occasion to suggest to your 
observation; we have two faculties, two elementary 
phenomena, evidently distinct, and yet each depend- 
ing on the other for its realization. Without a power 
of Acquisition, a power of Conservation could not be 
exerted ; and, without the latter, the former would be 
frustrated, for we should lose as fast as we acquired. 
But as the faculty of Acquisition would be useless 
without the faculty of Retention, so the faculty of Re- 
tention would be useless without the faculties of Re- 

94 



AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 95 

production and Representation. That the mind 
retained, beyond the sphere of consciousness, a treas- 
ury of knowledge would be of no avail, did it not 
possess the power of bringing out, and of displaying, 
— in other words, of reproducing, and representing, — 
this knowledge in consciousness. But because the 
faculty of Conservation would be fruitless without the 
ulterior faculties of Reproduction and Representation, 
we are not to confound these faculties, or to view the 
act of mind, which is their joint result, as a simple 
and elementary phenomenon. Though mutually de- 
pendent on each other, the faculties of Conservation, 
Reproduction, and Representation are governed by dif- 
ferent laws, and, in different individuals, are found 
greatly varying in their comparative vigor. The in- 
timate connection of these three faculties, or elemen- 
tary activities, is the cause, however, why they have 
not been distinguished in the analysis of philosophers ; 
and why their distinction is not precisely marked in 
ordinary language. In ordinary language, we have, 
indeed , words which , without excluding the other fac- 
ulties, denote one of these more emphatically. Thus, 
in the term Memory, the Conservative Faculty, the 
phenomenon of Retention is the central notion, with 
which, however, those of Reproduction and Represen- 
tation are associated. In the term Recollection, again, 
the phenomenon of Reproduction is the principal no- 
tion, accompanied, however, by those of Retention 
and Representation, as its subordinates. 

By Memory or Retention, you will see, is only 
meant the condition of Reproduction ; and it is, there- 
fore, evident that it is only by an extension of the 



96 AN OUTLINE OF 

term that it can be called a faculty, that is, an active 
power. It is more a passive resistance than an energy, 
and ought, therefore, perhaps to receive rather the 
appellation of a capacity. But the nature of this ca- 
pacity or faculty we must now proceed to consider. 
(Led. on Metaph., XXX.) 



§ 1. THE FACT OF RETENTION. 

In the first place, then, I presume that the fact of 
Retention is admitted. "We are conscious of certain 
cognitions as acquired, and we are conscious of these 
cognitions as resuscitated. That, in the interval, 
when out of consciousness, these cognitions do con- 
tinue to subsist in the mind, is certainly an hypothe- 
sis, because whatever is out of consciousness can only 
be assumed ; but it is an hypothesis which we are not 
only warranted, but necessitated, by the phenomena, 
to establish. For, besides the phenomena of Reten- 
tion, there are many which it is impossible to explain 
by any other hypothesis ; and I shall here adduce the 
evidence which appears to me not merely to warrant, 
but to necessitate the conclusion, that the sphere of 
our conscious modifications is only a small circle in 
the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, 
of which we are only conscious through its effects. 

I. External Perception. Let us take our first ex- 
ample from Perception, and in that faculty let us 
commence with 

1. The sense of Sight. Now, you either already 
know, or can be at once informed, what it is that has 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 97 

obtained the name of Minimum Visibile. You are of 
course aware, in general, that vision is the result of 
the rays of light reflected from the surface of objects 
to the eye ; a greater number of rays is reflected from 
a larger surface ; if the superficial extent of an object, 
and, consequently, the number of rays which it re- 
flects, be diminished beyond a certain limit, the ob- 
ject becomes invisible ; and the Minimum Visibile is 
the smallest expanse which can be seen, — which can 
consciously affect us, — which we can be conscious of 
seeiug. This being understood, it is plain that, if we 
divide this Minimum Visibile into two parts, neither 
half can, by itself, be an object of vision, or visual 
consciousness. They are, severally and apart, to 
consciousness as zero. But it is evident that each 
half must, hy itself, have produced in us a certain 
modification, real though unperceived ; for as the per- 
ceived whole is nothing but the union of the unper- 
ceived halves, so the Perception — the perceived 
affection itself of which we are conscious — is only 
the sum of two modifications, each of which severally 
eludes our consciousness. When we look at a distant 
forest, we perceive a certain expanse of green. Of 
this, as an affection of our organism, we are clearly 
and distinctly conscious. Now, the expanse, of which 
we are conscious, is evidently made up of parts of 
which we are not conscious. No leaf, perhaps no 
tree, may be separately visible. But the greenness 
of the forest is made up of the greenness of the 
leaves ; that is, the total impression of which we are 
conscious is made up of an infinitude of small im- 
pressions of which we are not conscious. 

7 



98 AN OUTLINE OF 

2. Sense of Hearing. — Take another example, 
from the sense of hearing. In this sense, there is, in 
like manner, a Minimum Audibile, that is, a sound the 
least which can come into perception and conscious- 
ness. But this Minimum Audibile is made up of parts 
which severally affect *the sense, but of which affec- 
tions, separately, we are not conscious, though of 
their joint result we are. We must, therefore, here 
likewise admit the reality of modifications beyond the 
sphere of consciousness. To take a special example. 
When we hear the distant murmur of the sea, — what 
are the constituents of the total perception of which 
we are conscious? This murmur is a sum made up 
of parts, and the sum would be as zero if the parts 
did not count as something. The noise of the sea is 
the complement of the noise of its several waves ; — 

tzovtL<ov re xufidrwv ' Av-qpid-jiov yiXa<T/j.a ; and if the noise of 

each wave made no impression on our sense, the noise 
of the sea, as the result of these impressions, could 
not be realized. But the noise of each several wave, 
at the distance we suppose, is inaudible ; we must, 
however, admit that they produce a certain modifica- 
tion, beyond consciousness, on the percipient subject ; 
for this is necessarily involved in the reality of their 
result. 

3. The same is equally the case in the other senses; 
the taste or smell of a dish, be it agreeable or disa- 
greeable, is composed of a multitude of severally im- 
perceptible effects, which the stimulating particles of 
the viand cause on different points of the nervous ex- 
pansion of the gustatory and olfactory organs ; and 
the pleasant or painful feeling of smoothness or rough- 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 99 

ness is the result of an infinity of unfelt modifications, 
"which the body handled determines on the countless 
papillae of the nerves of touch. 

II. Association of Ideas. — Let us now take an ex- 
ample from another mental process. We have not 
yet spoken of what is called the Association of Ideas ; 
and it is enough for our present purpose that you 
should be aware, that one thought suggests another 
in conformity with certain determinate laws, — laws 
to which the successions of our whole mental states 
are subjected. Now, it sometimes happens, that we 
find one thought rising immediately after another in 
consciousness, but whose consecution we can reduce 
to no law of association. In these cases we can 
generally discover, by an attentive observation, that 
these two thoughts, though not themselves associated, 
are each associated with certain other thoughts, so 
that the whole consecution would have been regular 
had these intermediate thoughts come into conscious- 
ness between the two which are not immediately as- 
sociated. 

You are probably aware of the following fact in 
mechanics. If a number of billiard balls be placed 
in a straight row, and touching each other, and if a 
ball be made to strike, in the line of the row, the ball 
at one end of the series, what will happen? The mo- 
tion of the impinging ball is not divided among the 
whole row ; this, which we might a priori have ex- 
pected, does not happen ; but the impetus is trans- 
mitted through the intermediate balls, which remain 
each in its place, to the ball at the opposite end of 
the series, and this ball alone is impelled on. Some- 



100 AN OUTLINE OF 

thins: like this seems often to occur in the train of 
thought. One idea mediately suggests another into 
consciousness, — the suggestion passing through one 
or more ideas which do not themselves rise into con- 
sciousness. The awakening and awakened ideas here 
correspond to the ball striking and the ball struck off; 
while the intermediate ideas of which we are uncon- 
scious, but which carry on the suggestion, resemble 
the intermediate balls which remain moveless, but 
communicate the impulse, An instance of this occurs 
to me, with which I was recently struck. Thinking 
of Ben Lomond, this thought was immediately fol- 
lowed by the thought of the Prussian system of edu- 
cation. Now, conceivable connection between these 
two ideas, in themselves, there was none. A little 
reflection, however, explained the anomaly. On my 
last visit to the mountain, I had met upon its summit 
a German gentleman, and though I had no conscious- 
ness of the intermediate and unawakened links between 
Ben Lomond and the Prussian schools, they were un- 
doubtedly these; the German, — Germany, — Prus- 
sia, — and, these media being admitted, the connec- 
tion between the extremes was manifest. 

Mr. Stewart explains this phenomenon on a differ- 
ent hypothesis ; but his explanation will be considered 
in connection with the similar explanation, which he 
gives, of 

III. Our Acquired Habits and Dexterities, which 
in like manner are capable of explanation only on the 
theory I have advanced. In these phenomena the 
consecution of various operations is extremely rapid ; 
but it is allowed on all hands that, though we are con- 



six ivilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 101 

scions of the series of operations, that is, of the men- 
tal state which they conjunctly constitute, — of the 
several operations themselves as acts of volition we 
are wholly incognizant. Now, this incognizance may 
be explained on three possible hypotheses. The first 
regards the whole series of operations as merely me- 
chanical or automatic, and thus denying to the mind 
all active or voluntary intervention, consequently re- 
moves them beyond the sphere of consciousness. The 
second, again, allows to each several motion a sepa- 
rate act of conscious volition ; while the third, which 
I would maintain, holds a medium between these, 
constitutes the mind the agent, accords to it a con- 
scious volition over the series, but denies to it a con 
sciousness and deliberate volition in regard to each 
separate movement in the series which it determines. 

1. The first of these has been maintained, among 
others, by two philosophers who in other points are 
not frequently at one, — by Reid and Hartley. 
"Habit," says Reid, "differs from instinct, not in its 
nature, but in its origin ; the last being natural, the 
first acquired. Both operate without will or inten- 
tion, without thought, and therefore may be called 
mechanical principles." 

But this opinion is unphilosophical for two reasons. 
(a) In the first place, it assumes an occult, an in- 
comprehensible principle j to enable us to comprehend 
the effect. (6) In the second place, admitting the 
agency of the mind in accomplishing the series of 
movements before the habit or dexterity is formed, it 
afterwards takes it out of the hands of the mind in 
order to bestow it on another agent. This hypothesis 



102 AN OUTLINE OF 

thus violates the two great laws of philosophizing : 

(a) to assume no occult principle without necessity ; 

(b) to assume no second principle without necessity. 
2. The second hypothesis, which Mr. Stewart 

adopts, is at once complex and contradictory. It 
supposes a consciousness and no memory. Now, 

(a) This is altogether hypothetical. It cannot ad- 
vance a shadow of proof in support of the fact which 
it assumes, that an act of consciousness does or can 
take place without any, the least, continuance in mem- 
ory. 

(6) This assumption is disproved by the whole anal- 
ogy of our intellectual nature. It is a law of mind, 
that the intensity of the present consciousness deter- 
mines the vivacity of the future memory. Memory 
and consciousness are thus in the direct ratio of each 
other. On the one hand, looking from cause to ef- 
fect, — vivid consciousness, long memory; faint con- 
sciousness, short memory ; no consciousness, no 
memory ; and, on the other, looking from effect to 
cause, — long memory, vivid consciousness; short 
memory, faint consciousness ; no memory, no con- 
sciousness. Thus the hypothesis, which postulates 
consciousness without memory, violates the funda- 
mental laws of our intellectual being. 

(c) This hypothesis is at once illegitimate and su- 
perfluous . As we must admit, from the analogy of 
perception, that efficient modifications may exist with- 
out any consciousness of their existence, and as this 
admission affords a solution of the present problem, 
the hypothesis in question here again violates the 
law of parcimony by assuming, without necessity, a 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 103 

plurality of principles to account for what one more 
easily suffices to explain. 

3. The third hypothesis, then, — that which em- 
ploys the single principle of latent agencies to account 
for so numerous a class of mental phenomena, — how 
does it explain the phenomenon under consideration ? 
Nothing can be more simple and analogical than its 
solution. As, — to take an example from vision, — in 
the external perception of a stationary object, a cer- 
tain space, an expanse of surface, is necessary to the 
minimum visibile; in other words, an object of sight 
cannot come into consciousness unless it be of a cer- 
tain size ; in like maimer, in the internal perception 
of a series of mental operations, a certain time, a cer- 
tain duration, is necessary for the smallest section of 
continuous energy to which consciousness is compe- 
tent. Some minimum of time must be admitted as 
the condition of consciousness, and as time is divisible 
ad infinitum, whatever minimum be taken, there must 
be admitted to be, beyond the cognizance of con- 
sciousness, intervals of time, in which, if mental agen- 
cies be performed, these will be latent to conscious- 
ness. If we suppose that the minimum of time, to 
which consciousness can descend, be an interval called 
six, and that six different movements be performed in 
this interval, these, it is evident, will appear to con- 
sciousness as a simple, indivisible point of modified 
time ; precisely as the minimum visibile appears as 
an indivisible point of modified space. And, as in 
the extended parts of the minimum visibile, each must 
determine a certain modification on the percipient sub- 
ject, seeing that the effect of the whole is only the 



104 AN OUTLINE OF 

conjoined effect of its parts, in like manner, the pro- 
tended parts of "each conscious instant, — of each dis- 
tinguishable minimum of time, — though themselves 
beyond the ken of consciousness, must contribute to 
give the character to the whole mental state which 
that instant, that minimum, comprises. This being 
understood, it is easy to see how we lose the con- 
sciousness of the several acts, in the rapid succession 
of many of our habits and dexterities. At first, 
and before the habit is acquired, every act is slow, 
and we are conscious of the effort of deliberation, 
choice, and volition ; by degrees, the mind proceeds 
with less vacillation and uncertainty ; at length, the 
acts become secure and precise : in proportion as this 
takes place, the velocity of the procedure is increased, 
and as this acceleration rises, the individual acts drop 
one by one from consciousness, as we lose the leaves 
in retiring further and further from the tree ; and, at 
last, we are only aware of the general state which re- 
sults from these unconscious operations, as we can at 
last only perceive the greenness which results from 
the unperceived leaves. (Lect. on Metaph., XVIII. 
and XIX.) 

§ 2. EXPLANATION OF RETENTION. 

But if it cannot be denied that the knowledge we 
have acquired by Perception and Self-consciousness 
does actually continue, though out of consciousness, 
to endure, can we, in the second place, find any 
ground on which to explain the possibility of this en- 
durance ? I think we can, and shall adduce such an 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY. 105 

explanation, founded on the general analogies of our 
mental nature. The phenomenon of retention is in- 
deed so natural on the ground of the self-energy of 
mind, that we have no need to suppose any special 
faculty for memory ; the conservation of the action 
of the mind being involved in the very conception of 
its power of self-activity. 

Let us consider how knowledge is acquired by the 
mind. Knowledge is not acquired by a mere passive 
affection, but through the exertion of spontaneous ac- 
tivity on the part of the knowing subject ; for though 
this activity be not exerted without some external ex- 
citation, still this excitation is only the occasion on 
which the mind develops its self-energy. But this 
energy being once determined, it is natural that it 
should persist, until again annihilated by other causes. 
This would, in fact, be the case, were the mind 
merely passive in the impression it receives ; for it is 
a universal law of nature, that every effect endures as 
long as it is not modified or opposed by any other ef- 
fect. But the mental activity, the act of knowledge, 
of which I now speak, is more than this ; it is an 
energy of the self-active power of a subject one and 
indivisible ; consequently t a part of the*Ego must be 
detached or annihilated, if a cognation once existent 
be again extinguished. Hence it is, that the problem 
most difficult of solution is not, how a mental activity 
endures, but how it ever vanishes. 

The solution of this problem is to be sought for in 
the theory of obscure or latent modifications of mind. 
The disappearance of internal energies from the view 
of internal perception does not warrant the conclusion 



106 AN' OUTLINE OF 

that they no longer exist. Every mental activity be- 
longs to the one vital activity of mind in general ; it 
is, therefore, indivisibly bound up with it, and can 
neither be torn from, nor abolished in, it. But the 
mind is only capable, at any one moment, of exerting 
a certain quantity or degree of force. This quantity 
must, therefore, be divided among the different activ- 
ities, so that each has only a part; and the sum of 
force belonging to all the several activities taken to- 
gether is equal to the quantity or degree of force be- 
longing to the vital activity of mind in general. Thus, 
in proportion to the greater number of activities in 
the mind, the less will be the proportion of force 
which will accrue to each ; the feebler, therefore, 
each will be, and the fainter the vivacity with which 
it can affect self-consciousness. This weakening of 
vivacity can, in consequence of the indefinite increase 
in the number of our mental activities, caused by the 
ceaseless excitation of the mind to new knowledge, be 
carried to an indefinite tenuity, without the activities, 
therefore, ceasing altogether to be. Thus it is quite 
natural that the great proportion of our mental cog- 
nitions should have waxed too feeble to affect our in- 
ternal perception with the competent intensity ; it is 
quite natural that they should have become obscure 
or delitescent. In these circumstances, it is to be 
supposed, that every new cognition, every newly ex- 
cited activity, should be in the greatest vivacity, and 
should draw to itself the greatest amount of force ; 
this force will, in the same proportion, be withdrawn 
from the other earlier cognitions ; and it is they, con- 



. SIR IFILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY. 107 

sequently, which must undergo the fate of obscura- 
tion. 

. In further explanation of this faculty I would annex 
two observations which arise out of the preceding the- 
ory. 

1. The first is, that retention does not belong alone 
to the cognitive faculties, but that 'the same law ex- 
tends in like manner over all the three primary classes 
of mental phenomena. It is not. cognitions only, but 
feelings and conations, which are held fast, and which 
can, therefore, be again awakened. This fact, of the 
conservation of our practical modifications, is not in- 
deed denied ; but psychologists usually so represent 
the matter, as if, when feelings or conations are re- 
tained in the mind, that this takes place only through 
the medium of the memory ; meaning by this, that 
we must, first of all, have had notions of these affec- 
tions, which notions being preserved, they, when 
recalled to mind, do again awaken the modification 
they represent. From the theory I have detailed to 
you, it must be seen that there is no need of this in- 
termediation of notions, but that we immediately re- 
tain feelings, volitions, and desires, no less than 
notions and cognitions ; inasmuch as all the three 
classes of fundamental phenomena arise equally out 
of the vital manifestations of the same one and indi- 
visible subject. 

2. The second result of this theory is, that the va- 
rious attempts to explain memory by physiological 
hypotheses are as unnecessary as they are untenable. 
This is not the place to discuss the general problem 
touching the relation of mind and body. But in prox- 



108 AN OUTLINE OF 

imate reference to memory, it may be satisfactory to 
show, that this faculty does not stand in need of such 
crude modes of explanation. It must be allowed, that 
no faculty affords a more tempting subject for mate- 
rialistic conjecture. No other mental power betrays 
a greater dependence on corporeal conditions than 
memory. Not only, in general, does its vigorous or 
feeble activity essentially depend on the health and 
indisposition of the body, more especially of the ner- 
vous systems ; but there is manifested a connection 
between certain functions of memory and certain parts 
of the cerebral apparatus. This connection, however, 
is such as affords no countenance to any particular 
hypotheses at present in vogue. For example, after 
certain diseases, or certain affections of the brain, 
some partial loss of memory takes place. Perhaps 
the patient loses the whole of his stock of knowledge 
previous to the disease, the faculty of acquiring and 
retaining new information remaining entire. Perhaps 
he loses the memory of words, and preserves that of 
things. Perhaps he may retain the memory of nouns, 
and lose that of verbs, or vice versa; nay, what is 
still more marvellous, though it is not a very unfre- 
quent occurrence, one language may be taken neatly 
out of his retention, without affecting his memory of 
others. By such observations, the older psycholo- 
gists were led to the various physiological hypotheses 
by which they hoped to account for the phenomena 
of retention, — as, for example, the hypothesis of per- 
manent material impressions on the brain, — or of 
permanent dispositions in the nervous fibres to repeat 
the same oscillatory movements, — of particular or- 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 109 

gans for the different functions of memory, — of par- 
ticular parts of the brain as the repositories of the 
various classes of ideas, — or even of a particular 
fibre as the instrument of every several notion. But 
all these hypotheses betray only an ignorance of the 
proper object of philosophy, and of the true nature of 
the thinking principle. They are at best but useless ; 
for if the unity and self-activity of mind be not denied, 
it is manifest, that the mental activities, which have 
been once determined, must persist, and these corpo- 
real explanations are superfluous. {Led. on Metaph.> 
XXX.) 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE REPRODUCTIVE FACULTY. 

I now pass to the next faculty in order, — the fac- 
ulty which I have called the Reproductive. I am not 
satisfied with this name ; for it does not precisely, of 
itself, mark what I wish to be expressed, — namely, 
the process by which what is lying dormant in mem- 
ory is awakened, as contradistinguished from the rep- 
resentation in consciousness of it as awakened. 

Perhaps the Resuscitative Faculty would have been 
better ; and the term Reproduction might have been 
employed to comprehend the whole process, made up 
of the correlative acts of Retention, Resuscitation, and 
Representation. Be this, however, as it may, I shall 
at present continue to employ the term in the limited 
meaning I have already assigned. 

Every one is conscious of a ceaseless succession or 
train of thoughts, one thought suggesting another, 
which again is the cause of exciting a third, and so on. 
But if thoughts and feelings and conations (for you 
must observe, that the train is not limited to the phe- 

110 



AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. Ill 

noinena of cognition only) do notarise of themselves, 
but only in causal connection with preceding and sub- 
sequent modifications of mind, it remains to be asked 
and answered, — Do the links of this chain follow 
each other under any other condition than that of sim- 
ple connection? — in other words, may any thought, 
feeling, or desire be connected ivith any other? Or is 
the succession regulated by other and special laws, ac- 
cording to which certain kinds of modification exclu- 
sively precede, and exclusively follow, each other? 
The slightest observation of the phenomenon shows 
that the latter alternative is the, case ; and on this all 
philosophers are agreed. Nor do philosophers differ 
in regard to what kind of thoughts are associated to- 
gether. They differ almost exclusively in regard to 
the subordinate question, of how these thoughts ought 
to be classified, and carried up into system. This, 
therefore, is the question to which I shall address 
myself. (Led. on Metaph., XXXT.) 

The relations, on the ground of which one thought 
suggests another, give us what may be called the 
primary laws of Reproduction; but when several 
thoughts are all capable of being suggested by another, 
as all equally related by the primary laws, what de- 
termines which of these thoughts shall actually be 
suggested ? The principles that determine this may 
be named secondary laws of Reproduction. 1 



1 In this paragraph 1" have attempted an explicit definition of the 
distinction, as drawn by Hamilton, between the primary and the sec- 
ondary laws of reproduction. — J. C. M. 



112 AN OUTLINE OF 



§ 1. PRIMARY LAWS OF REPRODUCTION. 

There are three subjective unities, wholes, or identi- 
ties , each of which affords a ground of chronological 
succession, and reciprocal suggestion, to the several 
thoughts which they comprehend in one. In other 
words, Reproduction has three sources. These are 
(1.) The unity of thoughts, differing in time and mod- 
ification, in a co-identity of Subject; (2.) The unity 
of thoughts, differing in time, in a co-identity of Mod- 
ification; (3.) The unity of thoughts, differing in 
modification, in a co-identity of Time. The three 
unities thus characterized constitute three 

(A) General Laws op Reproduction. 

I. Law of Possible Reproduction. Of these 
unities the first affords a common principle of the pos- 
sibility of association, or mutual suggestion for all our 
mental movements, however different in their charac- 
ter as modifications, however remote in the times of 
their occurrence ; for all, even the most heterogene- 
ous and most distant, are reproducible, co-suggestible, 
or associable, as, and only as, phenomena of the same 
unity of consciousness, — affections of the same indi- 
visible Ego. There thus emerges the Law of Asso- 
ciability or Possible Co-Suggestion : All thoughts 
of the same mental subject are associable, or capable of 
suggesting one another. 

II. Laws op Actual Reproduction. But the 
unity of subject, the fundamental condition of the as- 
sociability of thought in general, affords no reason 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 113 

why this particular thought should, de facto, recall or 
suggest that. We require, therefore, besides a law 
of possible, a law or laws of actual Reproduction. Two 
such are afforded iu the tivo other unities, — those of 
Modification and of Time. 

And now let us, for the sake of subsequent refer- 
ence, pause a moment to state the following symbolic 
illustration : — 

ABC 

A' 
A" 

Here the same letter, repeated in perpendicular or- 
der, is intended to denote the same mental mode, 
brought into consciousness, represented, at different 
times. Here the different letters, in horizontal order, 
are supposed to designate the partial thoughts inte- 
grant of a total mental state, and therefore coexistent 
or immediately consequent, at the moment of its actual 
realization. This being understood, we proceed : — 

Of these two unities that of modification affords the 
ground, why, for example, an object determining a 
mental modification of a certain complement and char- 
acter to-day, this presentation tends to call up the 
representation of the same modification determined by 
that object yesterday. Or suppose, as in our sym- 
bols, the three A's to typify the same thought, deter- 
mined at three different times, be the determining 
movement of a presentation or a representation. On 
the second occasion, A' will suggest the representation 
of A. This it will not be denied that it can do ; for, 



114 AN OUTLINE OF 

on the possibility hereof depends the- possibility of 
simple remembrance. The total thought, after this 
suggestion, will be A' -(- A ; and on the third occa- 
sion, A" may suggest A' and A ; both on this princi- 
ple, and on that other which we are immediately to 
consider, of co-identity in time. We have thus, as a 
first general law of actual Reproduction, Suggestion, 
or Association : — 

1. The Law or Repetition or of Direct Re- 
membrance : Thoughts, co-identical in modification, 
but differing in time, tend to suggest each other. 

The unity of time affords the ground why thoughts, 
different in their character as mental modes, but hav- 
ing once been proximately coexistent (including 
under coexistence immediate consecution) as the 
parts of some total thought, — and a totality of 
thought is determined even by a unity of time, — do, 
when recalled into consciousness, tend immediately to 
.suggest each other, as co-constituents of that former 
whole, and mediately, that whole itself. Thus let 
(A, B, C, D, E, F) be supposed a complement of 
such concomitant thoughts. If A be recalled into 
consciousness, A will tend to reawaken B, B fy) re- 
awaken C, and so on, until the whole formerly co- 
existent series has been reinstated, or the mind di- 
verted by some stronger movement on some other 
train. We have thus, as a second general law of ac- 
tual Reproduction, Suggestion, or Association, — 

2. The Law of Redintegration, of Indirect 
Remembeance, or of Reminiscence : Thoughts, 
once co-identical in time, are, however different as men- 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 115 

tal modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in 
the mutual order which they originally held. 

Philosophers, in generalizing the phenomena of re- 
production, have, if the exception of Aristotle be ad- 
mitted, of these two, exclusively regarded the law of 
Redintegration. That of Repetition was, however, 
equally worthy of their consideration . For the exci- 
tation of the same by the same, differing in time, is 
not less marvellous than the excitation of the differ- 
ent by the different, identical in time. It was a prin- 
ciple, too, equally indispensable to explain the phe- 
nomena. For the attempts to reduce these to the 
law of Redintegration alone will not stand the test 
of criticism ; since the reproduction of thought by 
thought, as disjoined in time, cannot be referred to 
the reproduction of thought by thought, as conjoined 
in time. Accordingly we shall find, in coming to de- 
tail, that some phenomena are saved by the law of 
Repetition alone, while others require a combination 
of the two laws of Repetition and Redintegration. 
Such combinations of these two laws constitute the 

(B) Special Laws of Repkoduction. The laws 
under this head are, — 

I. The Law of Similaes : Things, — thoughts, 
resembling each other (be the resemblance simple or an- 
alogical) , are mutually suggestive. 

From Aristotle downwards, all who have written 
on Suggestion, whether intentional or spontaneous, 
have recognized the association of similar objects. 
But whilst all have thus fairly acknowledged the ef- 
fect, none, I think (if Aristotle be not a singular 
excejDtion) , have speculated aright as to the cause. 



116 AN OUTLINE OF 

Iii general, Similarity has been lightly assumed, 
lightly laid down, as one of the ultimate principles of 
associations. Nothing, however, can be clearer than 
that resembling objects, — resembling mental modifi- 
cations, — being, to us, in their resembling points, 
identical, they must, on the principle of Repetition, call 
up each other. This, of course, refers principally to 
suggestion for the first time. Subsequently, Redinte- 
gration co-operates with Repetition ; for now the re- 
sembling parts have formed together parts of the same 
mental whole, and are, moreover, associated both as 
similar and as contrasted. 

II. The Law of Contkast : Things, — thoughts, 
contrasted with each other (be the contrast one of con- 
trariety or of contradiction) , are mutually suggestive. 

1. All contrast is of things Contained under a com- 
mon notion. Qualities are contrasted only as they 
are similar. A good horse and a bad syllogism have 
no contrast. Virtue and vice agree as moral attri- 
butes ; great and little agree as quantities, and as ex- 
traordinary deflections from ordinary quantity. Even 
existence and non-existence are not opposed as differ- 
ent genera, but only as species of existence, — posi- 
tive existence and negative existence. Conspecies 
thus (as wolf and dog) may be associated either as 
similars or as contraries, — similars as opposed to ani- 
mals of other genera, — contraries as opposed to each 
other. Contraries are thus united under a higher no- 
tion. 

2. Affirmation of any quality involves the negation 
of its contradictory, — the affirmation of goodness is 
virtually the negation of badness ; and many terms 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 117 

for the contradictory qualities are only negations and 
affirmations, — just, unjust, — finite, infinite, — par- 
tial, impartial. Hence logical contradictory opposi- 
tion is even a stronger association than logical con- 
trariety, because only between two. 

3. Contrast is a relation, — the knowledge of con- 
traries is one. 

4. Consciousness is only of the distinguishable ; 
and therefore contrast most clearly distinguished must 
heighten consciousness. 

III. The Law of Co-adjacency : Things, — 
thoughts, related to each other as Cause and Effect, 
Whole and Parts, Substance and Attribute, Sign and 
Signified, are mutually suggestive. 

§ 2. SECONDARY LAWS OF REPRODUCTION. 

In obedience to the primary laws, movements sug- 
gest and are suggested in proportion to the strictness 
of the dependency between that prior and this poste- 
rior.. But such general relation between two thoughts 
— and on which are founded the two Abstract or 
Primary laws of Repetition and Redintegration — is 
frequently crossed, is frequently superseded, by an- 
other, and that a particular relation, which determines 
the suggestion of a movement not warranted by any 
dependence on its antecedent. To complete the laws 
of reproduction we must therefore recognize, as a 
Secondary or Concrete principle, what may be styled 
(under protest, for it is hardly deserving of the title 
Law), The Law of Preference: Thoughts are 
suggested, not merely by force of the general subjective 



118 AN OUTLINE OF 

relation subsisting between themselves; they are als'o 
suggested in proportion to the relation of interest (from 
whatever source) in which these stand to the individual 
mind. 

This general law of Preference yields, as its modes, 
the special secondary laws ; for, under the laws of 
possibility, one thought being associated with a plural- 
ity, and each of that plurality being therefore suggest- 
ible, it suggests one in preference to another according 
to two laws: (1.) By relation to itself, the thought 
most strictly associated with itself; (2.) By relation 
to mind, the thought most easily suggestible. That 
there must be two laws, is shown, because two associ- 
ated thoughts do not suggest each other with equal 
force. B may be very strongly associated with A, 
but A very slightly associated with B. This is two- 
fold ; (1.) in order of time, (2.) in order of interest. 

(A) Under the first head, that of suggestion by re- 
lation to the thought suggesting, may be stated the fol- 
lowing special laws : — 

I. The Law op Immediacy : Of two thoughts, if 
the one be immediately, the other mediately, connected 
with a third, the first will be suggested by the third in 
preference to the secoyid. 

- II. The Law of Homogeneity : A thought ivill 
suggest another of the same order in preference to one 
of a different order. 

Thus a smell will suggest a smell, a sight a sight, 
an imagination an imagination, in preference to a 
thought of a different class. 

(B) Under the second head, that of suggestion by 
relation to the mind, may be stated, as a special law, 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 119 

The Law of Facility : A thought easier to suggest 
will be roused in preference to a more difficult one. The 
easier are 

I. Those more clearly, strongly impressed than the 
reverse. Such are ideas more undistractedly, atten- 
tively received; in youth, in the morning; assisted 
by novelty, wonder, passion, etc. Hence, also, sights 
are more easily suggested than smells, imaginations 
than thoughts, etc. 

II. Those more recent, than older (cceteris par- 
ibus} . 

III. Those more frequently repeated (caiteris par- 
ibus) . 

IV. Those which stand more isolated from foreign 
and thwarting thoughts. 

V. Those which are more connected with homoge- 
neous and assisting thoughts. 

VI. Those more interesting to (1.) natural cogni- 
tive powers, talents ; (2.) acquired habits of cognition, 
studies ; (3.) temporary line of occupation. 

VII. Those more in harmony with affective dispo- 
sitions, (1.) natural, (2.) habitual, (3.) temporary. 1 
(Beid's Works, Note D***.) 



1 It is due to Sir William Hamilton to bear in mind, that bis the- 
ory of the laws of reproduction seems never to have been worked 
into a form perfectly satisfactory to himself. Nearly all that relates 
to the secondary laws, as well as to the special primary laws, is left 
in an unfinished state. The exposition in reference to these points, 
which I have given, is taken, with a few alterations and additions of 
expression, from the fragments obtained by Mr. Mansel among Sir 
William's papers. — J. C. M. 



120 AN OUTLINE OF 



§ 3. DISTINCTION OF SUGGESTION AND REMINISCENCE. 

The faculty of Reproduction may be considered as 
operating either spontaneously, without any interfer- 
ence of the will, or as modified in its action by the in- 
tervention of volition. In the one case, as in the 
other, the Reproductive Faculty acts in subservience 
to its own laws. In the former case, one thought is 
allowed to suggest another, according to the greater 
general connection subsisting between them ; in the 
latter, the act of volition, by concentrating attention 
upon a certain determinate class of associating circum- 
stances, bestows on these circumstances an extraordi- 
nary vivacity, and, consequently, enables them to ob- 
tain the preponderance, and exclusively to determine 
the succession of the intellectual train. The former 
of these cases, where the Reproductive Faculty is left 
wholly to itself, may not improperly be called Spon- 
taneous Suggestion, or Suggestion simply ; the latter 
ought to obtain the name of Reminiscence or Recol- 
lection. 

To form a correct notion of the phenomena of Rem- 
iniscence, it is requisite that we consider under what 
conditions it is determined to exertion. In the first 
place, it is to be noted that, at every crisis of our ex- 
istence, momentary circumstances are the causes which 
awaken our activity, and set our recollection at work 
to supply the necessaries of thought. In the second 
place, it is as constituting a want (and by want, I 
mean the result either of an act of desire or of voli- 
tion) , that the determining circumstance tends prin- 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'' S PHILOSOPHY. 121 

cipally to awaken the thoughts with which it is asso- 
ciated. This being the case, we should expect that 
each circumstance which constitutes a want should 
suggest, likewise, the notion of an object, or objects, 
proper to satisfy it ; and this is what actually hap- 
pens. It is, however, further to be observed, that it 
is not enough that the want suggests the idea of the 
object ; for if that idea were alone, it would remain 
without effect, since it could not guide me in the pro- 
cedure I should follow. It is necessary, at the same 
time, that to the idea of this object there shoidd be 
associated the notion of the relation of this object to 
the want, of the place where I may find it, of the 
means by which I may procure it, and turn it to ac- 
count, etc. For instance, I wish to make a quota- 
tion : this want awakens in me the idea of the author 
in whom the passage is to be found, which I am de- 
sirous of citing ; but this idea would be fruitless, un- 
less there were conjoined, at the same time, the 
representation of the volume, of the place where I 
may obtain it, of the means I must employ, etc. 

Hence I infer, in the first place, that a want does 
not awaken an idea of its object alone, but that it 
awakens it accompanied with a number, more or less 
considerable, of accessory notions, which form, as it 
were, its train or attendance. This train may vary 
according to the nature of the want which suggests 
the notion of an object ; but the train can never fall 
wholly off, and it becomes more indissolubly attached 
to the object, in proportion as it has been more fre- 
quently called up in attendance. 

I infer, in the second place, that this accompani- 



122 AN OUTLINE OF 

ment of accessory notions, simultaneously suggested 
with the principal idea, is far from being as vividly 
and distinctly represented in consciousness as that 
idea itself; and when these accessories have once 
been completely blended with the habits of the mind, 
and its reproductive agency, they at length finally dis- 
appear, becoming fused, as it were, in the conscious- 
ness of the idea to which they are attached. 

Thus, if we appreciate correctly the phenomena of 
Reproduction or Reminiscence, we shall recognize, as 
an incontestable fact, that our thoughts suggest each 
other, not one by one successively, as the order to 
which language is astricted might lead us to infer ; 
but that the complement of circumstances, under which 
we at every moment exist, awakens simultaneously 
a great number of thoughts ; these it calls into the 
presence of the mind, either to place them at our dis- 
posal, if we find it requisite to employ them, or to 
make them co-operate in our deliberations, by giving 
them, according to their nature and our habits, an 
influence, more or less active, on our judgments and 
consequent acts. 

It is also to be observed, that, in this great crowd 
of thoughts always present to the mind, there is only 
a small number of which we are distinctly conscious ; 
and that, in this small number, we ought to distinguish 
those which, being clothed in language oral or men- 
tal, become the objects of a more fixed attention; 
those which hold a closer relation to circumstances 
more impressive than others ; or which receive a pre- 
dominant character by the more vigorous attention we 
bestow on them. As to the others, although not the 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON 's PHILOSOPHY. 123 

objects of clear consciousness, they are nevertheless 
present to the mind, there to perform a very impor- 
tant part as motive principles of determination ; and 
the influence which they exert in this capacity is even 
the more powerful in proportion as it is less apparent, 
being more disguised by habit. (Led. on 3Ietaj)h., 
XXXII.) 



PHENOMENOLOGY OE THE COGNITIONS. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

THE REPRESENTATIVE FACULTY. 

By the faculty of Representation, as I formerly men- 
tioned, I mean strictly the power the mind has of 
holding up vividly before itself the thoughts which, 
by the act of Eeproduction, it has recalled into con- 
sciousness. Though the processes of Representation 
and Reproduction cannot exist independently of each 
other, they are nevertheless not more to be confounded 
into one than those of Reproduction and Conservation. 
They are, indeed, discriminated by differences suffi- 
ciently decisive. Reproduction, as we have seen, op- 
erates, in part at least, out of consciousness. Repre- 
sentation, on the contrary, is only realized as it is 
realized in consciousness ; the degree or vivacity of 
the Representation being always in proportion to the 
degree or vivacity of our consciousness of its reality. 
Nor are the energies of Representation and Reproduction 
always exerted by the same individual in equal inten- 
sity, any more than the energies of Reproduction and 
Retention. Some minds are distinguished for a higher 

124 



AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 125 

power of manifesting one of these phenomena ; others, 
for manifesting another ; and as it is not always the 
person who forgets nothing who can most promptly 
recall what he retains, so neither is it always the per- 
son who recollects most easily and correctly who can 
exhibit what he remembers in the most vivid colors. 
It is to be recollected, however, that Retention, Re- 
production, and Representation, though not in differ- 
ent persons of the same relative vigor, are, however, 
in the same individuals, all strong or weak in refer- 
ence to the same classes of objects. For example, if 
a man's memory be more peculiarly retentive of words, 
his verbal reminiscence and imagination will, in like 
manner, be more particularly energetic. 

In common language, it is not of course to be ex- 
pected that there should be found terms to express 
the result of an analysis which had not even been per- 
formed by philosophers ; and, accordingly, the term 
Imagination, or Phantasy, which denotes most 
nearly the Representative process, does this, how- 
ever, not without an admixture of other processes, 
which it is of consequence for scientific precision that 
we should consider apart. 

In the view I take of the fundamental processes, 
the act of Representation is merely the energy of the 
mind in holding up to its own contemplation what it 
is determined to represent. I distinguish, as essen- 
tially different, the Representation and the determi- 
nation to represent. I exclude from the Faculty of 
Representation all power of preference among the ob- 
jects it holds up to view. This is the function of 
faculties wholly different from that of Representation, 



126 AN OUTLINE OF 

which, though active in representing, is wholly pas- 
sive as to what it represents. What, then, it maybe 
asked, are the powers by which the Representative 
Faculty is determined to represent, and to represent 
this particular object, or this particular complement 
of objects, and not any other? These are two. 

1. The first of these is the Reproductive Faculty. 
This faculty is the great immediate source from which 
the Representative receives both the materials and the 
determination to represent ; and the laws by which 
the Reproductive Faculty is governed govern also the 
Representative. Accordingly, if there were no other 
laws in the arrangement and combination of thought 
than those of association, the Representative Faculty 
would be determined in its manifestations, and in the 
character of its manifestations, by the Reproductive 
Faculty alone ; and, on this supposition, Representa- 
tion could no more be distinguished from Reproduc- 
tion than Reproduction from Association. 

2. But there is another elementary process which 
we have not yet considered : Comparison, or the 
Faculty of Relations , to which the representative act is 
likewise subject, and which plays a conspicuous part 
in determining in what combinations objects are rep- 
resented. By the process of Comparison, the complex 
objects, called up by the Reproductive Faculty, un- 
dergo various operations. They are separated into 
parts ; they are analyzed into elements ; and these 
parts and elements are again compounded in every 
various fashion. In all this the Representative Fac- 
ulty co-operates. It, first of all, exhibits the phe- 
nomena so called up by the laws of ordinary associa- 



sir William Hamilton's philosophy. 127 

lion. In this it acts as handmaid to the Reproductive 
Faculty. It then exhibits the phenomena as variously 
elaborated by the analysis and synthesis of the Com- 
parative Faculty, to which, in like manner, it performs 
the part of a subsidiary. 

1 This being understood, you will easily perceive 
that the Imagination of common language — the 
Productive Imagination of philosophers — is nothing 
but the Representative process, plus the process to 
which I would give the name of the Comparative. In 
this compound operation, it is true that the Represen- 
tative act is the most conspicuous, perhaps the most 
essential, element. For, in the^rs^ place, it is a con- 
dition of the possibility of the act of comparison, that 
the material on which it operates (that is, the objects 
reproduced in their natural connections) should be 
held up to its observation in a clear light, in order 
that it may take note of their various circumstances 
of relation ; and, in the second, that the result of its 
own elaboration, that is, the new arrangements which 
it proposes, should be realized in a vivid act of Rep- 
resentation. Thus it is, that, in the view both of 
the vulgar and of philosophers, the more obtrusive, 
though really the more subordinate, element in this 
compound process has been elevated into the princi- 
pal constituent ; whereas, the act of Comparison — 
the act of separation and reconstruction — has been re- 
garded as identical with the act of Representation. 

Thus Imagination, in the common acceptation of 
the term, is not a simple but a compound faculty, — 
a faculty, however, in which Representation forms the 
principal constituent. If, therefore, we were. obliged 



128 AN OUTLINE OF 

to find a common word for every elementary process 
of our analysis, Imagination would be the term which, 
with the least violence to its meaning, could be ac- 
commodated to express the Kepresentative Faculty. 

By Imagination, thus limited, you are not to sup- 
pose that the faculty of representing mere objects of 
sense alone is meant. On the contrary, a vigorous 
power of Kepresentation is as indispensable a condi- 
tion of success in the abstract sciences as in the poet- 
ical and plastic arts ; and it may, accordingly, be 
reasonably doubted whether Aristotle or Homer were 
possessed of the more powerful Imagination. The 
term Imagination, however, is less generally applied 
to the representations of the Comparative Faculty 
considered in the abstract than to the representations 
of sensible objects concretely modified by comparison. 
The two kinds of imagination are, in fact, not fre- 
quently combined. Accordingly, using the term in 
this its ordinary extent, that is, in its limitation to 
objects of sense, it is finely said by Mr. Hume : 
"Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights 
of imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of 
more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright 
fancies may, in this respect, be compared to those 
angels whom the Scriptures represent as covering 
their eyes with their wings." 

Dreaming, Somnambulism, Eeverie, are so many 
effects of imagination determined by association, — at 
least, states of mind in which these have a decisive in- 
fluence. 

1. Dreaming. If an impression on the sense often 
commences a dream, it is by imagination and sugges- 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 129 

tion that it is developed and accomplished. Dreams 
have frequently a degree of vivacity which enables 
them to compete with the reality ; and if the events 
which they represent to us were in accordance with 
the circumstances of time and place in which we stand, 
it would be almost impossible to distinguish a vivid 
dream from a sensible perception. " If," says Pascal,, 
" we dreamt every night the same thing, it would per- 
haps affect us as powerfully as the objects which we 
perceive every day. And if an artisan were certain 
of dreaming every night for twelve hours that he was 
a king, I am convinced that he would be almost as 
happy as a king who dreamt for twelve hours that 

he was an artisan It is only because 

dreams are different and inconsistent, that we can say, 
when we awake, that we have dreamt; for life is a 
dream a little less inconstant." 

The influence of dreams upon our character is not 
without its interest. A particular tendency may be 
strengthened in, a man solely by the repeated action 
of dreams. Dreams do not, however, as is commonly 
supposed, afford any appreciable indication of the 
character of individuals. It is not always the subjects 
that occupy us most when awake that form the mat- 
ter of our dreams ; and it is curious that the persons 
the dearest to us are precisely those about whom we 
dream most rarely. 

2. Somnambulism is a phenomenon still more as- 
tonishing. In this singular state, a person performs 
a regular series of rational actions, and those fre- 
quently of the most difficult and delicate nature, and, 
what is still more marvellous, with a talent to which 
9 



130 AN OUTLINE OF 

he could make no pretension when awake. His mem- 
ory and reminiscence supply him with recollections 
of words and things which perhaps were never at 
his disposal in the ordinary state ; he speaks more 
fluently a more refined language ; and, if we are 
to credit what the evidence on which it rests 
hardly allows us to disbelieve, he has not only per- 
ceptions through other channels than the common or- 
gans of sense, but the sphere of his cognitions is am- 
plified to an extent far beyond the limits to which 
sensible perception is confined. This subject is one 
of the most perplexing in the whole compass of phi- 
losophy ; for, on the one hand, the phenomena are so 
marvellous that they cannot be believed, and yet, on 
the other, they are of so unambiguous and palpable 
a character, and the witnesses to their reality are so 
numerous, so intelligent, and so high above every 
suspicion of deceit, that it is equally impossible to 
deny credit to what is attested by such ample and un- 
exceptionable evidence. 

3. Reverie. The third state, that of Reverie, or 
castle-building, is a kind of wakiug dream, and does 
not differ from dreaming, except by the consciousness 
which accompanies it. In this state, the mind aban- 
dons itself without a choice of subject, without control 
over the mental train, to the involuntary associa- 
tions of imagination. It is thus occupied without 
being properly active ; it is active, at least, without 
effort. Young persons, women, the old, the unem- 
ployed, and the idle, are all disposed to reverie. 
There is a pleasure attached to its illusions, which 
renders it as seductive as it is dangerous. The mind, 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 131 

by indulgence in this dissipation, becomes enervated ; 
it acquires the habit of a pleasing idleness, loses its 
activity, and at length even the power and the desire 
of action. 

Organs of Imagination. I shall terminate the 
consideration of Imagination Proper by a speculation 
concerning the organ which it employs in the repre- 
sentations of sensible objects. The organ which it 
thus employs seems to be no other than the organs 
themselves of Sense, on which the original impressions 
were made, and through which they were originally 
perceived. Experience has shown that Imagination 
depends on no one part of the cerebral apparatus ex- 
clusively. There is no portion of the brain which has 
not been destroyed by mollification, or induration, or 
external lesion, without the general faculty of Repre- 
sentation being injured. But experience equally 
proves that the intracranial portion of any external 
organ of sense cannot be destroyed without a certain 
partial abolition of the Imagination Proper. For ex- 
ample, there are many cases recorded by medical ob- 
servers, of persons losing their sight, who have also 
lost the faculty of representing the images of visible 
objects. They no longer call up such objects by remi- 
niscence ; they no longer dream of them. Now, in 
these cases, it is found that not merely the external 
instrument. of sight — the eye — has been disorgan- 
ized, but that the disorganization has extended to 
those parts of the brain which constitute the internal 
instrument of this sense, that is, the optic nerves and 
thalami. If the latter — the real organ of vision — 
remain sound, the eye alone being destroyed, the im- 



132 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON' S PHILOSOPHY. 

agination of colors and forms remains as vigorous as 
when vision was entire. Similar cases are recorded 
in regard to the deaf. These facts, added to the ob- 
servation of the internal phenomena which take place 
during our acts of representation, make it, I think, 
more than probable that there are as many organs of 
Imagination as there are organs of Sense. Thus I 
have a distinct consciousness, that, in the internal 
representation of visible objects, the same organs are 
at work which operate in the External Perception of 
these ; and the same holds good in an imagination of 
the objects of Hearing, Touch, Taste, and Smell. 

But not only sensible perceptions, voluntary mo- 
tions, likewise, are imitated in and by the imagination. 
I. can, in imagination, represent the action of speech, 
the play of the muscles- of the countenance, the move- 
ment of the limbs ; and when I do this, I feel clearly 
that I awaken a kind of tension in the same nerves 
through which, by an act of will, I can determine an 
overt and voluntary motion of the muscles ; nay, 
when the play of imagination is very lively, this ex- 
ternal movement is actually determined. Thus we 
frequently see the countenances of persons, under the 
influence of imagination, undergo various changes ; 
they gesticulate with their hands, they talk to them- 
selves, and all this is in consequence only of the im- 
agined activity going out into real activity. I should, 
therefore, be disposed to conclude, that, as in Percep- 
tion, the living organs of sense are from without de- 
termined to energy, so, in Imagination, they are de- 
termined to a similar energy by an influence from 
within. (Lect. on Metaph., XXXIII.) 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 



CHAPTER V 



THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY. 



The faculties Avith which we have been hitherto 
engaged may be regarded as subsidiary to that which 
we are now about to consider. This, to which I gave 
the name of the Elaborative Faculty, the Faculty of 
Relations, or Comparison, constitutes what is properly 
denominated Thought, and corresponds to what the 
Greek philosophers understood by dtdvota, the Latin by 
Discursus. It supposes always at least two terms, 
and its act results in a judgment, that is, an affirma- 
tion or negation of one of these terms of the other. 

In opposition to the views hitherto promulgated in 
regard to Comparison, I will show that this facuhy is 
at work in every, the simplest, act of mind ; and that 
from the primary affirmation of existence in an origi- 
nal act of consciousness to the judgment contained in 
the conclusion of an act of reasoning, every operation 
is only an evolution of the same elemental process, 
— that there is a difference in the complexity, none 
in the nature of the act. What I have, therefore, to 

133 



134 AN OUTLINE OF 

prove is, in the first place, that Comparison is sup- 
posed in every, the simplest, act of knowledge ; in the 
second, that our factitiously simple, our factitiously 
complex, our abstract, and our generalized notions 
are all merely so many products of Comparison ; in 
the third, that Judgment, and, in the fourth, that 
Reasoning, is identical with Comparison. 

§ 1. PRIMARY ACTS OF COMPARISON. 

1. The first or most elementary act of Comparison, 
or of that mental process in which the relation of two 
terms is recognized and affirmed, is the judgment vir- 
tually pronounced, in an act of Perception, of the 
Non-ego, or, in an act of Self-consciousness, of the 
Ego. This is the primary affirmation of existence. 
The notion of existence is one native to the mind . It 
is the primary condition of thought. The first act of 
experience awoke it, and the first act of consciousness 
was a subsumption of that of which we were conscious 
under this notion ; in other words, the first act of 
consciousness was an affirmation of the existence of 
something. The first or simplest act of Comparison 
is thus the discrimination of existence from non-ex- 
istence ; and the first or simplest judgment is the 
affirmation of existence, in other words, the denial of 
non-existence. 

2. But the something of which we are conscious, 
and of which we predicate existence, in the primary 
judgment, is twofold, — the Ego and the Non-ego. 
We are conscious of both, and affirm existence of 
both. But we do more ; we do not merely affirm the 



SIR 1VILLIAM HAMILTON' S PHILOSOPHY. 135 

existence of each out of relation to the other, but, in 
affirming their existence, we affirm their existence in 
duality, in difference, in mutual contrast; that is, we 
not only affirm the Ego to exist, but deny it existing 
as the Non-ego ; we not only affirm the Non-ego to 
exist, but deny it existing as the Ego. The second 
act of Comparison is thus the discrimination of the 
Ego and the Non-ego ; and the second judgment is 
the affirmation that each is not the other. 

3. The third gradation in the act of Comparison is 
in the recognition of the multiplicity of the coexistent 
or successive phenomena, presented either to Percep- 
tion or Self-consciousness, and the judgment in regard 
to their resemblance or dissimilarity. 

4. The fourth is the Comparison of the phenomena 
with the native notion of Substance, and the judgment 
is the grouping of these phenomena into different bun- 
dles, as the attributes of different subjects. In the 
external world this relation constitutes the distinction 
of things ; in the internal, the distinction of pow- 
ers. 

5. The fifth act of Comparison is the collation of 
successive phenomena under the native notion of Caus- 
alit}^, and the affirmation or negation of their mutual 
relation as cause and effect. 

§ 2. CLASSIFICATION. 

So for, the process of Comparison is determined 
merely by objective conditions ; hitherto, it has fol- 
lowed only in the footsteps of nature. In those, 
again, we are now to consider, the procedure is, in a 



136 AN OUTLINE OF 

certain sort, artificial, and determined by the necessi- 
ties of the thinking subject itself. The mind is finite 
in its powers of comprehension ; the objects, on the 
contrary, which are presented to it, are, in proportion 
to its limited capacities, infinite in number. How, 
then, is this disproportion to be equalized? How can 
the infinity of nature be brought down to the finitude 
of man? This is done by means of Classification. 
Objects, though infinite in number, are not infinite in 
variety ; they are all, in a certain sort, repetitions of 
the same common qualities, and the mind, though lost 
in the multitude of individuals, can easily grasp the 
classes into which their resembling attributes enable 
us to assort them. This whole process of Classifica- 
tion is a mere act of Comparison, as the following de- 
duction will show. 

(A) Collective Notions. In the first place, this 
may be shown in regard to the formation of complex 
notions, with which, as the simplest species of classi- 
fication, we may commence. By Complex or Collec- 
tive notions I mean merely the notion of a class formed 
by the repetition of the same constituent notion. 
Such are the notions of an army, a forest, a town, a 
number. These are the names of classes, formed 
by the repetition of the notion of a soldier, of a tree, 
of a house, of a unit. You are not to confound, as 
has sometimes been done, the notion of an army, a for- 
est, a town, a number, with the notions of army , forest, 
town, and number; the former, as I have said, are 
complex or collective, the latter are general or univer- 
sal notions. 

It is evident that a collective notion is the result of 



sin iriLLiAJi Hamilton's philosophy. 137 

comparison. The repetition of the same constituent 
notion supposes that these notions were compared, 
their identity or absolute similarity affirmed. 

In the whole process of classification the mind is in 
a great measure dependent upon language for its suc- 
cess ; and in this, the simplest of the acts of Classifica- 
tion, it may be proper to show how language affords 
to mind the assistance it requires. Our complex no- 
tions being formed by the repetition of the same notion, 
it is evident that the difficulty we can experience in 
forming an adequate conception of a class of identical 
constituents will be determined by the difficulty we 
have in conceiving a multitude. The comprehension 
of the mind is limited ; it can embrace at once but a 
small number of objects. It would thus seem that an 
obstacle is raised to the extension of our complex ideas 
at the very outset of our combinations. How, then, 
does the mind proceed? When, by a first combina- 
tion, we have obtained a complement of notions as 
complex as the mind can embrace, we give this com- 
plement a name. This being done, we regard the as- 
semblage of units thus bound up under a collective 
name as itself a unit, and proceed, by a second combi- 
nation, to accumulate these into a new complement of 
the same extent. To this new complement we give 
another name ; and then again proceed to perform, on 
this more complex unit, the same operation we had 
performed on the first ; and so we may go on rising 
from complement to complement to an indefinite ex- 
tent. Thus, a merchant, having received a large un- 
known sum of money in crowns, counts out the pieces 
by fives, and having done this till he has reached 



138 AN OUTLINE OF 

twenty, he lays them together in a heap ; around 
these he assembles similar piles of coin, till they 
amount, let us say, to twenty ; and he then puts the 
whole four hundred into a bag. In this manner he 
proceeds, until he fills a number of bags, and placing 
the whole in his coffers, he will have a complex or 
collective notion of the quantity of crowns which he 
has received. It is on this principle that arithmetic 
proceeds ; tens, hundreds, thousands, myriads, hun- 
dreds of thousands, millions, etc., are all so many 
factitious units, which enable us to form notions, vague 
indeed, of what otherwise we could have obtained no 
conception at all. So much for complex or collective 
notions, formed without decomposition, — a process 
which I now go on to consider. 

(B) Abstraction. Our thought, that is, the sum 
total of the Perceptions and Representations which 
occupy us at any given moment, is always, as I have 
frequently observed, compound. The composite ob- 
jects of thoughts may be decomposed in two ways, 
and for the sake of two different interests. 

1. In the first place, we may decompose in order 
that we may recombine, influenced by the mere pleas- 
ure which this plastic operation affords us. This is 
poetical analysis and synthesis. On this process it is 
needless to dwell. It is evidently the work of com- 
parison. For example, the minotaur, or chimsera, 
or centaur, or gryphon (hippogryph) , or any other 
poetical combination of different animals, could only 
have been effected by an act in which the representa- 
tions of these animals were compared, and in which 
certain parts of one were affirmed compatible with 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 139 

certain parts of another. How, again, is the imagina- 
tion of all ideal beauty or perfection formed '? Simply 
by comparing the various beauties or excellences of 
which we have had actual experience, and thus being 
enabled to pronounce in regard to their common and 
essential quality. 

2. In the second place, we may decompose in the 
interest of science ; and as the poetical composition 
was principally accomplished by a separation of in- 
tegral parts, so this is principally accomplished by an 
abstraction of constituent qualities. On this process 
it is necessary to be more particular. 

Suppose an unknown body is presented to my 
senses, and that it is capable of affecting each of these 
in a certain manner. As furnished with five different 
organs, each of which serves to introduce a certain 
class of perceptions and representations into the mind, 
we naturally distribute all sensible objects into five 
species of qualities. The abstraction of the senses is 
thus an operation the most natural ; it is even impos- 
sible for us not to perform it. Let us now see 
whether abstraction by the mind be more arduous than 
that of the senses. 

We have formerly found that the comprehension of 
the mind is extremely limited : it can only take cog- 
nizance of one object at a time, if that be known with 
full intensity ; and it can accord a simultaneous at- 
tention to a very small plurality of objects, and even 
that imperfectly. Thus it is that attention fixed on 
one object is tantamount to a withdrawal, to an ab- 
straction, of consciousness from every other. The ab- 
straction of the intellect is thus as natural as that of 



140 AN OUTLINE OF 

the senses ; it is even imposed by the very constitu- 
tion of our minds. 

But is Abstraction, or rather, is exclusive attention 
the work of Comparison ? This is evident. The ap- 
plication of attention to a particular object, or quality 
of an object, supposes a choice or preference, and this 
again supposes Comparison and Judgment. But this 
may be made more manifest from a view of the 
act of generalization, on which we are about to en- 
ter. 

(C) Generalization. The notion of the figure of 
the desk before me is an abstract idea, — an idea that 
makes part of the total notion of that body, and on 
which I have concentrated my attention, in order to 
consider it exclusively. This idea is abstract, but it 
is at the same time individual ; it represents the fig- 
ure of this particular desk, and not the figure of any 
other body. But had we only individual abstract no- 
tions, what would be our knowledge? We should be 
cognizant only of qualities viewed apart from their 
subjects (and of separate phenomena there exists none 
in nature) ; and as these qualities are also separate 
from each other, we should have no knowledge of 
their mutual relations. We should also be over- 
whelmed with their number. 

It is necessary, therefore, that we should form Ab- 
stract General notions. This is done when, comparing 
a number of objects, we seize on their resemblances ; 
when we conceutrate our attention on these points 
of similarity, thus abstracting the mind from a consid- 
eration of their differences ; and when we give a name 
to our notion of that circumstance in which they all 



sin wiLLTAM Hamilton's philosophy. 141 

agree. The General Notion is thus one which makes 
us know a quality, property, power, action, relation ; 
in short, any point of view uucler which we recog- 
nize a plurality of objects as a unity. It makes us 
aware of a quality, a point of view, common to many 
things. It is a notion of resemblance ; hence the 
reason why general names or terms, the signs of gen- 
eral notions, have been called terms of resemblance 
{termini similitadinis) . In this process of Generali- 
zation we do not stop short at a first Generalization. 
By a first Generalization we have obtained a num- 
ber of classes of resembling individuals. But these 
classes we can compare together, observe their simi- 
larities, abstract from their dhTerences, and bestow on 
their common circumstance a common name. On 
these second classes we can again perform the same 
operation, and thus ascending the scale of general no- 
tions, throwing out of view always a greater number 
of differences, and seizing always on fewer similarities 
in the formation of our classes, we arrive at length 
at the limit of our ascent in the notion of being or ex- 
istence. Thus placed on the summit of the scale of 
classes, we descend by a process the reverse of that 
by which we have ascended ; we divide and subdivide 
the classes, by introducing always more and more 
characters, and laying always fewer differences aside ; 
the notions become more and more composite, until 
we at length arrive at the individual. 

I may here notice that there is a twofold kind of 
quantity to be considered in notions. It is evident 
that in proportion as the class is high it will, in the first 
place, contain under it a greater number of classes, 



142 AN OUTLINE OF 

and, in the second, will include the smallest com- 
plement of attributes. Thus being or existence con- 
tains under it every class ; and yet, when we say that 
a thing exists, we say the very least of it that is pos- 
sible. On the other hand, an individual, though it 
contain nothing but itself, involves the largest amount 
of predication. For example, when I say, This is 
Richard, I not only affirm of the subject every class 
from existence down to man, but likewise a number 
of circumstances proper to Richard as an individual. 
Now, the former of these quantities, the external, is 
called the Extension of a notion ; the latter, the in- 
ternal quantity, is called its Comprehension or Inten- 
sion. They are in the inverse ratio of each other : 
the greater the Extension, the less the Comprehen- 
sion ; the greater the Comprehension, the less the Ex- 
tension. 

Having given you this necessary information in re- 
gard to the nature of Generalization, I proceed to con- 
sider one of the most simple, and, at the same time, 
one of the most perplexed, problems in philosophy, — 
in regard to the object of consciousness, when we em- 
ploy a general term. In the explanation of the pro- 
cess of Generalization, all philosophers are at one ; 
the only differences that arise among them relate to 
the point, whether we can form an adequate idea of 
that which is denoted by an abstract, or abstract and 
general term. 

Throwing out of account the ancient doctrine of 
Realism, which is curious only in an historical point 
of view, there are two opinions which still divide phi- 
losophers. Some maintain that every act and every 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 143 

object of mind is necessarily singular, and that the 
name is that alone which can pretend to generality. 
Others, again, hold that the mind is capable of forming 
notions, representations, correspondent in universality 
to the classes contained under, or expressed by, the gen- 
eral term. The former is the doctrine of Nominalism ; 
the latter, the doctrine of Conceptualism. 

The Nominalists maintain that every notion, con- 
sidered in itself, is singular, but becomes, as it were, 
general, through the intention of the mind to make it 
represent every resembling notion, or notion of the 
same class. Take, for example, the term man. Here 
we can call up no notion, no idea, corresponding to 
the universality of the class or term. This is mani- 
festly impossible. For as man involves contradictory 
attributes, and as contradictions cannot coexist in one 
representation, an idea or notion adequate to man can- 
not be realized in thought. The class man includes 
individuals, male and female, white and black and 
copper-colored, tall and short, fat and thin, straight 
and crooked, whole and mutilated, etc., etc. ; and the 
notion of the class must, therefore, at once represent 
all and none of these. It is, therefore, evident, though 
the absurdity was maintained by Locke, that we can- 
not accomplish this ; and, this being impossible, we 
cannot represent to ourselves the class man by any 
equivalent notion or idea. All that we can do is to 
call up some individual image, and consider it as rep- 
resenting, though inadequately representing, the gen- 
erality. This we easily do, for as we can call into 
imagination any individual, so we can make that indi- 
vidual image stand for any or for every other which 



144 AN OUTLINE OF 

it resembles in those essential points which constitute 
the identity of the class. This opinion, which, after 
Hobbes, has been maintained, among others, by 
Berkeley, Hume, Adam Smith, Campbell, and Stew- 
art, appears to me not only true, but self-evident. 

A general notion is nothing but the abstract notion 
of a circumstance in which a number of individual ob- 
jects are found to agree, that is, to resemble each 
other. Now, resemblance, being a relation, cannot 
be represented in Imagination. 1 The two terms, the 
two relative objects, can be severally imaged in the 
sensible phantasy, but not the relation itself. This is 
the object of the Comparative Faculty, or of Intelli- 
gence Proper. To objects so different as the images 
of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence, 
different names ought to be given; and, accordingly, 
this has been clone wherever a philosophical nomen- 
clature of the slightest pretensions to perfection has 
been formed. In the German language, which is now 
the richest in metaphysical expressions of any living 
tongue, the two kinds of objects are carefully distin- 
guished. In our language, on the contrary, the terms- 
idea, conception, notion, are used almost as convertible 
for either ; and the vagueness and confusion which is 
thus produced, even within the narrow sphere of spec- 
ulation to which the want of the distinction also con- 
fines us, can be best appreciated by those who are 



1 It must be observed that the term Imagination is here used for 
the representation of sensible objects alone. See above, p. 128. — 
J. C. M. 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 145 

conversant with the philosophy of the different coun- 
tries. 1 

In connection with general terms, another curious 
question has likewise divided philosophers. It is this : 
Does Language originate in General Appellatives or 
by Proper Names? Did mankind, in the formation 
of language, and do children, in their first application 
of it, commence with the one kind of words or with 
the other? The determination of this question — 
the question of the Primum Cognitum, as it was 
called in the Schools — is not involved in the question 
of Nominalism. On this question two opposite theo- 
ries have been advanced. 

1. Many illustrious philosophers have maintained 
that all terms, as at first employed, are expressive of 
individual objects, and that these only subsequently ob- 
tain a general acceptation. This opinion I find main- 
tained by Vives, Locke, Rousseau, Condillac, Adam 
Smith, Steinbart, Tittel, Brown, and others. "There 
is nothing," says Locke, "more evident than that the 
ideas of the persons children converse with (to in- 
stance in them alone) are like the persons themselves, 
only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the 
mother are well framed in their minds ; and, like pic- 
tures of them there, represent only those individuals. 
The ..names they first gave to them are confined to 
these individuals ; and the names of nurse and mamma, 
the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. 



1 In the Lect. on Metaph. (Lect. XXXV.) will be found an elabo- 
rate critique of the doctrine of Conceptualism, in the form in which 
it was maintained by Dr. Thomas Brown. — J. C. M. 
10 



146 AN OUTLINE OF 

Afterwards, when time ahd a larger acquaintance have 
made them observe that there are a great many other 
things in the world that in some common agreements 
of shape and several other qualities resemble their 
father and mother, and those persons they have been 
used to, they frame an idea which they find those 
many particulars do partake in ; and to that they give, 
with others, the name man, for example. And thus 
they come to have a general name and a general 
idea." l 

2. On the other hand, an opposite doctrine is main- 
tained by many profound philosophers. " General 
terms," says Leibnitz, "serve not only for the perfec- 
tion of languages, but are even necessary for their es- 
sential constitution. For if by particulars be under- 
stood things individual, it would be impossible to 
speak, if there were only proper names, and no appel- 
latives, that is to say, if there were only names for 
things individual, since, at every moment, we are met 
by new ones, when we treat of persons, of accidents, 
and especially of actions, which are those that we de- 
scribe the most ; but if by particulars be meant the 
lowest species (species infimce) , besides that it is fre- 
quently very difficult to determine them, it is manifest 
that these are already universals, founded on similarity. 
Now, as the only difference of species and genera lies 
in a similarity of greater or less extent, it is natural 
to note every kind of similarity or agreement, and 
consequently to employ general terms of every de- 
gree ; nay, the most general being less complex with 

1 Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, III., 3, 7. 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON 3 S PHILOSOPHY. 147 

regard to the essences which they comprehend, al- 
though more extensive in relation to the things indi- 
vidual to which they apply, are frequently the easiest 
to form, and arc the most useful. It is likewise seen 
that children, and those who know but little of the 
language which they attempt to speak, or little of the 
subject on which they would employ it, make use of 
general terms, as thing, plant, animal, instead of us- 
ing proper names, of which they are destitute. And 
it is certain that all proper or individual names have 
been originally appellative or general." l 

3. But I have now to state a third opinion, inter- 
mediate between these, which conciliates both, and 
seems, moreover, to carry a superior probability in its 
statement. This opinion maintains, that, as our 
knowledge proceeds from the confused to the distinct, 
so, in the mouths of children, language at first ex- 
presses neither the precisely general nor the determi- 
nately particular, but the vague and confused; and 
that, out of this, the universal is elaborated by gen- 
erification, the particular and singular by specifica- 
tion and individualization. 

Though our capacity of attention be very limited in 
regard to the number of objects on which a faculty 
can be simultaneously directed, yet these objects may 
be large or small. We may make, for example, a 
single object of attention either of a whole man, or of 
his face, or of his eye, or of the pupil of his eye, or 
of a speck upon the pupil. To each of these objects 
there can only be a certain amount of attentive per- 

1 Nouveaux Essais, Lib. III., cap. 1. 



148 AN OUTLINE OF 

ception applied, and we can concentrate it all on any- 
one. In proportion as the object is larger and more 
complex, our attention can of course be less applied 
to any part of it, and, consequently, our knowledge of 
it in detail will be vaguer and more imperfect. But 
having first acquired a comprehensive knowledge of it 
as a whole, we can descend to its several parts, con- 
sider these both in themselves, and in relation to each 
other, and to the whole of which they are constituents, 
and thus attain to a complete and articulate knowledge 
of the object. We decompose, and then we recom- 
pose. 

But in this we always proceed first by decomposi- 
tion or analysis. All analysis indeed supposes a fore- 
gone composition or synthesis, because we cannot 
decompose what is not already composite. But in 
our acquisition of knowledge, the objects are pre- 
sented to us compounded ; and they obtain a unity only 
in the unity of our consciousness. The unity of con- 
sciousness is, as it were, the frame in which objects 
are seen. I say, then, that the first procedure of 
mind in the elaboration of its knowledge is always 
analytical. It descends from the whole to the parts, 
— from the vague to the definite. Definitude, that is, 
a knowledge of minute differences, is not, as the op- 
posite theory supposes., the first, but the last, term of 
our cognitions. Between two sheep an ordinary spec- 
tator can probably apprehend no difference, and if 
they were twice presented to him, he would be unable 
to discriminate the one from the other. But a shep- 
herd can distinguish every individual sheep ; and 
why? Because he has descended from the vague 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 149 

knowledge which we all have of sheep, — from the 
vague knowledge which makes every sheep, as it were, 
only a repetition of the same undifferenced unit, — to 
a definite knowledge of qualities by which each is con- 
trasted from its neighbor. Now, in this example, we 
apprehend the sheep by marks not less individual than 
those by which the shepherd discriminates them ; but 
the whole of each sheep being made an object, the 
marks by which we know it are the same in each and 
all, and cannot, therefore, afford the principle by 
which we can discriminate them from each other. 
Now this is what appears to me to take place with 
children. They first know the things and persons 
presented to them as wholes. But wholes of the same 
kind, if we do not descend to their parts, afford us no 
mark by which we can discriminate the one from the 
other. Children, thus, originally perceiving similar 
objects — persons, for example — only as wholes, 
do at first hardly distinguish them. They apprehend 
first the more obtrusive marks that separate species 
from species, and, in consequence of the notorious con- 
trast of dress, men from women ; but they do not as 
yet recognize the finer traits that discriminate indi- 
vidual from individual. But, though thus apprehend- 
ing individuals only by what we now call their specific 
or their generic qualities, it is not to be supposed 
that children know them by any abstract general 
attributes ; that is, by attributes formed by com- 
parison and attention. On the other hand, because 
their knowledge is not general, it is not to be sup- 
posed to be particular or individual, if by particular 
be meant a separation of species from species, and by 



150 AN OUTLINE OF 

individual, the separation of individual from indi- 
vidual ; for children are at first apt to confound in- 
dividuals together, not only in name, but in reality. 

What I have now said is, I think, sufficient in regard 
to the nature of Generalization. It is notoriously a mere 
act of Comparison. We compare objects ; we find 
them similar in certain respects, that is, in certain 
respects they affect us in the same manner ; we con- 
sider the qualities in them, that thus affect us in the 
same manner, as the same ; and to this common qual- 
ity we give a name ; and as we can predicate this 
name of all and each of the resembling objects, it con- 
stitutes them into a class. Aristotle has truly said 
that general names are only abbreviated definitions, 
and definitions, you know, are judgments. For ex- 
ample, animal is only a compendious expression for 
organized and animated body ; man, only a summary 
of rational animal, etc. 

§ 3. JUDGMENT. 

In the processes of judgment and reasoning, the act 
of Comparison is a judgment of something more than 
a mere affirmation of the existence of a phenomenon, 
— something more than a mere discrimination of one 
phenomenon from another; and, accordingly, while 
it has happened that the intervention of judgment in 
every, even the simplest, act of primary cognition, as 
monotonous and rapid, has been overlooked, the name 
has been exclusively limited to the more varied and 
elaborate comparison of one notion with another, and 
the enouncement of their agreement or disagreement. 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 151 

It is in the discharge of this, its more obtrusive func- 
tion, that we are now about to consider the Elabora- 
tive Faculty. 

I have already noticed that our knowledge does not 
commence with the individual and the most particular 
objects of knowledge, — that we do not rise in any 
regular progress • from the less to the more general, 
first considering the qualities which characterize indi- 
viduals, then those which belong to species and gen- 
era, in regular ascent. On the contrary, our knowl- 
edge commences with the vague and confused. Out 
of this the general and the individual are both equally 
evolved. In consequence of this genealogy of our 
knowledge we usually commence by bestowing a name 
upon a whole object or congeries of objects, of which, 
however, we possess only a partial and indefinite con- 
ception. In the sequel, this vague notion becomes 
somewhat more determinate ; the partial idea which 
we had becomes enlarged by new accessions ; by de- 
grees our conception waxes fuller, -find represents a 
greater number of attributes. With this conception, 
thus amplified and improved, we compare the last no- 
tion which has been acquired ; that is to say, we com- 
pare a part with its whole, or with the other parts of 
this whole, and, finding that it is harmonious, — that it 
dovetails and naturally assorts with other parts, —we 
acquiesce in this union ; and this we denominate an 
act of judgment. 

I have the conception of a triangle, and this concep- 
tion is composed in my mind of several others. 
Among these partial notions, I select that of two sides 
greater than the third, and this notion, which I had at 



152 AN OUTLINE OF 

first, as it were, taken apart, I reunite with the others 
from which it had been separated, saying the triangle 
contains always two sides, which together are greater 
than the third. 

Every time we judge, we compare a total concep- 
tion with a partial, and we recognize that the latter 
really constitutes a part of the former. One of these 
conceptions has received the name of subject; the 
other, that of attribute or predicate. The verb which 
connects these two parts is called the copula. The 
quadrangle is a double triangle; nine is an odd num- 
ber; body is divisible. Here quadrangle, nine, body, 
are subjects ; a double triangle, an odd number, divis- 
ible, are predicates. The whole mental judgment, 
formed by the subject, predicate, and copula, is called, 
when enounced in words, proposition. 

In discourse, the parts of a proposition are not al- 
ways found placed in logical order ; but to discover 
and discriminate them, it is only requisite to ask, 
What is the thing of which something else is affirmed 
or denied? The answer to this question will point 
out the subject; and we shall find the predicate if we 
inquiry, What is affirmed or denied of the matter of 
which we speak? 

In fine, when we judge, we must have, in the first 
place, at least two notions ; in the second place, we 
compare these; in the third, we recognize that one 
contains or excludes the other ; and, in the fourth, we 
acquiesce in this recognition. 



sm wizliam Hamilton's philosophy. 153 



§ 4. REASONING. 

Simple Comparison or Judgment is conversant with 
two notions, the one of which is contained in the 
other. But it often happens that one notion is con- 
tained in another not immediately, but mediately, and 
we may be able to recognize the relation of these to 
each other only through a third, which, as it imme- 
diately contains the one, is immediately contained in the 
other. Take the notions A, B, C, — A contains B ; 
B contains C ; A therefore also contains C. But as, 
ex hypothesi, we do not at once and directly know C 
as contained in A, we cannot immediately compare 
them together and judge of their relation. We there- 
fore perform a double or complex process of compari- 
son ; we compare B with A, and C with B, and then 
C with A through B. We say, B is a part of A ; C 
is a part of B ; therefore C is a part of A. This 
double act of comparison has obtained the name of 
Reasoning; the term Judgment being left to express 
the simple act of comparison, or rather its result. 

Reasoning is either from the whole to its parts ; or 
from all the parts, discretively, to the whole they con- 
stitute, collectively. The former of these is Deduc- 
tive, the latter is Inductive, Reasoning. The state- 
ment you will find, in all logical books, of reasonings 
from certain parts to the whole, or from certain parts 
to certain parts, is erroneous. I shall first speak of 
the reasoning from the whole to its parts, — or of 

I. Deductive Reasoning. It is self-evident, that 
whatever is the part of a part is a part of the whole . 



154 AN OUTLINE OF 

This one axiom is the foundation of all reasoning from 
the whole to the parts. There are, however, two kinds 
of whole and parts ; and these constitute two varieties, 
or rather two phases, of deductive reasoning. This 
distinction, which is of the most important kind, has 
nevertheless been wholly overlooked by philosophers, 
in consequence of which the utmost perplexity and 
confusion have been introduced into the science. 

I have formerly stated that a proposition consists 
of two terms, — the subject and the predicate. Now, 
in different relations we may regard the subject as the 
whole and the predicate as its part, or the predicate 
as the whole and the subject as its part. 

Let us take the proposition, milk is white. Now, 
here we may either consider the predicate white as 
one of a number of attributes, the whole complement 
of which constitutes the subject milk. In this point 
of view, the predicate is a part of the subject. Or, 
again, we may consider the predicate white as the 
name of a class of objects, of which the subject is 
one. In this point of view, the subject is a part of the 
predicate. 

You will remember the distinction, which I for- 
merty stated , of the twofold quantity of notions or terms . 
The Extension of a notion or term corresponds to the 
greater number of subjects contained under a predi- 
cate ; the Intension, or Comprehension, of a notion or 
term, to the greater number of predicates contained 
in a subject. These quantities or wholes are always 
in the inverse ratio of each other. Nov/, it is sino-u- 
lar that logicians should have taken this distinction 
between notions, and yet not have thought of applying 



SIR 1FILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 155 

it to reasoning. But so it is ; and this is not the only 
oversight they have committed in the application of the 
very primary principles of their science. The great 
distinction we have established between the subject 
and predicate considered severally, as, in different re- 
lations, whole and as part, constitutes the primary and 
principal division of Syllogisms, both Deductive and 
Inductive ; and its introduction wipes off a complex 
mass of rules and qualifications, which the want of it 
rendered necessary. I can, of course, at present, 
only explain in general the nature of this distinction ; 
its details belong to the science of the Laws of 
Thought, or Logic, of which we are not here to 
treat. 

1. Deductive Reasoning in Comprehension. I shall 
first consider the process of that Deductive Inference 
in which the subject is viewed as the whole, the pred- 
icate as the part. In this reasoning, the whole is deter- 
mined by the Comprehension, and is, again, either a 
Physical or Essential whole, or an Integral or Mathe- 
matical whole, (a) A Physical or Essential whole is 
that which consists of not really separable parts, of or 
pertaining to its substance. Thus, man is made up of 
two substantial parts, — a mind and a body ; and 
each of these has again various qualities, which, though 
separable only by mental abstraction, are considered 
as so many parts of an essential whole. Thus the at- 
tributes of respiration, of digestion, of locomotion, of 
color, are so many parts of the whole notion we have 
of the human body ; cognition, feeling, desire, virtue, 
vice, etc., so many parts of the whole notion we have 
of the human mind ; and all these together, so many 



156 AN OUTLINE OF 

parts of the whole notion we have of man. (b) A 
Mathematical or Integral or Quantitative whole is that 
which has part out of part, and which therefore can 
be really partitioned. The Integral, or, as it ought 
to be called, Integrate whole (totum integratum) is 
composed of integrant parts (partes integrantes) , 
which are either homogeneous or heterogeneous. An 
example of the former is given in the division of a 
square into two triangles ; of the latter, in the divis- 
ion of the animal body into head, trunk, extremities, 
etc. 

This being understood, let us consider how we pro- 
ceed when we reason from the relation between a com- 
prehensive whole and its parts. Here it is evident 
that all the parts of the predicate must also be parts 
of the subject; in other terms, all that belongs to 
the predicate must also belong to the subject. In the 
words of the scholastic adage, Nota notoe est nota 
rei ipsius; Predicatum predicati est predicatum sub- 
jecti. An example of this reasoning : — 

Europe contains England ; 

England contains Middlesex ; 

Therefore, Europe contains Middlesex. 

In other words, England is an integrant part of Eu- 
rope ; Middlesex is an integrant part of Europe. This 
is an example from a mathematical whole and parts. 
Again : — 

Socrates is just (that is, Socrates contains justice 
as a quality) ; 

Justice is a virtue (that is, justice contains virtue 
as a constituent part) ; 

Therefore, Socrates is virtuous. 



sir willtam Hamilton's philosophy. 157 

In other words, justice is an attribute or essential 
part of Socrates ; virtue is an attribute or essential 
part of justice ; therefore, virtue is an attribute or 
essential part of Socrates. This is an example from 
a physical or essential whole and parts. 

2. Deductive Reasoning in Extension. I proceed, 
in the second place, to the other kind of Deductive 
Reasoning, — that in which the subject is the part, 
the predicate is the whole. This reasoning proceeds 
under that species of whole which has been called the 
Logical, or Potential, or Universal. This whole is 
determined by the Extension of a notion ; the genera 
having species, and the species individuals, as their 
parts. The parts of a logical or universal whole are 
called the subject parts. 

From what you know of the process of generaliza- 
tion, you are aware that general terms are expressive 
of attributes which may be predicated of many differ- 
ent objects ; and inasmuch as these objects resemble 
each other in the common attribute, they are consid- 
ered by us as constituting a class. Thus, when I say 
that a horse is a quadruped ; Bucephalus is a horse ; 
therefore, Bucephalus is a quadruped; — I virtually 
say, — horse, the subject, is a part of the predicate 
quadruped; Bucephalus, the subject, is part of the 
predicate horse; therefore, Bucephalus, the subject, is 
part of the predicate quadruped. In the reasoning 
under this whole you will observe that the same word, 
as it is whole or part, changes from predicate to sub- 
ject ; horse, when viewed as a part of quadruped, be- 
ing the subject of the proposition ; whereas, when 



158 AN OUTLINE OF 

viewed as a whole containing Bucephalus, it becomes 
the predicate. 

II. Inductive Reasoning is founded on the princi- 
ple, that what is true of every constituent part belongs, 
or does not belong, to the constituted whole. Induction, 
like Deduction, may be divided into two kinds, ac- 
cording as the whole and parts, about which it is con- 
versant, are Comprehensive or Extensive. 

1. Thus, in the former: — 

Gold is a metal, yellow, ductile, fusible in aqua 
regia, of a certain specific gravity, and so on ; 

These qualities constitute this body (are all its 
parts) ; 

Therefore, this body is gold. 

2. In the latter: — 

Ox, horse, dog, etc., are animals, that is, are con- 
tained under the class animal ; 

Ox, horse, dog, etc., constitute (are all the con- 
stituents of) the class quadruped ; 

Therefore, quadruped is contained under animal. 

Both in the Deductive and Inductive processes the 
inference must be of an absolute necessity, in so far 
as the mental illation is concerned ; that is, every 
consequent proposition must be evolved out of every 
antecedent proposition with intuitive evidence. I do 
not mean, by this, that the antecedent should be nec- 
essarily true, or that the consequent be really con- 
tained in it ; it is sufficient that the antecedent be 
assumed as true, and that the consequent be, in con- 
formity to the laws of thought, evolved out of it as its 
part or its equation. This last is called Logical or 
Formal or Subjective truth ; and an inference may be 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 159 

subjectively or formally true, which is objectively or 
really false. 

The account given of Induction in all works of 
Logic is utterly erroneous. Sometimes we find this 
inference described as a precarious, not a necessary, 
reasoning. It is called an illation from some to all. 
But here the some, as it neither contains nor consti- 
tutes the all, determines no necessary movement, and 
a conclusion drawn under these circumstances is log- 
ically vicious. Others again describe the Inductive 
process thus : — 

What belongs to some objects of a class belongs to 
the whole class ; 

This property belongs to some objects of the class ; 

Therefore, it belongs to the whole class. 

This account of Induction, which is the one vou 
will find in all the English works on Logic, is not an 
inductive reasoning at all. It is, logically considered, 
a deductive syllogism ; and, logically considered, a 
syllogism radically vicious. It is logically vicious to 
say, that, because some individuals of a class have 
certain common qualities apart from that property 
which constitutes the class itself, therefore the whole 
individuals of the class should partake in these quali- 
ties. For this there is no logical reason, — no neces- 
sity of thought. The probability of this inference, 
and it is only probable, is founded on the observation 
of the analogy of nature, and, therefore, not upon the 
laws of thought by which alone reasoning, considered 
as a logical process, is exclusively governed. To be- 
come a formally legitimate induction, the objective 
probability must be clothed with a subjective neces- 



160 AN OUTLINE OF 

sity, and the some must be translated into the a?? which 
it is supposed to represent. 

In the deductive syllogism we proceed by analysis, 
that is, by decomposing a whole into its parts ; but 
as the two wholes with which reasoning is conversant 
are in the inverse ratio of each other, so our analysis 
in the one will correspond to our synthesis in the 
other. For example, when I divide a whole of exten- 
sion into its parts, — when I divide a genus into the 
species, a species into the individuals it contains, — I 
do so by adding new differences, and thus go on ac- 
cumulating in the parts a complement of qualities 
which did not belong to the wholes. This, therefore, 
which, in point of extension, is an analysis, is, in 
point of comprehension, a synthesis. In like manner, 
when I decompose a whole of comprehension, that 
is, decompose a complex predicate into its constit- 
uent attributes, I obtain by this process a simpler 
and more general quality, and thus this, which, in re- 
lation to a comprehensive whole, is an analysis, is, in 
relation to an extensive whole, a synthesis. As the 
deductive inference is Analytic, the inductive is Syn- 
thetic. But as induction, equally as deduction, is 
conversant with both wholes, so the synthesis of in- 
duction on the comprehensive whole is a reversed 
process to its synthesis on the extensive whole. 

You will therefore be aware, that the terms analysis 
and synthesis, when used without qualification, may 
be- employed at cross purposes, to denote operations 
precisely the converse of each other. And so it has 
happened. Analysis, in the mouth of one set of phi- 
losophers, means precisely what synthesis denotes in 



Silt WILLIAM HAMILTON' S PHILOSOPHY. 161 

the mouth of another ; nay, what is even still more 
frequent, these words are perpetually converted with 
each other by the same philosopher. I may notice, 
what has rarely, if ever, been remarked, that synthe- 
sis, in the writings of the Greek logicians, is equivalent 
to the analysis of modern philosophers ; the former, 
regarding the extensive whole as the priucipal, applied 
analysis, xa T ' ^<>%rjv, to its division ; the latter, viewing 
the comprehensive whole as the principal, in general 
limit analysis to its decomposition. This, however, 
has been overlooked, and a confusion the most inex- 
tricable prevails in regard to the use of these words, 
if the thread of the labyrinth is not obtained. (Led. 
on Metaph., XXXIV.-XXXVII.) 



11 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE COGNITIONS. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE EEGULATIVE FACULTY. 

I now enter upon the last of the Cognitive Faculties, 
— the faculty which I denominated the Regulative. 
Here the term faculty ', you will observe, is employed 
in a somewhat peculiar signification, for it is employed 
not to denote the proximate cause of any definite en- 
ergy, but the power the mind has of being the native 
source of certain necessary or a priori cognitions ; 
which cognitions, as they are the conditions, the forms, 
under which our knowledge in general is possible, 
constitute so many fundamental laws of intellectual 
nature. It is in this sense that I call the power which 
the mind possesses of modifying the knowledge it re- 
ceives, in conformity to its proper nature, its Regula- 
tive Faculty. The Regulative Faculty is, however, 
in fact, nothing more than the complement of such 
laws ; it is the locus principiorum. It thus corre- 
sponds to what was known in the Greek philosophy 
under the name of vovt;, when that term was rigor- 
ously used. To this faculty has been latterly applied 

162 



AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 163 

the name Reason; but this term is so vague and am- 
biguous, that it is almost unfitted to convey any defi- 
nite meaning. The term Common Sense has likewise 
been applied to designate the place of principles. This 
word is also ambiguous. In the first place, it was the 
expression used in the Aristotelic philosophy to denote 
the Central or Common Sensory, in which the differ- 
ent external senses met and were united. In the sec- 
ond place, it was employed to signify a sound under- 
standing applied to vulgar objects, in contrast to a 
scientific or speculative intelligence; and it is in this 
signification that it has been taken by those who have 
derided the principle on which the philosophy, which 
has been distinctively denominated the Scottish, pro- 
fesses to be established. This is not, however, the mean- 
ing which has always, or even principally, been at- 
tached to it ; and an incomparably stronger case might 
be made out in defence of this expression than has 
been done by Reid, or even by Mr. Stewart. It is, in 
fact, a term of high antiquity and very general accep- 
tation. Were it allowed in metaphysical philosophy, 
as in physical, to discriminate scientific differences by 
scientific terms, I would employ the word noetic, as 
derived from voDc, to express all those cognitions 
that originate in the mind itself; dianoetic to denote 
the operations of the Discursive, Elaborative, or Com- 
parative Faculty. 1 (Led. onMetaph., XXXVIII.) 



1 For an account of the various names by which the principles of 
Common Sense have been designated, see Betel's Works, Note A. 
This note is an elaborate dissertation on the Philosophy of Common 
Sense, and deserves study in this connection. — J. C. M. 



164 AN OUTLINE OF 

The essential notes or characters, by which we are 
enabled to distinguish our original from our derivative 
cognitions, may be reduced to four : — 

1. Their Incomprehensibility. When we are able 
to comprehend how or why a thing is, the belief of 
the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of 
consciousness, but a subsumption under the cognition 
or belief which affords its reason. 

2. Their Simplicity. If a cognition or belief be 
made up of, and can be explicated into, a plurality of 
cognitions or beliefs, it is manifest that, as compound, 
it cannot be original. 

3. Their Necessity and Absolute Universality. 
These may be regarded as coincident. For when a 
belief is necessary, it is, eo ipso, universal ; and that 
a belief is universal is a certain index that it must be 
necessary. To prove the necessity, the universality 
must, however, be absolute ; for a relative univer- 
sality indicates no more than custom and education, 
howbeit the subjects themselves may deem that they 
follow the dictates of nature. 

4. Their Comparative Evidence and Certainty. 
This, along with the third, is well stated by Aristotle : 
"What appears to all, that we affirm to be; and he 
who rejects this belief will assuredly advance nothing 
better deserving of credence." (Reid's Works, pp. 
754-5.) 

Though it be now generally acknowledged, by the 
profoundest thinkers, that it is impossible to analyze 
all our knowledge into the produce of experience, ex- 
ternal or internal, and that a certain complement of 
cognitions must be allowed as having their origin in 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 165 

the nature of the thinking principle itself; they are 
not at one in regard to those which ought to be rec- 
ognized as ultimate and elemental, and those which 
ought to be regarded as modifications or combinations 
of these. The reduction of our native cognitions to 
system is therefore a problem which still remains to 
be solved. These cognitions are founded on the nec- 
essary conditions of thought ; and we have now to 
see that philosophers have failed to enumerate all 
those conditions. {Led. on Metaph., XXXVIII.) 

Now, the conditions of all positive thought are two : 
(1.) Non-contradiction; (2.) Relativity. If either of 
these conditions be violated, thought (employing that 
term as comprehending all our cognitive energies) is not 
positive, — it is only negative; for thought is positive 
only when existence, objective or subjective, is predi- 
cated of an object. If the condition of Non-contra- 
diction be not fulfilled, there emerges The really im- 
possible, — Nihil purum; if that of Relativity be not 
purified, there results The Impossible to Thought, — 
Nihil cogitabile. It might be supposed that negative 
thinking, being a negation of thought, is in propriety 
a negation therefore, absolutely, of all mental activity. 
But this would be erroneous. In fact, as Aristotle 
observes, every negation involves an affirmation, and 
we cannot think or predicate non-existence except 
by reference to existence . Thus even negative thought 
is realized only under the condition of Relativity and 
positive thinking. For example, we try to think, — to 
predicate existence in some way, — but find ourselves 
unable. We then predicate incogitability ; and if we 



166 AN OUTLINE OF 

do not always predicate, as an equivalent, (objective) 
non-existence, we shall never err. 

It is only, then, when both of these conditions are 
fulfilled, that we think — Something. 

§ 1. THE CONDITION OF NON-CON TH A DICTION. 

This condition is insuperable. We think it not 
only as a law of thought, but as a law of things ; and 
while we suppose its violation to determine an abso- 
lute impossibility, we suppose its fulfilment to afford 
only the Not-impossible. Thought is, under this con- 
dition, merely explicative or analytic; and the condi- 
tion itself is brought to bear under three phases, 
constituting three laws : (1 . ) the law of Identity ; 
(2.) the law of Contradiction (more properly Non- 
contradiction) ; (3.) the law of Excluded Middle 
(between two contradictories) - 1 The science of these 
is Logic; and as the laws are only explicative, Logic 
is only formal. 

Though necessary to state the condition of Non-con- 
tradiction, there is no dispute about its effect, no dan- 
ger of its violation. When, therefore, I speak of the 
Conditioned, the term is used in special reference to 
Eelativity. By existence Conditioned is meant em- 
phatically existence relative, — existence thought 
under relation. Relation may thus be understood to 
contain all the categories and forms of positive thought. 
(Discussions, pp. 602-3.) 

1 Eor a full discussion of these laws see Led. on Log., V. and VI. ; 
and Appendix IV. — J. C. M. 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 167 



§ 2. THE CONDITION OF RELATIVITY. 

By this condition it is implied that the mind can 
conceive, and can consequently know, only the limited, 
and the conditionally limited. The unconditionally un- 
limited, or the Infinite, the unconditionally limited, or 
the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the mind ; 
they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, 
or abstraction of, those very conditions under which 
thought itself is realized: consequently the notion 
of the Unconditioned is only negative, — negative of 
the conceivable itself. For example : — 

I. On the one hand, we can positively conceive 
neither (1.) an absolute whole, that is, a whole so 
great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part 
of a still greater whole, nor (2.) an absolute part, that 
is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as 
a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. 

II. On the other hand, we cannot positively repre- 
sent or realize or construe to the mind (as here Un- 
derstanding and Imagination coincide), (1.) an in- 
finite whole, for this could only be done by the infinite 
synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would re- 
quire an infinite time for its accomplishment ; nor (2.) , 
for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an 
infinite divisibility of parts. 

The result is the same whether we apply the pro- 
cess to limitation in space, in time, or in degree. The 
unconditional negation and the unconditional affirma- 
tion of limitation — in other words, the Infinite and 
the Absolute, properly so called — are thus equally 



168 AN OUTLINE OF 

inconceivable to us. The conditionally limited (which 
we may briefly call the Conditioned) is thus the only 
possible object of knowledge and of positive thought ; 
thought necessarily supposes condition. For as the 
eagle cannot outsoar the atmosphere in which he floats, 
and by which alone he is supported ; so the mind can- 
not transcend that sphere of limitation within and 
through which exclusively the possibility of thought 
is realized. 

The Conditioned is the mean between two extremes, 
— two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither 
of which can be conceived as possible, but of which, on 
the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, 
one must be admitted as necessary. Our faculties are 
thus shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind 
is not represented as conceiving two propositions, 
subversive of each other, as equally possible ; but 
only as unable to understand, as possible, either of 
two extremes, one of which, however, on the ground 
of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recog- 
nize as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, 
that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted 
into the measure of existence ; and are warned from 
recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessa- 
rily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And, 
by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very 
consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above 
the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the 
existence of something unconditioned beyond the 
sphere of all reprehensible reality. (Discussions, pp. 
13-15.) 

The condition of Eelativity is therefore not insuper- 



sir jvilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 169 

able. We should think it not as a law of things, but 
merely as a law of thought. Thinking, under this 
condition, is ampliative or synthetic. Its science, 
Metaphysic, using that term in a comprehensive mean- 
ing, is therefore material, in the sense of non-formal. 
The relations under which this condition is brought 
to bear are either necessary and original, or contin- 
gent and derivative. The latter are such as One and 
Other, End and Mean, Whole and Part, etc., etc. 
Relations like these, which we frequently employ in 
the actual applications of our cognitive energies, ad- 
mit of classification from different points of view ; but 
to attempt their arrangement at all, far less on any 
exclusive principle, would here be manifestly out of 
place. In so far, then, as it is necessary, the condi- 
tion of Relativity is brought to bear under two prin- 
cipal relations ; the one springing from the subject of 
knowledge (the relation of Knowledge) , the other from 
the object of knowledge (the relations of Existence). 

(A) The Relation of Knowledge is that which 
arises from the reciprocal dependence of the subject 
and object of thought. Whatever comes into con- 
sciousness is thought by us either as belonging to the 
mental self exclusively (subjectivo-subjective) , or as 
belonging to the not-self exclusively (objectivo-objec- 
tive) , or as belonging partly to both (subjectivo-objec- 
tive). 

(B) The Relations of Existence are either in- 
trinsic or extrinsic. 

I. The intrinsic, which may also be called the qual- 
itative, relation is that of Substance and Quality 
(quality being variously styled form, accident, prop- 



170 AN OUTLINE OF 

erty, mode, affection, phenomenon, appearance, attri- 
bute, predicate, denomination, etc.). Substance and 
Quality are manifestly only thought as mutual rela- 
tives. 

1. We cannot think a quality existing absolutely, in 
or of itself; we are constrained to think it as inhering 
in some basis, substratum, hypostasis, subject, or sub- 
stance. 

2. But this substance cannot be conceived by us, 
except negatively, that is, as the unapparent, — the 
inconceivable correlative of certain appearing quali- 
ties. If we attempt to think it positively, we can 
think it only by transforming it into a quality or bun- 
dle of qualities, which, again, we are compelled to re- 
fer to an unknown substance, now necessarily supposed 
for their incogitable basis. 

Everything in fact may be conceived as the quality 
or as the substance of something else. But absolute 
substance and absolute quality, — these are both in- 
conceivable, as more than negations of the conceiv- 
able. 

II. The extrinsic relation of existence may be called 
quantitative, and is threefold, as constituted by three 
species of quantity, — Time, Space, and Degree. 

i. Time, Protension, or Protensive quantity, called 
likewise Duration, is a necessary condition of thought. 
It may be considered both (1.) in itself, and (2.) in 
the things which it contains. 

1. In itself, — 

(a) Time is positively inconceivable, firstly, either, 
(a) on the one hand, as absolute, that is, absolutely 
commencing or absolutely terminating, or (/3) on the 



sin ivilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 171 

other hand, as infinite or eternal, whether ab ante or 
a post; it is no less inconceivable, secondly, if we at- 
tempt (a) to fix an absolute minimum or (/5) to fol- 
low out an infinite division. 

(b) Time is positively conceivable, if conceived, 
firstly, as an indefinite past, present, or future, or, sec- 
ondly, as an indeterminate mean between the two 
unthinkable extremes of an absolute least and an infi- 
nite divisibility ; for thus it is relative. 

2. Things in Time are either, firstly, coinclusive, 
wheu, (a) if of the same time they are, pro tanto, iden- 
tical apparently and in thought, (b) if of different times 
(as causes and effect, causce et causatum), they appear 
as different but are thought identical; or, secondly, 
they are coexclusive, when they are mutually either 
prior and posterior or contemporaneous. The impossi- 
bility of thinking as non-existent in time (either past 
or future) aught which we have conceived as existent, 
affords the principle of Causality, etc. 1 

ii. Space, Extension, or Extensive quantity is, in like 
manner, a necessary condition of thought, and may 
also be considered both (1.) in itself and (2.) in the 
things which it contaius. 

1. In itself, — 

(a) Space is positively inconceivable, firstly, as a 
whole, either (a) infinitely unbounded or (/5) absolutely 
bounded ; secondly, as a part, either (a) infinitely 
divisible or (/?) absolutely indivisible. 

(6) Space is positively conceivable as a mean be- 



1 See this principle developed in the Appendix to this Chapter. — 
J. C. M. 



172 AN OUTLINE OF 

tween these extremes, that is, either as an indefinite 
whole or as an indefinite part ; for thus it is rela- 
tive. 

2. The things in Space maybe considered, firstly, 
in relation to Space itself, when the extension occu- 
pied by a thing is called its place, and a thiug chang- 
ing its place gives the relation of motion. Considered, 
secondly, in relation to each other, they are either (a) 
inclusive, thus originating the relation of containing 
and contained, or (6) coexclusive, thus determining the 
relation of position or situation, — of here and there 
( Ubication) . On Space are dependent what are 
called the Primary Qualities of body, strictly so de- 
nominated, and Space combined with Degree affords, 
of body, the Secundo-primary Qualities. Our inabil- 
ity to conceive an absolute elimination from space of 
aught which we have conceived to occupy space, 
gives the law of what I have called Ultimate Incom- 
pressibility , etc. 1 

iii. Degree, Intension, or Intensive quantity is not, 
like Time and Space, an absolute condition of thought. 
It may therefore be thought as null, or as existing 
only potentially. But thinking it to be, we must 
think it as a quantity ; and, as a quantity, it is posi- 
tively both inconceivable and conceivable. 

1. In itself, — 

(«) Degree is positively inconceivable, (a) abso- 
lutely, either as least or as greatest, (/5) infinitely, 
either in increase or diminution ; but 

(b) It is positively conceivable, in so far as it is 

1 See above, Chap. I., § 1. (B). — J. C. M. 



sip wilham Hamilton's philosophy. 173 

conceived as relative, — as indefinitely high or higher, 
as indefinitely low or lower. 

2. The things thought under Degree, (a) if of the 
same intension, are correlatively uniform ; (6) if of a 
different degree, are correlatively higher or lower. 

Degree is developed into the Secondary Qualities 
of body, and, combined with Space, into the Secundo- 
primary. 1 (Discussions, pp. 602-8. Compare Led. 
on Metaph., XXXVIII.) (On the next page is given 
a tabular view of the above conditions of thought.) 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTEE VI. 

LAW OF THE CONDITIONED IN ITS APPLICATION TO 
THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY. 

To manifest the utility of introducing the principle 
of the Conditioned into our metaphysical speculations, 
I shall (always in outline) give one only, but that a 
signal illustration of its importance. 

Of all questions in the history of philosoph} r , that 
concerning the origin of our judgment of Cause and 
Effect is perhaps the most celebrated ; but, strange to 
say, there is not, so far as I am aware, to be found 
a comprehensive view of the various theories proposed 
in explanation, — not to say, among these, any satis- 
factory explanation of the phenomenon itself. 

The phenomenon is this : When aware of a new 
appearance, we are unable to conceive that therein 

1 See the preceding note. — J. C. M. 



174 



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sir william Hamilton'' s philosophy. 175 

has originated any new existence, and are therefore 
constrained to think that what now appears to us under 
a new form, had previously an existence under others 
— others conceivable by us or not. These others (for 
they are always plural) are called its cause; and a 
cause, or more properly causes, we cannot but suppose ; 
for a cause is simply everything without which the 
effect would not result, and all such concurring, the 
effect cannot but result. We are utterly unable to 
realize in thought the possibility of the complement 
of existence being either increased or diminished. 
We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing 
becoming something, or, on the other, something be- 
coming nothing. When God is said to create out of 
nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing 
that he evolves existence out of nothing but himself ; 
and in like manner we conceive annihilation only by 
conceiving the Creator to withdraw his creation, by 
withdrawing his creative energy from actuality into 
power. 

" Nil posse creaTi 

De Nihilo, neque quod genitu 'st ad Nil revocari; " 

" Gigni 

De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil posse reverti." 

These lines of Lucretius and Persius enounce a phys- 
ical axiom of antiquity, which, when interpreted by 
the doctrine of the Conditioned, is itself at once re- 
1 called into harmony with revealed truth, and, express- 
ing in its purest form the conditions of human thought, 
expresses also implicitly the whole intellectual phe- 
nomenon of causality. 

There is thus conceived an absolute tautology be- 



176 AN OUTLINE OF 

tween the effect and its causes. We think the causes 
to contain all that is contained in the effect ; the ef- 
fect to contain nothing which was not contained in the 
causes. Take an example. A neutral salt is an 
effect of the conjunction of an acid and an alkali. Here 
we do not, and here we cannot, conceive that, in ef- 
fect, any new existence has been added, nor can we 
conceive that any has been taken away. But another 
example : Gunpowder is the effect of a mixture of 
sulphur, charcoal, and nitre ; and these three sub- 
stances are again the effect of simpler constituents, 
and these constituents again of simpler elements, either 
known or conceived to exist. Now, in all this series 
of compositions, we cannot conceive that aught begins' 
to exist. The gunpowder, the last compound, we are 
compelled to think, contains precisely the same quan- 
tum of existence that its ultimate elements contained 
prior to their combination. Well; we explode the 
powder. Can we conceive that existence has been 
diminished by the annihilation of a single element 
previously in being, or increased by the addition of a 
single element which was not heretofore in nature ? 
" Omnia mutant ur ; nihil interit," is what we think, 
what we must think. This, then, is the mental phe- 
nomenon of causality, — that we necessarily deny in 
thought that the object, which appears to begin to be, 
really so begins ; and that we necessarily identify its 
present with its past existence. Here it is not requi- 
site that we should know under what form, under 
what combinations, this existence was previously 
realized; in other words, it is not requisite that we 
should know what are the particular causes of the par- 



sip iyilliam Hamilton's philosophy. Ill 

ticular effect. The discovery of the connection of 
determinate causes and determinate effects is merely 
contingent and individual, — merely the datum of 
experience ; but the principle that every event should 
have its causes is necessary and universal, and is im- 
posed on us as a condition of our human intelligence 
itself. This necessity of so thinking is the only phe- 
nomenon to be explained. 

The opinions in regard to the nature and origin of 
the principle of causality fall into two great catego- 
ries. The first category (A) comprehends those 
theories which consider this principle as Empirical, 
or a posteriori, that is, as derived from experience; the 
other (B) comprehends those which view it as Pure, 
or a priori, that is, as a condition of intelligence itself. 
These two primary genera are, however, severally 
subdivided into various subordinate classes. 

The former category (A) , under which this princi- 
ple is regarded as the result of experience, contains two 
classes, inasmuch as the causal judgment may be sup- 
posed founded either (I.) on an Original, or (II.) on 
a Derivative, cognition. Each of these again is 
divided into two, according as the principle is sup- 
posed to have an objective, or a subjective, origin. In 
the former case, that is, where the cognition is sup- 
posed to be original and underived, it is Objective, or 
rather Objectivo-Objective ; when held to consist in 
an immediate perception of the power or efficacy of 
causes in the external and internal ivorlds (1.) ; and 
Subjective, or rather Objectivo-Subjective, when 
viewed as given in a self-consciousness alone of the 
power or efficacy of our own volitions (2.). In the 
12 



178 AN OUTLINE OF 

latter case, that is, where the cognition is supposed 
to be derivative ; if objective, it is viewed as a product 
of Induction and Generalization (3.) ; if subjective, 
of Association and Custom (4.). 

In like manner, the latter category (B), under 
which the causal principle is considered not as a re- 
sult, but as a condition, of experience, is variously 
divided and subdivided. In the first place, the opin- 
ions under this category fall into two classes, inasmuch 
as some regard the causal judgment (I.) as an Ulti- 
mate or Primary law of mind, while others regard 
it (II.) as a Secondary or Derived. Those who hold 
the former doctrine, in viewing it as a simple original 
principle, hold likewise that it is a positive act, — an 
affirmative datum of intelligence. This class is finally 
subdivided into two opinions. For some hold that the 
causal judgment, as necessary, is given in what they 
call " the principle of Causality," that is, the principle 
which declares that everything which begins to be must 
have its cause (5.) ; while at least one philosopher, 
without explicitly denying that the causal judgment 
is necessary, would identify it with the principle of 
our "Expectation of the Constancy of Nature" (6.). 

Those who hold that it can be analyzed into a higher 
principle, also hold that it is not of a positive, but of 
a negative, character. These, however, are divided 
into two classes. By some it has been maintained, 
that the principle of Causality can be resolved into the 
principle of Contradiction (7.), which, as I formerly 
stated, ought in propriety to be called the principle 
of Non-Contradiction. On the other hand, it may be 
(though it never has been) argued, that the judgment 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 179 

of Causality can be analyzed into what I called the 
principle of the Conditioned, — the principle of relativ- 
ity (8.). To one or the other of these eight heads 
all the doctrines that have been actually maintained 
in regard to the origin of the principle in question, 
may be referred ; and the classification is the better 
worthy of your attention, as in no work will you find 
any attempt at even an^ enumeration of the various 
theories, actual and possible, on this subject. (The 
table on the next page affords a general conspectus 
of these theories.) 

An adequate discussion of these several heads, and 
a special consideration of the differences of the indi- 
vidual opinions which they comprehend, would far 
exceed our limits. I shall, therefore, confine myself 
to a few observations on the value of these eight doc- 
trines in general, without descending to the particular 
modifications under which they have been maintained 
by particular philosophers. 

(A) Theories which derive the Causal Judg- 
ment from Experience. Of these, 

I. The first two, — (1.) that which asserts that we 
have a perception of causal agency as we have a percep- 
tion of external objects; and (2.) that which maintains 
that we are self-conscious of efficiency, — have been 
always held in combination, though the second has 
been frequently held by philosophers who have aban- 
doned the first as untenable. Considering them to- 
gether, that is, as forming the opinion that we directly 
and immediately apprehend the efficiency of causes, 
both external and internal, — this opinion is refuted 
by two objections. The first is, that we have no such 



180 



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Sin WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 181 

apprehension ; the second, that if we had, this being 
merely empirical, merely conversant with indi- 
vidual instances, could never account for the quality 
of necessity and universality which accompanies the 
judgment of causality. 

(a) First objection, (1.) as against the first theory. 
In regard to the first of these objections, it is now 
universally admitted, that we have no perception of 
the connection of cause and effect in the external 
world. For example ; when one billiard-ball is seen 
to strike another, we perceive only that the impulse of 
the one is followed by the motion of the other, but have 
no perception of any force or efficiency in the first, 
by which it is connected with the second, in the rela- 
tion of causality. Hume was the philosopher who 
decided the opiuion of the world on this point. He 
was not, however, the first who stated the fact, or 
even the reasoner who stated it most clearly. I could 
adduce a whole army of philosophers previous to 
Hume who had announced and illustrated the fact. 

First objection, (2.) as against the second theory. 
There are many philosophers who surrender the exter- 
nal perception, and maintain our internal conscious- 
ness, of causation or power. This opinion was, in 
one chapter of his Essay, advanced by Locke, and, at 
a very recent date, it has been amplified and enforced 
with distinguished ability by the late M. Maine de 
Biran, one of the acutest metaphysicians of France. 
On this doctrine, the notion of cause is not given to 
us by the observations of external phenomena, which, 
as considered only by the senses, manifest no causal 
efficiency, and appear to us only as successive ; it is 



182 AN OUTLINE OF 

given to us within, in reflection, in the consciousness 
of our operations and of the power which exerts them, 
— namely, the will. I make an effort to move my 
arm, and I move it. When we analyze attentively 
the phenomenon of effort, which M. de Biran considers 
as the type of the phenomena of volition, the follow- 
ing are the results : 1°, The consciousness of an 
act of will ; 2°, The consciousness of a motion pro- 
duced ; 3°, A relation of the motion to the volition. 
And what is this relation ? Not a simple relation of 
succession. The will is not for us a pure act without 
efficiency, — it is a productive energy ; so that, in a 
volition, there is given to us the notion of cause ; and 
this notion we subsequently project out from our in- 
ternal activities, into the changes of the external 
world. 

This reasoning, in so far as regards the mere empir- 
ical fact of our consciousness of causality, in the rela- 
tion of our will as moving, and of our limbs as moved, 
is refuted by the consideration, that between the overt 
fact of corporeal movement of which we are cognizant, 
and the internal act of mental determination of which 
we are also cognizant, there intervenes a numerous 
series of intermediate agencies of which we have no 
knowledge; and, consequently, that we can have no 
consciousness of any causal connection between the 
extreme links of this chain, — the volition to move 
and the limb moving, as this hypothesis asserts. No 
one is immediately conscious, for example, of moving 
his arm through his volition. Previously to this ulti- 
mate movement, muscles, nerves, a multitude of solid 
and fluid parts, must be set in motion by the will ; 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 183 

but of this motion we know, from consciousness, abso- 
lutely nothing. A person struck with paralysis is 
conscious of no inability in his limb to fulfil the de- 
terminations of his will ; and it is only after having 
willed, and finding that his limbs do not obey his vo- 
lition, that he learns by his experience, that the exter- 
nal movement does not follow the internal act. But 
as the paralytic learns after the volition that his limbs 
do not obey his mind ; so it is only after volition that 
the man in health learns that his limbs do obey the 
mandates of his will. 

(6) The Second Objection, mentioned above, is 
fatal to the theory which would found the judgment 
of causality on any empirical cognition, whether of 
the phenomena of mind or of the phenomena of mat- 
ter. Admitting that causation were cognizable, and 
that perception and self-consciousness were competent 
to its apprehension, still, as these faculties could only 
take note of individual causations, we should be 
wholly unable, out of such empirical acts, to evolve 
the quality of necessity and universality, by which 
this notion is distinguished. Admitting that we had 
really observed the agency of any number of causes, 
still this would not explain to us how we are unable 
to think a manifestation of existence without thinking 
it as an effect. Our internal experience, especially 
in the relation of our volitions to their effects, may be 
useful in giving us a clearer notion of causality ; but 
it is altogether incompetent to account for what in it 
there is of the quality of necessity. 

II. As the first and second opinions have been 
usually associated, so also have the third and fourth ; 



184 AN OUTLINE OF 

that is, the doctrine that our notion of causality is the 
offspring of the objective principle of Induction or Gen- 
eralization, and the doctrine that it is the offspring of 
the subjective principle of Association or Custom. 

3. In regard to the former, it is plain that the ob- 
servation that certain phenomena are found to succeed 
certain other phenomena, and the generalization con- 
sequent thereon, that these are reciprocally causes and 
effects, could never of itself have engendered, not 
only the strong, but the irresistible belief, that every 
event must have its cause. Each of these observa- 
tions is contingent ; and any number of observed con- 
tingencies will never impose upon us the feeling of 
necessity, — of our inability to think the opposite. 
Nay, more, this theory evolves the absolute notion 
of causality out of the observation of a certain number 
of uniform consecutions among phenomena ; that is, 
it would collect that all must be, because some are. 
But we find no difficulty whatever in conceiving the 
reverse of all or any of the consecutions w T e have ob- 
served ; and yet the general notion of causality, 
which, ex hypothesi, is their result, we cannot possibly 
think as possibly unreal. We have always seen a 
stone fall to the ground when thrown into the air; 
but we find no difficulty in representing to ourselves 
the possibility of one or all stones gravitating from 
the earth ; only we cannot conceive the possibility 
of this, or any other event, happening without a 
cause. 

4. Nor does the latter afford a better solution. 
The necessity of so thinking cannot be derived from a 
custom of so thinking. Allow the force of custom to 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 185 

be great as may be, still it is always limited to the 
customary ; and the customary has nothing whatever 
in it of the necessary. But we have here to account 
not for a strong, but for an absolutely irresistible belief. 
On this theory, also, the causal judgment, when asso- 
ciation is recent, should be weak, and should only 
gradually acquire its full force in proportion as cus- 
tom becomes inveterate. But do we find that the 
causal judgment is weaker in the young, stronger in 
the old? There is no difference. In either case, 
there is no less and no more ; the necessity in both is 
absolute. 

(B) Theories which maintain the Causal Judg- 
ment to be a Deliverance of Intelligence. Of 
the four opinions comprised under this category, 

I. The first two agree in holding that the causal 
judgment may be identified with a primary intellec- 
tual principle. 

5. Of these, the first (the fifth in general) main- 
tains that this principle is necessary, making its rejec- 
tion in thought impossible. To this are to be referred 
the relative theories of Descartes, Leibnitz, Karnes, 
Eeid, Kant, Fichte, Bouterweck, Jacobi, Stewart, 
Cousin, and the majority of modern philosophers. 
Now, without descending into details, it is manifest 
in general, that against the assumption of a special 
principle, which this doctrine makes, there exists a 
primary presumption of philosophy. This is the Law 
of Parcimony, which forbids, without necessity, the 
multiplication of entities, powers, principles, or 
causes; above all, the postulation of an unknown 
force where a known impotence can account for the 



186 AN OUTLINE OF 

phenomenon. We are, therefore, entitled to apply 
Occam's razor to this theory of causality, unless it be 
proved impossible to explain the causal judgment at 
a cheaper rate, by deriving it from a higher, and that 
a negative, origin. On a doctrine like the present is 
thrown the onus of vindicating its necessity, by show- 
ing that, unless a special and positive principle be 
assumed, there exists no competent mode to save the 
phenomena. It can only, therefore, be admitted pro- 
visorily ; and it falls of course, if the phenomenon it 
would explain can be explained on less onerous condi- 
tions. Leaving, therefore, this theory, which cer- 
tainly does account for the phenomenon, to fall or 
stand, according as either of the two last opinions be, 
or be not, found sufficient, I go on to that preceding 
these. 

6. Dr. Brown has promulgated a doctrine of Caus- 
ality, which may be numbered as the sixth ; though 
perhaps it is hardly deserving of distinct enumeration. 
He actually identifies the causal judgment, which to 
us is necessary, with the principle by which we are 
merely inclined to believe in the uniformity of nature's 
operations. But apart from all subordinate objec- 
tions, it is sufficient to say that the phenomenon to be 
explained is the necessity of thinking, — the absolute 
impossibility of not thinking, — a cause ; whilst all 
that the latter pretends to is, to incline us to expect 
that like antecedents will be followed by like conse- 
quents. This necessity to suppose a cause for every 
phenomenon, *Dr. Brown, if he does not expressly 
deny, keeps cautiously out of view, virtually, in fact, 



sir wilham Hamilton's philosophy. 187 

eliminating all that requires explanation in the prob- 
lem. 

II. The two remaining theories agree with the fifth 
and sixth in regarding the causal judgment as of a pri- 
ori origin, but differ from them in viewing it as deriv- 
ative and secondary. Of these two theories, 

7. The first attempts to establish the principle of 
Causality upon the principle of Contradiction. Listen 
to the pretended demonstration : Whatever is produced 
without a cause, is produced by nothing, in other 
words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing can no 
more be a cause than it can be something. The same 
intuition, which makes us aware that nothing is not 
something, shows us that everything must have a real 
cause of its existence. To this it is sufficient to say, 
that the existence of causes being the point in ques- 
tion, the existence of causes must not be taken for 
granted in the very reasoning which attempts to prove 
their reality. In excluding causes, we exclude all 
causes ; and consequently exclude " nothing " con- 
sidered as a cause ; it is not, therefore, allowable, 
contrary to that exclusion, to suppose "nothing" as a 
cause, and then from the absurdity of that supposition 
to infer the absurdity of the exclusion itself. If every- 
thing must have a cause, it follows that, upon the ex- 
clusion of other causes, we must accept of nothing as 
a cause. But it is the very point at issue, whether 
everything must have a cause or not ; and, therefore, 
it violates the first principles of reasoning to take this 
qusesitum itself as granted. This opinion is now uni- 
versally abandoned. 

8. The eighth and last opinion is that which re- 



188 AN OUTLINE OF 

gards the judgment of causality as derived; and 
derives it not from a power, but from an impotence, 
of mind ; in a word, from the principle of the Con- 
ditioned. I do not think it possible, without a de- 
tailed exposition of the various categories of thought, 
to make you fully understand the grounds and bear- 
ings of this opinion. In attempting to explain, you 
must, therefore, allow me to take for granted certain 
laws of thought, to which I have only been able inci- 
dentally to allude. Those, however, which I postu- 
late, are such as are now generally admitted by all 
philosophers who allow the mind itself to be a source 
of cognitions ; and the only one which has not been 
recognized by them, but which, as I endeavored 
briefly to prove, must likewise be taken into account, 
is the Law of the Conditioned, that the conceivable has 
always two opposite extremes, and that the extremes are 
equally inconceivable. 

Philosophers, who allow a native principle to the 
mind at all, allow that Existence is such a principle. 
I shall, therefore, take for granted Existence as the 
highest category or condition of thought. All that 
we perceive or imagine as different from us, we per- 
ceive or imagine as objectively existent. All that 
we are conscious of as an act or modification of self, 
we are conscious of only as subjectively existent. All 
thought, therefore, implies the thought of existence. 
As a second category or subjective condition of 
thought, I postulate that of Time. This likewise 
cannot be denied me. It is the necessary condition 
of every conscious act ; thought is only realized to us 
as in succession, and succession is only conceived by 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 189 

us under the concept of time. Existence and Exist- 
ence in Time is thus an elementary form of our intel- 
ligence. But we do not conceive existence in time 
absolutely or infinitely, — we conceive it only as con- 
ditioned in time; and Existence Conditioned in Time 
expresses, at once and in relation, the three categories 
of thought which afford us in combination the princi- 
ple of Causality. This requires some explanation. 

When we perceive or imagine an object, we per- 
ceive or imagine it (1.) As existent, and (2.) As in 
Time; Existence and Time being categories of all 
thought. But what is meant by saying, I perceive, 
or imagine, or, in general, think an object only as I 
perceive, or imagine, or, in general, think it to exist? 
Simply this : that, as thinking it, I cannot but think 
it to exist, in other words, that I cannot annihilate it 
in thought. I may think away from it, I may turn 
to other things, and I can thus exclude it from my 
consciousness; but, actually thinking it, I cannot 
think it as non-existent, for as it is thought, so it is 
thought existeut. 

But a thing is thought to exist, only as it is thought 
to exist in time. Time is present, past, and future. 
We cannot think an object of thought as non-existent 
depresenti. But can we think that quantum of exist- 
ence of which an object, real or ideal, is the comple- 
ment, as non-existent, either in time past, or in time 
future? Make the experiment. Try to think the ob- 
ject of your thought as non-existent in the moment 
before the present. You cannot. Try it in the mo- 
ment before that. You cannot. Nor can you annihi- 
late it by carrying it back to any moment, however 



190 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON^ PHILOSOPRY. 

distant in the past. You may conceive the parts of 
which this complement of existence is composed, as 
separated ; if a material object, you can think it as 
shivered to atoms, sublimated into ether; but not 
one iota of existence can you conceive as annihilated, 
which subsequently you thought to exist. In like 
manner, try the future, — try to conceive the prospec- 
tive annihilation of any present object, of any atom 
of any present object. You cannot. All this may be 
possible, but of it we cannot think the possibility. 
But if you can thus conceive neither the absolute com- 
mencement nor the absolute termination of anything 
that is once thought to exist, try, on the other hand, 
if you can conceive the opposite alternative of infinite 
non-commencement, or of infinite non-termination. 
To this you are equally impotent. This is the cate- 
gory of the Conditioned as applied to the category of 
Existence under the category of Time. 

But in this application is the principle of Causality 
not given ? Why, what is the law of Causality ? Sim- 
ply this, — that, when an object is presented phenom- 
enally as commencing, we cannot but suppose that 
the complement of existence, which it now con- 
tains, has previously been; in other words, that all 
that we at present come to know as an effect must 
previously have existed in its causes ; though what 
these causes are, we may perhaps be altogether un- 
able even to surmise. (Led. on Metaph., XXXIX., 
and Discussions, pp. 609-622. Compare also Led. 
on Metaph., XL.) 



SECOND PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 



SECOND PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 



INTRODUCTION. 

In entering on the second great class of mental 
phenomena, there is a preliminary question to be dis- 
posed of: What is the position of the Feelings by 
reference to the two other classes ; and, in particular, 
should the consideration of the Feelings precede or 
follow that of the Conations ? 

To resolve this problem let us take an example. 
A person is fond of cards. In a company, where he 
beholds a game in progress, there arises a desire to 
join in it. Now, the desire is here manifestly kin- 
dled by the pleasure which the person had and has 
in the play. The feeling thus connects the cognition 
of the play with the desire to joiu in it ; it forms the 
bridge, and contains the motive, by which we are 
roused from mere knowledge to appetency, — to co- 
nation, by reference to which we move ourselves so 
as to attain the end in view. 

Thus we find, in actual life, the Feelings interme- 
diate between the Cognitions and the Conations. And 
13 193 



194 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 

this relative position of the several powers is neces- 
sary : without the previous cognition, there could be 
neither feeling nor conation ; and without the previ- 
ous feeling there could be no conation. For if the 
mere cognition of a thing were sufficient to rouse co- 
nation, then it is evident (1.) that all objects, known 
in the same manner and in the same degree, would 
become equally the objects of desire and will ; while 
(2.) all persons would desire an object equally, as 
long as their cognition of the object remained the 
same. 

Our conclusion, therefore, is, that as in our actual 
existence the feelings find their place after the cogni- 
tions and before the conations, so in the science of 
mind the theory of the feelings ought to follow that 
of our faculties of knowledge, and to precede that of 
our faculties of will and desire. 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 



CHAPTER I. 

ABSTRACT THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 

I proceed to deliver the theory of pleasure and 
pain. 

I. Man exists only as he lives ; as an intelligent 
and sensible being, he consciously lives, but this only 
as he consciously energizes. Human existence is only 
a more general expression for human life, and human 
life only a more general expression for the sum of 
energies in which that life is realized, and through 
which it is manifested in consciousness. 

Observation. The term energy is here used to com- 
prehend all the mixed states of action and passion of 
which we are conscious. 

II. Human existence, human life, human energy, 
is not unlimited, but on the contrary determined to a 
certain number of modes, through which alone it can 
possibly be exerted. These different modes of action 
are called, in different relations, powers, faculties, ca- 
pacities, dispositions, habits. 

HI. Man, as he consciously exists, is the subject 
of pleasure and pain ; and these of various kinds ; 

195 



196 A N OUTLINE OF 

but as man consciously exists in and through the 
exertion of certain determinate powers, so it is only 
through the exertion of these powers that he becomes 
the subject of pleasure and pain ; each power being 
in itself at once the faculty of a specific energy, and 
a capacity of an appropriate pleasure or pain, as the 
concomitant of that energy. 

IV. The energy of each power of conscious exist- 
ence having, as its reflex or concomitant, an appro- 
priate pleasure or pain, and no pleasure or pain being 
competent to man, except as the concomitant of some 
determinate energy of life, the all-important question 
arises : What is the general law under which these 
counter-phenomena appear in all their special mani- 
festations ? 

V. The answer to this question is : the more 
perfect, the more pleasurable, the energy ; the more 
imperfect, the more painful. 

VI. The perfection of an energy is twofold : (1.) 
subjective, by relation to the power of which it is the 
exertion; (2.) objective, by relation to the object 
about which it is conversant. 

VII. (1.) By relation to its power, an energy is 
perfect, when it is tantamount (a) to the full, and (b) 
not to more than the full, complement of free and 
spontaneous energy which the power is capable of 
exerting ; an energy is imperfect, either (a) when 
the power is restrained from putting forth the whole 
amount of energy it would otherwise tend to do, or 
(5) when it is stimulated to put forth a larger amount 
than that to which it is spontaneously disposed. 

The amount of energy in the case of a single power 



sir jvilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 197 

is of two kinds, (a) intensive, (b) protensive. A per- 
fect energy is, therefore, that which is evolved by a 
power, both in the degree and for the continuance to 
which it is competent without straining ; an imperfect 
energy, that which is evolved by a power in a lower 
or in a higher degree, for a shorter or for a longer con- 
tinuance than, if left to itself, it would freely ex- 
ert. 

When we look to complex states in which & plurality 
of powers may be simultaneously called into action, 
we have, besides (a) the intensive and (5) protensive 
quantities of energy, (c) a third kind, to wit, the ex- 
tensive quantity. A state is said to contain a greater 
amount of extensive energy, in proportion as it forms 
the complement of a greater number of simultaneously 
co-operating powers. This complement, it is evident, 
may be conceived as made up either of energies all 
intensively and protensively perfect and pleasurable ; 
or of energies all intensively and protensively imper- 
fect and painful ; or of energies partly perfect, partly 
imperfect ; and this in every combination afforded by 
the various perfections and imperfections of the inten- 
sive and protensive quantities. 

It may be here noticed that the intensive and the 
two other quantities stand always in an inverse ratio to 
each other; that is, the higher the degree of any en- 
ergy, the shorter is its continuance, and, during its 
continuance, the more completely does it constitute 
the whole mental state. 

VIII. (2.) By relation to the object about which it 
is conversant (and by object is here denoted every 
objective cause by which a power is determined to 



198 AN OUTLINE OF 

activity) , an energy is perfect, when this object is of 
such a character as to afford to its power the condition 
requisite to let it spring to full spontaneous activity ; 
imperfect, when the object is of such a character as 
either (a) to stimulate the power to a degree or to a 
continuance of activity beyond its maximum of free 
exertion ; or (b) to thwart it in its tendency towards 
this its natural limit. An object is consequently 
pleasurable or painful, inasmuch as it determines a 
power to perfect or to imperfect energy. 

But an object, or plurality of objects simultaneously 
presented, may determine a plurality of powers into 
co-activity. The complex state, which thus arises, is 
pleasurable in proportion as its constitutive energies 
are severally more perfect ; painful in proportion as 
these are more imperfect : and in proportion as an 
object, or a complement of objects, occasions the av- 
erage perfection or the average imperfection of the 
complex state, is it, in like manner, pleasurable or 
painful. 

IX. In conformity to this doctrine, pleasure and 
pain may be thus defined : Pleasure is a reflex of the 
spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of 
whose energy we are conscious; Pain, a reflex of the 
overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power. 

Observations. I. In illustration of these definitions 
it may be observed that, 

1. Pleasure is defined to be the reflex of perfect 
energy, and not to be either energy or the perfection 
of energy itself; and why? (a) It is not simply de- 
fined an energy, because some energies are not pleas- 
urable, being either painful or indifferent, (b) It is 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON' S PHILOSOPHY. 199 

not simply defined the perfection of an energy, be- 
cause we can easily separate in thought the perfection 
of an act from any feeling of pleasure in its perform- 
ance. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, of the 
definition of pain, as a reflex of imperfect energy. 

2. The term spontaneous refers to the subjective, 
the term unimpeded to the objective, perfection. 

3. There are powers in man, the activities of 
which lie beyond the sphere of consciousness ; l but 
it is of the very essence of pleasure and pain to be 
felt, and there is no feeling out of consciousness. 

II. It is also to be observed that, on this doctrine, 
there are different kinds of pleasure and pain. 

1. In the first place, these are twofold, inasmuch as 
each is either positive and absolute or negative and rel- 
ative. («) The mere negation of pain does, by re- 
lation to pain, constitute a state of pleasure. Thus 
the removal of toothache replaces us in a state which, 
though one really of indifference, is, by contrast to 
our previous agony, felt as pleasurable. This is neg- 
ative or relative pleasure, (b) Positive or absolute 
pleasure, on the contrary, is all that pleasure which 
we feel above a state of indifference, and which is 
therefore prized as a good in itself, and not simply as 
the removal of an evil. On the same principle pain 
is also divided. 

2. But, in the second place, there is a subdivision 
of positive pain into (a) that which accompanies a 
repression of the spontaneous energy of a power, and 
(b) that which is conjoined with its effort when stim- 
ulated to over-activity. {Led. on Metaph., XLII.) 

1 See Phenomenology of the Cognitions, Chap. II., § 1. 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE ABSTRACT THEORY APPLIED TO THE CONCRETE 
PHENOMENA : CLASSIFICATION OF THE FEELINGS. 

We may consider the feelings either as causes or 
as effects. (1.) As causes, they are viewed in relation 
to their product, — pleasure, or pain. (2.) As effects, 
they are viewed as themselves products of the action 
of our different constitutive functions. 

§ 1. THE FEELINGS AS CAUSES. 

In this point of view, the feelings are distributed 
simply into the pleasurable and the painful; and it 
remains, on the theory I have proposed, to explain in 
general the causes of these opposite affections, without 
descending to their special kinds. 

I. The theory meets with no contradiction from the 
facts of actual life ; for the contradictions, which at 
first sight these seem to offer, prove, when examined, 
to be real confirmations. Thus it might be thought 
that the aversion from exercise, — the love of idle- 
ness, — in a word, the dolce far niente, — is a proof 

200 



AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 201 

that the inactivity, rather than the exertion, of our 
powers is the condition of our pleasurable feelings. 
This objection, from a natural proneness to inertion 
in man, is superficial. Is the far niente — is that 
doing nothing, in which so many find so sincere a 
gratification — in reality a negation of activity, and not 
in truth itself an activity intense and varied? To do 
nothing, in this sense, is simply to do nothing irk- 
some, especially to do no outward work. But is the 
mind internally, the while, unoccupied and inert? 
This, on the contrary, may be vividly alive, — may be 
intently engaged in the spontaneous play of imagina- 
tion ; and so far, therefore, in this case, from pleasure 
being the concomitant of inactivity, the activity is at 
once vigorous and unimpeded, and such accordingly 
as, on our theory, would be accompanied by a high 
degree of pleasure. Ennui is the state on which we 
find nothing to exercise our powers ; but ennui is a 
state of pain. 

II. A strong confirmation of the theory is derived 
from the phenomena presented by those affections 
which we emphatically denominate the painful. 

1. Take, for example, the affection of grief, — the 
sorrow we feel in the loss of a beloved object. Is 
this affection unaccompanied with pleasure? So far 
is this from being the case, that the pleasure so greatly 
predominates over the pain as to produce a mixed 
emotion, which is far more pleasurable than any other 
of which the wounded heart is susceptible. 

2. In like manner, fear is not simply painful. It 
is a natural disposition, has a tendency to act; and 
there is consequently, along with its essential pain, a 



202 AN OUTLINE OF 

certain pleasure as the reflex of its energy. This is 
finely expressed by Akensicle : — 

" Hence, finally, by night 
The village matron round the blazing hearth 
Suspends the infant audience with her tales, 
Breathing astonishment ! of witching rhymes 
And evil spirits of the death-bed call 
Of him who robbed the widow and devoured 
The orphan's portion ; of unquiet souls 
Risen from the grave to ease the heavy guilt 
Of deeds in life concealed ; of shapes that walk 
At dead of night and clank their chains, and wave 
The torch of hell around the murderer's bed. 
At every solemn pause the crowd recoil, 
Gazing each other speechless, and congealed 
With shivering sighs, till, eager for the event, 
Around the beldame all erect they hang, 
Each trembling heart with grateful terrors quelled." 

3. Pity, also, which, being a sympathetic passion, 
implies a participation in sorrow, is yet confessedly 
agreeable. The poet even accords to the energy of 
this benevolent affection a preference over the enjoy- 
ments of an exclusive selfishness : — 

" The broadest mirth unfeeling folly wears 
Is not so sweet as virtue's very tears." 

4. On the same principle is to be explained the en- 
joyment which men have in spectacles of suffering, — 
in the combats of animals and men, in executions, in 
tragedies, etc. ; a disposition which not un frequently 
becomes an irresistible habit, not only for individuals, 
but also for nations. The excitation of energetic 
emotions, painful in themselves, is also pleasura- 
ble. 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 203 

" We may here notice four general causes which con- 
tribute to raise or to lower the intensity of our ener- 
gies, and consequently to determine the correspond- 
ing degree of pleasure or pain. 

I. JSfovelty. The principle on which novelty 
determines a higher energy is twofold ; and of these 
the one may be called the subjective, the other the 
objective. 

1. In a subjective relation, the new is pleasurable, 
inasmuch as this supposes that the mind is determined 
to a mode of action, either from inactivity or from 
another state of energy, (a) In the former case, en- 
ergy, the condition of pleasure, is caused ; (b) in the 
latter, a change of energy is afforded, which is also 
pleasurable ; for powers energize less vigorously in 
proportion to the continuance of the same exertion, 
and, consequently, a new activity being determined, 
this replaces a strained or expiring exercise, that is, 
it replaces a painful, indifferent, or unpleasurable feel- 
ing by one of comparatively vivid enjoyment. 

2. In an objective relation, a novel object is please 
ing, because it affords a gratification to our desire of 
knowledge. The old is already known, and therefore 
no longer occupies the cognitive faculties ; whereas 
the new, as new, is still unknown, and rouses to en- 
ergy the powers by which it is to be brought within 
the system of our knowledge. 

II. Contrast operates in two ways ; for it has the 
effect of enhancing both the real or absolute, and the 
apparent or relative, intensity of a feeling. (1.) As 
an instance of the former, the unkindness of a person, 
from whom we expect kindness, rouses to a far higher 



204 AN OUTLINE OF 

pitch the emotions consequent on injury. (2.) As an 
instance of the latter, the pleasure of eating appears 
proportionally great when it is immediately con- 
nected and contrasted with the removal of the pangs 
of hunger. 

III. The relation of harmony or discord, in which 
one coexistent activity stands to another. At differ- 
ent times we exist in different complex states of 
feeling, and these states are made up of a number of 
constituent thoughts and affections. At one time — 
say during a sacred solemnity — we are in a very 
different frame of mind from what we are in at an- 
other, — say during the representation of a comedy. 
Now, then, in such a state of mind, if anything occurs 
to awaken to activity a power previously occupied, or 
to occupy a power, previously in energy, in a differ- 
ent manner, this new mode of activity is either of the 
same general character and tendency with the other 
constituent elements of the complex state, or it is not. 
(1.) In the former case, .the new energy chimes in 
with the old ; each operates without impediment from 
the other, and the general harmony of feeling is not 
violated; (2.) in the latter case, the new energy jars 
with the old, and each severally counteracts and im- 
pedes the other. Thus, in the sacred solemnity, and 
when our minds are brought to a state of serious con- 
templation, everything that operates in unison with 
that state — say a pious discourse or a strain of sol- 
emn music — will have a greater effect. But suppose 
that, instead of the pious discourse, or the strain of 
solemn music, we are treated to a merry tune or a 
witty address ; these, though at another season they 



sin wjlliam Hamilton's rniLosorar. 205 

might afford us considerable pleasure, would, under 
the circumstances, cause only pain. 

IV. Association. It is evident, in the first place, 
that one object, considered simply and in itself, will 
be more pleasing than another, in proportion as it, of 
its proper nature, determines the exertion of a greater 
amount of free energy. But, in the second place, the 
amount of free energy, which an object may itself 
elicit, is small, when compared with the amount that 
may be elicited by its train of associated representa- 
tions. Thus it is evident, that the object, which in 
itself would otherwise be pleasing, may, through the 
accident of association, be the occasion of pain ; and 
on the contrary, that an object, naturally indiffer- 
ent or even painful, may, by the same contingency, 
be productive of pleasure. 

This principle accounts for a great many of our 
intellectual pleasures and pains ; but it is far from 
accounting for everything. In fact, it supposes, as its 
condition, that there are pains and pleasures not 
founded on association. Association is a principle of 
pleasure and pain, only as it is a principle of energy 
of one character or another ; and the attempts that 
have been made to resolve all our mental pleasures 
and pains into association are guilty of a twofold vice. 
For (1.) they convert a partial into an exclusive law; 
and (2.) they elevate a subordinate into a supreme 
principle. (Lect. on Metaph., XLIV.) 

The influence of association, by which Mr. Alison 
and Lord Jeffrey , among others, have attempted to 
explain the whole phenomena of our intellectual 
pleasures, was more properly, I think, appreciated by 



206 AN OUTLINE OF 

Hutcheson. "We shall see hereafter," he says, and 
Aristotle said the same thing, " that associations of 
ideas make objects pleasant and delightful, which are 
not naturally apt to give any such pleasures ; • and the 
same way, the casual conjunction of ideas may give a 
disgust where there is nothing disagreeable in the 
form itself. And this is the occasion of many fantas- 
tic aversions to figures of some animals and to some 
other forms. Thus swine, serpents of all kinds, and 
some insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with 
aversion by many people, who have got some acci- 
dental ideas associated with them. And for distastes 
of this kind no other account can be given." 



§ 2. THE FEELINGS AS EFFECTS. 

Since all feeling is the state in which we are con- 
scious of some of the energies or processes of life, as 
these energies or processes differ, so will the correla- 
tive feelings : in a word, there will be as many differ- 
ent feelings as there are distinct modes of mental 
activity. Now, the feelings, which accompany the 
exertion of the bodily powers, whether cognitive or 
appetent, will constitute a distinct class, to which we 
may with great propriety give the name of Sensations ; 
whereas, on the feelings, which accompany the ener- 
gies of all our higher powers of mind, we may, with 
equal propriety, bestow the name of Sentiments. 

(A) The Sensations may be divided into two 
classes: (1.) those included under what has been 
called Sensus Fixus, comprehending the five deter- 
minate senses of touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight; (2.) 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY. 207 

those included under what has beeu called Sensus 
Vagus, comprehending such sensations as those of 
heat and cold, of muscular tension and lassitude, of 
hunger and thirst, etc. 

I. Sensus Fixus. In regard to the determinate 
senses, each of these organs has its specific action, and 
its appropriate pleasure or pain. This pleasure and 
pain, which is that alone belonging to the action of 
the living organ, and which therefore may be styled 
organic, we must distinguish from that higher feeling, 
which perhaps results from the exercise of imagina- 
tion and intellect upon the phenomena delivered by 
the senses. Thus, I would call organic the pleasure 
we feel in the perception of green or blue, and the 
pain we feel in the perception of a dazzling white ; 
but I would be perhaps disposed to refer to some 
other power than the external sense the enjoj^ment we 
experience in the harmony of colors, and certainly 
that which we find in the proportions of figure. 

When it is required of us to explain, particularly 
and in detail, why the rose, for example, produces 
this sensation of smell, assafcetida that other, and so 
forth, and to say in what peculiar action does the per- 
fect or pleasurable, and the imperfect or painful, ac- 
tivity of an organ consist, we must at once profess 
our ignorance. All that we can say is, that, on the 
general analogy of our being, when the impression of 
an object on a sense is in harmony with its amount of 
power, and thus allows it the condition of springing 
to full spontaneous energy, the result is pleasure ; 
whereas, when the impression is out of harmony with 



208 AN OUTLINE OF 

the amount of power, and thus either represses it or 
stimulates it to over-activity, the result is pain. 

II. Sensus Vagus. The same explanation must be 
applied to the sensations which belong to this sense, 
but in regard to these it is not necessary to say any- 
thing in detail. 

(B) The Sentiments may be divided into (1.) the 
contemplative, the concomitants of our cognitive pow- 
ers, and (2.) the practical, .the concomitants of our 
powers of conation. 

I. The contemplative sentiments are again distribu- 
ted into (1.) those of the subsidiary faculties, and 
(2.) those of the elaborative faculty. 

1. The feelings, accompanying the subsidiary fac- 
ulties, may be subdivided into (a) those of self-con- 
sciousness, and (b) those of imagination, compre- 
hending under imagination the relative faculty of 
reproduction. 

(a) Sentiments attending Self -consciousness. By 
self-consciousness we become aware that we live. 
Now, we are conscious of our life only as we are con- 
scious of our activity, and we are conscious of activity 
only as we are conscious of a change of state ; for all 
activity is the going out of one state into another. 
Now, if there be nothing which presents to our facul- 
ties the objects on which they may exert their activity ; 
in other words, if there be no cause whereby our act- 
ual state may be made to pass into another, there 
results a peculiar irksome feeling of a want of excite- 
ment, which we denominate tedium or ennui. An 
inability to thought is a security against this feeling, 
and therefore tedium is far less felt by the uncultivated 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON 3 's PHILOSOPHY. 209 

thau by the educated. The more varied the objects 
presented to our thought, the more varied and viva- 
cious our activity, the iuteuser will be our conscious- 
ness of living, and the more rapidly will the time 
appear to fly. Hence we explain why we call our 
easy occupations pastimes, and why play is so engag- 
ing when it is at all deep. Games of hazard de- 
termine a continual change, : — now we hope, now we 
fear; while in games of skill, we experience also the 
pleasure which arises from the activity of the under- 
standing in carrying through our own, and frustrating 
the plan of our antagonist. 

All that relieves tedium, by affording a change and 
an easy exercise for our thoughts, causes pleasure. 
The best cure of tedium is some occupation which, by 
concentrating our attention on external objects, shall 
divert it from a retortion on ourselves. All occupa- 
tion is either labor or play ; labor when there is some 
end ulterior to the activity, play when the activity is 
for its own sake alone. In both, however, there must 
be ever and anon a change of object, or both will soon 
grow tiresome. Labor is thus the best preventive of 
tedium, for it has an external motive which holds us 
steadfast to the work ; while, after the completion of 
our task, the feeling of repose, as the change from the 
feeling of a constrained to that of a spontaneous state, 
affords a vivid and peculiar pleasure. Labor must 
alternate with repose, or we shall never know what is 
the true enjoyment of life. 

Thus it appears that a uniform continuity in our in- 
ternal states is painful, and that pleasure is the result 
of their commutation. It is, however, to be observed, 

14 



210 AN OUTLINE OF 

that the change of our perceptions and thoughts, to be 
pleasing, must not be too rapid; for as the intervals, 
when too long, produce the feeling of tedium, so, 
when too short, they cause that of giddiness or vertigo. 
The too rapid passing, for example, of visible objects 
or of tones before the senses, of images before the 
phantasy, of thoughts before the understanding, occa- 
sions the disagreeable feeling of confusion or stupe- 
faction, which, in individuals of very sensitive 
temperament, results in nausea or sickness. 

(6) Sentiments attending Imagination. Whatever 
in general facilitates the play of imagination, is felt 
as pleasing ; whatever renders it more difficult is felt 
as displeasing. We are pleased with the portrait of 
a person whose face we know, if like, because it en- 
ables us to recall the features into consciousness easily 
and freely ; and we are displeased with it, if unlike, 
because it not only does not assist, but thwarts us in 
our endeavor to recall them ; while, after this has 
been accomplished, we are still further pained by the 
disharmony we experience between the portrait on the 
canvas and the representation in our own imagina- 
tion. A short and characteristic description of things 
which we have seen pleases us, because, without 
exacting a protracted effort of attention, and through 
a few striking traits, it enables the imagination to 
place the objects vividly before it. On the same prin- 
ciple, whatever facilitates the reproduction of the ob- 
jects which have been consigned to memory is 
pleasurable ; as, for example, resemblances, contrasts, 
other associations with the passing thought, metre, 
rhyme, symmetry, appropriate designations, etc. To 



SIK WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 211 

realize an act of imagination it is necessary that we 
comprehend the manifold as a single whole : an ob- 
ject, therefore, which does not allow itself without 
difficulty to be thus represented in unity, occasions 
pain ; whereas an object, which can easily be recalled 
to system, is the cause of pleasure. The former is 
the case when the object is too large or too complex 
to be perceived at once, when the parts are not promi- 
nent enough to be distinctly impressed on the memory. 
Order and symmetry, again, facilitate the acts of re- 
production and representation, and consequently afford 
us a proportional gratification. But, on the other 
hand, as pleasure is in proportion to the amount of 
free energy, an object which gives no impediment to 
the comprehensive energy of imagination may not be 
pleasurable, if it be so simple as not to afford to this 
faculty a sufficient exercise. Hence it is, that not 
variety alone, and not unity alone, but variety com- 
bined with unity, is that quality in objects, which we 
emphatically denominate beautiful. 

2. Under the head of the feelings which are asso- 
ciated with the elaborative faculty or the understand- 
ing, it will be proper to consider, in the first place, 
those which arise from the operations of the under- 
standing by itself, and afterwards those which accom- 
pany the joint exercise of the understanding and the 
imagination. 

(a) Sentiments attending the exercise of the Under- 
standing by itself. The function of the understanding 
may in general be said to bestow, on the cognitions 
which it elaborates, the greatest possible compass, the 
greatest possible clearness and distinctness, the great- 



212 AN OUTLINE OF 

est possible certainty and systematic order ; and inas- 
much as we approximate to the accomplishment of 
these ends, we experience pleasure ; inasmuch as we 
meet with hindrances in our attempts, we experience 
pain. Obscurity and confusion in our cognitions we 
feel as disagreeable, whereas their clearness and dis- 
tinctness afford us sincere gratification. We are 
pained by a hazy and perplexed discourse, but rejoice 
in one perspicuous and profound. Hence the pleasure 
we experience in having the cognitions we possessed, 
but darkling and confused, explicated into life and 
order ; and, on this account, there is hardly a more 
pleasing object than a tabular conspectus of any com- 
plex whole. We are soothed by the solution of a 
riddle ; and the wit which, like a flash of lightning, 
discovers similarities between objects which seemed 
contradictory, affords a still intenser enjoyment. 

The multitude — the multifarious character — of 
the objects presented to our observation stands in 
signal contrast with the very limited capacity of the 
human intellect. This disproportion constrains us to 
classify. Now, the process of classification is per- 
formed by that function of the understanding which 
apprehends resemblances. In this detection of the 
similarities between different objects an energy of the 
understanding is fully and freely exerted ; and hence 
results a pleasure. But as in general notions the 
knowledge of individual existences loses in precision 
and completeness, we again endeavor to find out dif- 
ferences in the things which stand under a notion, to 
the end that we may be able to specify and individual- 
ize them. This counter-process is performed by that 



sir William Hamilton's philosophy. 213 

function of the understanding which apprehends dis- 
similarities between resembling objects, and in the 
full and free exertion of this energy there is a feeling 
of pleasure. 

The intellect further tends to reduce the piecemeal 
and fragmentary cognitions it possesses to a systematic 
whole ; in other words, to elevate them into Science. 
Hence the pleasure we derive from all that enables us 
with ease and rapidity to survey the relation of com- 
plex parts as constituting the members of one organic 
whole. The intellect, from the necessity it has of 
thinking eyerything as the result of some higher 
reason, is thus determined to attempt the deduction 
of every object of cognition from a simple principle. 
When, therefore, we succeed or seem to succeed in 
the discovery of such a principle, we feel a pleasure ; 
as ^e feel a pain when the intellect is frustrated in 
this endeavor. 

To the feelings of pleasure which are afforded by 
the unimpeded energies of the understanding belongs, 
likewise, the gratification we find in the apprehension 
of adaptation of means to ends. Human intelligence 
is naturally determined to propose to itself an end ; 
and, in the consideration of objects, it thus naturally 
thinks them under this relation. If, therefore, we con- 
sider an object in reference to an end, and if this ob- 
ject be recognized to fulfil the conditions which 
this relation implies, the act of thought, in which this 
is accomplished, is an unimpeded and consequently 
pleasurable energy ; whereas the act of cognizing that 
these conditions are wanting, and the object therefore 



214 AN OUTLINE OF 

ill adapted to its end, is a thwarted, and therefore a 
painful, energy of thought. 

(b) Sentiments attending the Understanding and 
the Imagination in conjunction. The feelings of satis- 
faction which result from the plastic imagination, that 
is, the phantasy and the understanding conjointly, are 
principally those of beauty and sublimity ; and the 
judgments which pronounce an object to be sublime, 
beautiful, etc., are called, by a metaphorical expres- 
sion, Judgments of Taste. They have also been called 
^Esthetical Judgments ; but both terms are unsatis- 
factory. In the following observations it is almost 
needless to observe that I can make no attempt at 
more than a simple indication of the origin- of the 
pleasure we derive from the contemplation of those 
objects, which, from the character of the feelings they 
determine, are called beautiful, sublime, picturesque, 
etc. 

i. The Beautiful has been divided into the free or 
absolute, and the dependent or relative. In the former 
case it is not necessary to have a notion of what the ob- 
ject oughtto be before we pronounce it beautiful, ornot ; 
in the latter case such a previous notion is required. 
We judge, for example, a flower to be beautiful, 
though unaware of its destination, and that it contains 
a complex apparatus of organs all admirably adapted 
to the propagation of the plant. When we are made 
cognizant of this, we obtain, indeed, an additional 
gratification, but one wholly different from that which 
we experience in the contemplation of the flower 
itself, apart from all consideration of its adaptations. 
This distinction appears to me unsound. What has 



sir willtam Hamilton's philosophy. 215 

been distinguished as dependent or relative beauty is 
nothing more than a beautified utility or a utilized 
beauty. Be this, however, as it may, our pleasure 
in both cases arises from a free and full play being 
allowed to our cognitive faculties. 

(a) In the case of free beauty, — beauty, strictly 
so called, — both the imagination and the understand- 
ing find occupation ; and the pleasure we experience 
from such an object is in proportion as it affords to 
these faculties the opportunity of exerting fully and 
freely their respective energies. Now, it is the prin- 
cipal function of the understanding, out of the multi- 
farious presented to it, to form a whole. Its entire 
activity is, in fact, a tendency towards unity; and it 
is only satisfied when this object is so constituted as 
to afford the opportunity of an easy and perfect per- 
formance of this its function. The object is then 
judged to be beautiful or pleasing. This enables us 
to explain the differences of different individuals in 
the apprehension of the beautiful. If an understand- 
ing, by natural constitution, by cultivation and exer- 
cise, be vigorous enough to think up rapidly into a 
whole what is presented in complexity, the individual 
has an enjoyment, and he regards the object as beau- 
tiful ; whereas if an intellect perform this function 
slowly and with effort, if it succeed in accomplishing 
the end at all, the individual can feel no pleasure (if 
he does not experience pain), and the object must to 
him appear as one destitute of beauty, if not positively 
ugly. Hence it is that children, boors, in a word 
persons of a weak or uncultivated mind, may find the 



216 AN OUTLINE OF 

parts of a building beautiful, while unable to compre- 
hend the beauty of it as a whole. 

(/?) In the case of relative or dependent beauty we 
must distinguish the pleasure we receive into two,, 
combined indeed, but not identical. The one of these 
pleasures is that from the beauty which the object 
contains, and the principle of which we have been 
just considering. The other of these pleasures is that 
which we showed was attached to a perfect energy of 
the understanding in thinking an object under the 
notion of conformity as a mean adapted to an 
end. 

The result, then, of what has now been said is, that 
a thing beautiful is one whose form occupies the imagi- 
nation and understanding in a free and full, and con- 
sequently in an agreeable, activity. 

ii. The feeling of pleasure in the sublime is essen- 
tially different from our feeling of pleasure in the 
beautiful. The beautiful affords a feeling of un- 
mingled pleasure in the full and unimpeded activity 
of our cognitive powers ; whereas our feeling of sub- 
limity is a mingled one of pleasure and of pain, — of 
pleasure in the consciousness of strong energy, of 
pain in the consciousness that this energy is in vain. 
But as the amount of pleasure in the sublime is greater 
than the amount of pain, it follows that the free energy 
it elicits must be greater than the free energy it 
repels. The beautiful has reference to the form of an 
object, and the facility with which it is comprehended. 
For beauty, magnitude is thus an impediment. Sub- 
limity, on the contrary, requires magnitude as its 
condition ; and the formless is not unfrequently sub- 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 217 

lime. That we are at once attracted and repelled by 
sublimity, arises from the circumstance that the 
object, which we call sublime, is proportioned to one 
of our faculties, and disproportioned to another; but 
as the degree of pleasure transcends the degree of 
pain, the power whose energy is promoted must be 
superior to that power whose energy is repressed. 

The sublime may be divided, according to the three 
quantities, into the sublime of extension, the sublime 
of protension, and the sublime of intension; or, what 
comes to the same thing, the sublime of space, the 
sublime of time, and the sublime of power. In the 
two former the cognitive, in the last the conative, 
powers come into play. 

(«) An object is extensively or protensively sub- 
lime when it comprises so great a multitude of parts 
that the imagination sinks under the attempt to rep- 
resent it in an image, and the understanding to 
measure it by other quantities. Baffled in the attempt 
to reduce the object within the limits of the faculties 
by which it must be comprehended, the mind at once 
desists from the ineffectual effort, and conceives the 
object not by a positive, but by a negative, notion ; it 
conceives it as inconceivable, and falls back into 
repose, which is felt as pleasing by contrast to the 
continuance of a forced and impeded energy. Exam- 
ples of the sublime — of this sudden effort, and of 
this instantaneous desisting from the attempt — are 
manifested in the extensive sublime of Space, and in 
the protensive sublime of Eternity. 

(,3) An object is intensively sublime when it in- 
volves such a degree of force or power that the imag- 



218 AN OUTLINE OF 

ination cannot at once represent, and the understand- 
ing cannot at once bring under measure, the quantum 
of this force ; and when, from the nature of the 
object, the inability of the mind is at once made 
apparent, so that it does not proceed in the ineffectual 
effort, but at once calls back its energies from the 
attempt. 

It is thus manifest that the feeling of the sublime 
will be one of mingled pain and pleasure ; pleasure, 
from the vigorous exertion and the instantaneous 
repose ; pain, from the consciousness of limited and 
frustrated activity. This mixed feeling in the con- 
templation of the sublime object is finely expressed 
by Lucretius when he says : — 

"Me quaedam divina voluptas 
Percipit atque horror." 

iii. The Picturesque, however opposite to the sub- 
lime, seems, in my opinion, to stand to the beautiful 
in a somewhat similar relation. An object is posi- 
tively ugly, when it is of such a form that the imagi- 
nation and the understanding cannot help attempting 
to think it up into unity, and yet their energies fail 
in the endeavor, or accomplish it only imperfectly 
after time and toil. The cause of this continuance of 
effort is, that the object does not present such an 
appearance of incongruous variety as at once to com- 
pel the mind to desist from the attempt of reducing it 
to unity ; but, on the contrary, leads it on to attempt 
what it is yet unable to perform, — its reduction to a 
whole. But variety — variety even apart from unity 
— is pleasing ; and if the mind be made content to 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 219 

expatiate freely and easily in this variety, without at- 
tempting painfully to reduce it to unity, it will derive 
no inconsiderable pleasure from this exertion of its 
powers. Now, a picturesque object is precisely of 
such a character. It is so determinately varied and 
so abrupt in its variety ; it presents so complete a ne- 
gation of all rounded contour, and so regular an irreg- 
ularity of broken lines and angles ; that every attempt 
at reducing it to an harmonious whole is at once 
found to be impossible. The mind, therefore, which 
must forego the energy of representing and thinking 
the object as a unity, surrenders itself at once to the 
energies which deal with it only in detail. 

II. The practical feelings are divisible into five 
classes, as they relate to (1.) our self-preservation, 
(2.) the enjoyment of our existence, (3.) the preser- 
vation of the species, (4.) our tendency towards de- 
velopment and perfection, (5.) the moral law. 

1 . The feelings of self-preservation are those of hun- 
ger and thirst, loathing, sorrow, bodily pain, repose, 
fear at danger, anxiety, shuddering, alarm, composure, 
security, and the nameless feeling at the representa- 
tion of death. Several of these feelings are corpo- 
real, and may be considered, with equal propriety, as 
modifications of the vague sense. 

2. The feelings relating to the enjoyment of existence 
arise from the fact that man is determined not only 
to exist, but to exist well ; he is therefore determined 
also to desire whatever tends to render life agreeable, 
and to eschew whatever tends to render it disagree- 
able. All, therefore, that appears to contribute to 
the former, causes in him the feeling of joy ; whereas 



220 AN OUTLINE OF 

all that seems to threaten the latter excites in him 
the repressed feelings of fear, anxiety, sorrow, etc., 
which we have already mentioned. 

3. Man is determined not only to preserve him- 
self, but to preserve the species to which he belongs, 
and with this tendency various feelings are associated . 
To this head belong the feelings of sexual love and 
parental affection. But the human affections are not 
limited to family connections. " Man," says Aristotle, 
"is the sweetest thing to man." We have thus a ten- 
dency to social intercourse, ancf society is at once the 
necessary condition of our happiness and of our per- 
fection. In conformity with his tendency to social 
existence man is endowed with a sympathetic feeling ; 
that is, he rejoices with those that rejoice, and grieves 
with those that grieve. Compassion or pity is the 
name given to the latter modification of sympathy; 
the former is without a definite name. Besides sym- 
pathetic sorrow and sympathetic joy, there are a 
variety of feelings which have reference to our exist- 
ence in a social relation. Of these there is that con- 
nected with vanity, or the wish to please others from 
the desire of being respected by them ; with shame, 
or the fear and sorrow at incurring their disrespect ; 
with pride, or the overweening sentiment of our own 
worth. To the same class we may refer the feelings 
connected with indignation, resentment, anger, scorn, 

etc. 

4. There is in man implanted a desire of develop- 
ing his powers, — a tendency towards perfection. In 
virtue of this, the consciousness of all comparative 
inability causes pain ; the consciousness of all com- 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON 's PHILOSOPHY. 221 

parative power causes pleasure. To this class belong 
the feelings which accompany emulation, — the desire 
of rising superior to others ; and envy, — the desire 
of reducing others beneath ourselves. 

5. We are conscious that there is in man a moral 
law, which unconditionally commands the fulfilment 
of its behests. Inasmuch as moral intelligence uncon- 
ditionally commands us to perform what we are con- 
scious to be our duty, there is attributed to man an 
absolute worth. The feeling, which the manifesta- 
tion of this worth excites, is called respect. With the 
consciousness of the lofty nature of our moral tenden- 
cies, and our ability to fulfil what the law of duty 
prescribes, there is couuected the feeling of self- 
respect; whereas, from a consciousness of the contrast 
between what we ought to do and what we actually 
perform, there arises the feeling of self-abasement. 
The sentiment of respect for the law of duty is the 
moral feeling, which has by some been improperly 
denominated the moral sense; for through this feeling 
we do not take cognizance whether anything be 
morally good or morally evil, but when by our intel- 
ligence we recognize aught to be of such a character, 
there is herewith associated a feeling of pain or 
pleasure, which is nothing more than our state in ref- 
erence to the fulfilment or violation of the law. Man, 
as conscious of his liberty to act and of the law by 
which his actions ought to be regulated, recognizes 
his personal accountability, and calls himself before 
the internal tribunal which we denominate conscience. 
Here he is either acquitted or condemned. The ac- 



222 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 

quittal is connected with a peculiar feeling of pleasur- 
able exultation, as the condemnation is with a peculiar 
feeliug of painful humiliation, — remorse. {Led. on 
Metaph., XLV. and XLVI.) 



THIRD PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONATIONS. 



THIRD PART OF PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CONATIONS. 



Under the third class of mental phenomena are 
comprehended both the phenomenon of desire and 
the phenomenon of volition. In English unfortunately 
we have no term capable of adequately expressing 
what is common both to volition and desire, that is, 
the ?iisns or conatus, — the tendency towards the reali- 
zation of their end. Were we to say the phenomena 
of tendency, the phrase would be vague ; and the 
same is true of the phenomena of doing. Again, the 
term phenomena of appetency is objectionable, because 
(to say nothing of the unfamiliarity of the expression) 
appetency, though perhaps etymologically unexcep- 
tionable, has, both in Latin and English, a meaning 
almost synonymous with desire. Like the Latin 
appetentia, the Greek vps^t<; is equally ill-balanced ; 
for, though used by philosophers to comprehend both 
will and desire, it more familiarly suggests the latter, 
and we need not, therefore, be solicitous, with Mr. 
Harris and Lord Monboddo, to naturalize in Euglish 
the term orectic. Again, the phrase phenomena of 
activity would be even worse ; every possible objection 
15 ' 225 



226 AN OUTLINE OF 

can be made to the term active powers, by which the 
philosophers of this country have designated the orec- 
tic faculties of the Aristotelians. For you will ob- 
serve that all faculties are equally active ; and it is 
not the overt performance, but the tendency towards 
i it, for which we are in quest of an expression. The 
term Conative is employed by Cuclworth, and I shall 
adopt the word conations as the most appropriate 
expression for this class of phenomena. (Lect. on 
Metaph., XL) 

The conations, as tendencies to action, are divisible 
into classes, as such tendencies are either blind and 
fatal, or deliberate and free. The former are desires, 
the latter, volitions. 

(A) Desires may be subdivided according to their 
objects, for they relate either (1.) to Self-preserva- 
tion, or (2.) to the Enjoyment of Existence, or (3.) 
to the Preservation of the Species, or (4.) to our 
Tendency towards Development and Perfection, or 
(5.) to the Moral Law. 1 (Lect. on Metaph., XLYI.) 

II. Will is a free cause, a cause which is not also 
an effect, a power of absolute origination. (Discus- 
sions, p. 623.) It is proved to be so, 

1. Directly, by an immediate testimony of con- 
sciousness to the fact (Lect. on Metaph., II. ; ReioVs 
Works, p. 624, note, and pp. 616-7, notes) ; while 



1 It may be observed that this is the classification of the - desires 
given above (Phenomenology of the Feelings, Chap. II., § 2, (B) 
II.) ; and it is the only classification attempted by Sir William Ham- 
ilton. It ought not, however, to be forgotten that it is suggested, 
not in an independent treatment of the desires, but in a description 
of the feelings which the desires originate. — J. C. M. 



SIB WILLIAM HAMILTON' S PHILOSOPHY. 227 

2. Indirectly also it is implied in our conscious- 
ness, at once of an uncompromising law of duty, and 
of our beinsr the accountable authors of our actions. 
(Led. on Metaph., II. ; Discussions, pp. 623-4.) 

The fact of a free volition is indeed positively in- 
conceivable, and that for two reasons : — 

1. The Law of the Conditioned in Time, under the 
form of the Law of Causality, renders impossible the 
conception of an absolute commencement. 

2. On the one hand, the determination of the will 
by motives can be conceived only as a necessitation 
which would render moral accountability impossible. 
On the other hand, were we to admit as true what we 
cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motive- 
less volition would be only casualism ; and the free 
acts of an indifferent, are, morally and rationally, as 
worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined 
will. 

How, therefore, moral liberty is possible in man or 
in God must remain, under the present limitation of 
our faculties, wholly incomprehensible ; but the fact 
of liberty caunot be redargued on the ground of its 
incomprehensibility. For, 

1. The judgment of causality, which renders free 
will inconceivable, has been proved not to depend on a 
'power of the mind, imposing, as necessary in thought, 
what is necessary in the universe of existence. This 
judgment is a mere mental impotence, — an impotence 
to conceive either of two contradictories ; and as the 
one or the other of contradictories must be true, whilst 
both cannot, there is no ground for inferring a fact to 
be impossible merely from our inability to conceive its 



228 AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 

possibility. At the same time, if the causal judgment 
be not an express affirmation of mind, but only an 
incapacity of thinking the opposite, it follows that 
such a negative judgment cannot counterbalance the 
express affirmative, the unconditional testimony, of 
consciousness, that we are, though we know not how, 
the true and responsible authors of our actions, not 
merely the worthless links in an adamantine series of 
causes and effects. 

2. But not only may the fact of our moral liberty 
be shown to be possible, though inconceivable ; the 
very objection of incomprehensibility, by which the 
fatalist had thought to triumph over the libertarian, 
may be retorted against himself. The scheme of 
freedom is not more inconceivable than the scheme 
of necessity. For whilst fatalism is a recoil from 
the more obtrusive inconceivability of an absolute 
commencement, on the fact of which commencement 
the doctrine of liberty proceeds ; the fatalist over- 
looks the equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability 
of an infinite non-commencement, on the assertion of 
which non-commencement his own doctrine of neces- 
sity must ultimately rest. As equally unthinkable, 
the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus 
theoretically balanced. But practically our conscious- 
ness of the moral law, which, without a moral liberty 
in man, would be a mendacious imperative, gives a 
decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom 
over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act, if we 
are accountable for our actions. [Discussions, pp. 
623-5.) 



SECOND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 



NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



Nomological Psychology, or the Nomology of 
Mind, is that science which investigates, not contin- 
gent appearances, but the necessary and universal 
facts, that is, the laws, by which our faculties are 
governed, to the end that we may obtain a criterion 
by which to judge or to explain their procedures and 
manifestations. Now, there will be as many depart- 
ments of Nomological Psychology as there are classes 
of mental phenomena ; for as each class proposes a 
different end, and, in the accomplishment of that end, 
is regulated by peculiar laws, each must consequently 
have a different science conversant about these laws, 
that is, a different Nomology. 

(A) First Part of Nomological Psychology: 
Nomology of the Cognitions. There is no one, no 
Nomological, science of the Cognitive faculties, in 
general ; though we have some older treatises which, 
though partial in their subject, afford a name not un- 
suitable for a nomology of the cognitions, — namely, 
Gnoseologia or Gnostologia. There is no indepen- 
dent science of the laws of Perception ; if there were, 
it might be called ^Esthetic, which, however, as we 
shall see, would be ambiguous. Mnemonic, or the 

231 



232 AN OUTLINE OF 

science of the laws of Memory, has been elaborated 
at least in numerous treatises ; but the name Anam- 
nestic, the art of Recollection or Reminiscence, might 
be equally well applied to it. The laws of the Repre- 
sentative faculty, — that is, the laws of Association, — 
have not yet been elevated into a separate ISTomolog- 
ical science. Neither have the conditions of the Reg- 
ulative or Legislative faculty, the faculty itself of 
Laws, been fully analyzed, far less reduced to system ; 
though we have several deservedly forgotten treatises, 
of an older date, under the inviting name of Zoolo- 
gies. The only one of the cognitive faculties, whose 
laws constitute the object-matter of a separate science, 
is the Elaborative. This Nomology has obtained the 
name of Logic 1 among other appellations, but not 
from Aristotle. The best name would have been 
Dianoetic. Logic is the science of the laws of 
thought in relation to the end which our cognitive 
faculties propose, — i. e., the True. To this head 
might be referred Grammar, — Universal Grammar, 
Philosophical Grammar, or the science conversant 
with the laws of Language, as the instrument of 
thought. 

(B) Second Part of Nomological Psychology : 
Nomology of the Feelings. The Nomology of our 
Feelings, or the science of the laws which govern our 
capacities of enjoyment, in relation to the end which 
they propose, — *. e., the Pleasurable, — has ob- 
tained no precise name in our language. It has been 

1 Sir William Hamilton has a separate course of lectures on Logic, 
which, however, could not, even in the most abridged form, be em- 
bodied in the present work. — J. C. M. 



SIX WILLIAM HAMILTON'' S PHILOSOPHY. 233 

called the Philosophy of Taste, and, on the Continent 
especially, it has been denominated ^Esthetic. Neither 
name is unobjectionable. The first is vague, meta- 
phorical, and even delusive. In regard to the second, 
you are aware that aU&n<nq in Greek means feeling in 
general, as well as sense in particular; as our term 
feeling means either the sense of touch in particular, 
or sentiment, — and the capacity of the pleasurable 
and painful in general. Both terms are, therefore, to 
a certain extent, ambiguous ; but this objection can 
rarely be avoided, and ^Esthetic, if not the best ex- 
pression to be found, has already been long and gen- 
erally employed. The term Apolaustic would have 
been a more appropriate designation. 

(C) Third Part of Nomological Psychology : 
Nomology of the Conations. The Nomology of 
our Conative powers is Practical Philosophy , properly 
so called ; for practical philosophy is simply the 
science of the laws regulative of our will and desires 
in relation to the end which our conative powers pro- 
pose, — i. e., the Good. This, as it considers these 
laws in relation to man as an individual, or in relation 
to man as a member of society, will be divided into 
two branches, — Ethics and Politics ; and these again 
admit of various subdivisions. (Led. on Metajoh., 
VII.) 



THIRD DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 



INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER I. 

EXISTENCE IN GENEEAL. 

In connection with the general division of the phil- 
osophical sciences it was stated that the third great 
branch of philosophy investigates the inferences which 
are to be drawn from the phenomena presented in 
consciousness. It is not, therefore, to be supposed 
that we have an immediate knowledge of existence 
itself; we know it merely through the phenomena in 
which it is manifested. It is consequently necessary 
now to explain the great axiom, that all human knowl- 
edge is only of the relative and phenomenal. 

In this proposition the term relative is opposed to 
the term absolute; and therefore, in saying that we 
know only the relative, I virtually assert that we 
know nothing absolute, — nothing existing absolutely, 
that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us 
and our faculties. I shall illustrate this by its appli- 
cation. Our knowledge is either of matter or of 
mind. 

I. Now, what is matter? What do we know of 

237 



238 AN OUTLINE OF 

matter ? Matter or body is to us the name either of 
something known or of something Unknown. 

1. In so far as matter is the name for something 
known, it means that which appears to us under the 
forms of extension, solidity, divisibility, figure, mo- 
tion, roughness, smoothness, color, heat, cold, etc. ; 
in short, it is a common name for a certain series or 
aggregate or complement of appearances or phenom- 
ena manifested in coexistence. 

2. But as these phenomena appear only in conjunc- 
tion, we are compelled by the constitution of our 
nature to think them conjoined in and by something ; 
and as they are phenomena, we cannot think them the 
phenomena of nothing, but must regard them as the 
properties or qualities of something that is extended, 
solid, figured, etc. But this something, absolutely 
and in itself, — that is, considered apart from its phe- 
nomena, — is to us as zero. It is only in its quali- 
ties, only in its effects, in its relative or phenomenal 
existence, that it is cognizable or conceivable ; and it 
is only by a law of thought, which compels us to think 
something, absolute and unknown, as the basis or 
condition of the relative and known, that this some- 
thing obtains a kind of incomprehensible reality to us. 
Now, that which manifests its qualities, — in other 
words, that in which the appearing causes inhere, that 
to which they belong, — is called their subject, or sub- 
stance, or substratum. To this subject of the phenom- 
ena of extension, solidity, etc., the term matte?' or 
material substance is commonly, glyen ; and, therefore, 
as contradistinguished from these qualities, it is the 
name of something unknown and inconceivable. 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 239 

II. The same is true in regard to the term mind. 
1. In so far as mind is the common name for the 
states of knowing, willing, feeling, desiring, etc., of 
which I am conscious, it is only the name for a certain 
series of connected phenomena or qualities, and, con- 
sequently, expresses only what is known. 2. But iu 
so far as it denotes that subject or substance in which 
the phenomena of knowing, willing, etc., inhere, — 
something behind or under these phenomena, — it 
expresses what, in itself, or in its absolute existence, 
is unknown. 

Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are 
only two different series of phenomena or qualities ; 
mind and matter, as unknown and unknowable, are 
the two substances in which these two different series 
of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. 
The existence of an unknown substance is only an in- 
ference we are compelled to make from the existence 
of known phenomena ; and the distinction of two 
substances is only inferred from the seeming incom- 
patibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere 
in one. 

Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is thus, 
as we have said, only relative ; of existence, abso- 
lutely and in itself, we know nothing ; and we may 
say of man what Virgil says of ./Eneas, contemplating 
in the prophetic sculpture of his shield the future 
glories of Rome, — 

" Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet." 

Thus, our knowledge is of partial and relative ex- 
istence only, seeing that existence in itself, or abso- 



240 AN OUTLINE OF 

lute existence, is no object of knowledge. But it 
does not follow that all relative existence is relative 
to us; that all that can be known even by a limited 
intelligence is actually cognizable by us. We must, 
therefore, more precisely limit our sphere of knowl- 
edge, by adding, that all we know is known only 
under the special conditions of knowledge. 
„ Now, this principle of the relativity of all human 
knowledge divides itself into two branches. In the 
first place, it would be unphilosophical to conclude 
that the properties of existence necessarily are, in 
number, only as the number of our faculties of appre- 
hending them ; or, in the second, that the properties 
known are known in their native purity, and with- 
out addition or modification from our organs of sense, 
or our capacities of intelligence. I shall illustrate 
these in their order. 

I. In regard to the first assertion, it is evident that 
nothing exists for us, except in so far as it is known 
to us, and that nothing is known to us, except certain 
properties or modes of existence, which are relative 
or analogous to our faculties. Beyond these modes 
we know, and can assert, the reality of no existence. 
But if, on the one hand, we are not entitled to assert, 
as actually existent, except what we know ; neither, 
on the other, are we warranted in denying, as possi- 
bly existent, what we do not know. The universe 
may be conceived as a polygon of a thousand, or a 
hundred thousand, sides or facets ; and each of these 
sides or facets may be conceived as representing one 
special mode of existence. Now, of these thousand 
sides or modes, all may be equally essential, but three 



sir william Hamilton's philosophy. 241 

or four only may be turned towards us, or be analo- 
gous to our organs. One side or facet of the uni- 
verse, as holding a relation to the organ of sight, is 
the mode of luminous or visible existence ; another, 
as proportional to the organ of hearing, is the mode 
of sonorous or audible existence ; and so on. But if 
every eye to see, if every ear to hear, were annihi- 
lated, the mode of existence to which these organs 
uoav stand in relation, — that which could be seen, 
that which could be heard, — would still remain ; and 
if the intelligences, reduced to the three senses of 
touch, smell, and taste, were then to assert the im- 
possibility of any modes of being except those to 
which these three senses were analogous, the procedure 
would not be more unwarranted, than if we now ven- 
tured to deny the possible reality of other modes of 
material existence than those to the perception of 
which our five senses are accommodated. I will illus- 
trate this by a hypothetical parallel. Let us suppose 
a block of marble, on which there are four different 
inscriptions, — in Greek, in Latin, in Persic, in He- 
brew ; and that four travellers approach, each able to 
read only the inscription in his native tongue. The 
Greek is delighted with the information the marble 
affords him of the siege of Troy ; the Eoman finds 
interesting matter regarding the expulsion of the 
Kings ; the Persian deciphers an oracle of Zoroaster, 
and the Jew is surprised by a commemoration of the 
Exodus. Here, as each inscription exists or is sig- 
nificant only to him who possesses the corresponding 
language ; so the several modes of existence are man- 
ifested only to those intelligences who possess the 

16 



242 AN OUTLINE OF 

corresponding organs. And as each of the four 
readers would be rash, if he maintained that the mar- 
ble could be significant only as significant to him, so 
should we be rash, were we to hold that the universe 
had no other phases of being than the few that are 
turned towards our faculties, and which our five senses 
enable us to perceive. 

Before leaving this subject, it is perhaps proper to 
observe that, had we faculties equal in number to all 
the possible modes of existence, whether of mind or 
matter, still would our knowledge of mind or matter 
be only relative. If material existence could exhibit 
ten thousand phenomena, and -if we possessed ten 
thousand senses to apprehend these, of existence abso- 
lutely and in itself we -should be then as ignorant as 
we are at present. 

II. But the consideration that our actual faculties 
of knowledge are probably wholly inadequate in num- 
ber to the possible modes of being, is of comparatively 
less importance than the other consideration to which 
we now proceed, that whatever we know is not known 
as it is, but only as it seems to us to be; for it is of 
less importance that our knowledge should be limited, 
than that our knowledge should be pure. It is, there- 
fore, of the highest moment that we should be aware 
that what we know is not a simple relation appre- 
hended between the object known and the subject 
knowing, but that every knowledge is a sum made up 
of several elements, and that the great business of 
philosophy is to analyze and discriminate these ele- 
ments, and to determine from whence these contribu- 
tions have been derived. I shall explain what I mean 



SIX WILLIAM HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY. 243 

by an example. In the perception of an external 
object, the mind does not know it in immediate re- 
lation to itself, but mediately, in relation to the mate- 
rial organs of sense. If, therefore, we were to throw 
these organs out of consideration, and did not take 
into account what they contribute to, and how they 
modify our knowledge of, that object, it is evident 
that our conclusion in regard to the nature of external 
perception would be erroneous. Again, an object of 
perception may not even stand in immediate relation 
to the organ of sense, but may make its impression on 
that organ through an intervening medium. Now, if 
this medium be thrown out of account, and if it be 
not considered that the real external object is the sum 
of all that externally contributes to affect the sense, 
we shall, in like maimer, run into error. For exam- 
ple, I see a book, — I see that book through an ex- 
ternal medium (what that medium is, we do not now 
inquire) , — and I see it through my organ of sight, 
the eye. Now, as the full object presented to the 
mind (observe that I say the mind), in perception, is 
an object compounded of (1.) the external object 
emitting or reflecting light, i. e. , modifying the exter- 
nal medium, of (2.) this external medium, and of (3.) 
the living organ of sense, in their mutual relation, let 
us suppose, in the example I have taken, that the full 
or adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and 
that this amount is made up of three several parts, — 
of four contributed by the book, of four contributed 
by all that intervenes between the book and the 
organ, and of four contributed by the living organ 
itself. 



244 AN OUTLINE OF 

I use this illustration to show, that the phenome- 
non of the external object is not presented imme- 
diately to the mind, but is known by it only as 
modified through certain intermediate agencies ; and 
to show that sense itself may be a source of error, if 
we do not analyze and distinguish what elements, in 
an act of perception, belong to the outward reality, 
what to the outward medium, and what to the action 
of sense itself. But this source of error is not limited 
to our perceptions ; and we are liable to be deceived, 
not merely by not distinguishing in an act of knowl- 
edge what is contributed by sense, but by not dis- 
tinguishing what is contributed by the mind itself. 
This is the most difficult and important function of 
philosophy ; and the greater number of its higher 
problems arise in the attempt to determine the shares 
to which the knowing subject, and the object known, 
may pretend in the total act of cognition. For, accord- 
ing as we attribute a larger or a smaller proportion to 
each, we either run into the extremes of Idealism and 
Materialism, or maintain an equilibrium between the 
two. {Led. on Metaph., VIII.) 

But although existence be only revealed to us in 
phenomena, and though we can, therefore, have only 
a relative knowledge either of mind or of matter ; still, 
by inference and analogy, we may legitimately attempt 
to rise above the mere appearances which experience 
and observation afford. Thus, for example, the ex- 
istence of God and the Immortality of the Soul are 
not given us as phenomena, as objects of immediate 
knowledge ; yet, if the phenomena actually given do 



sib william Hamilton's philosophy. 245 

necessarily require, for their rational explanation, the 
hypotheses of immortality and of God, we are as- 
suredly entitled, from the existence of the former, to 
infer the reality of the latter. (Ibid., VII.) 



INFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER II. 

EXISTENCE OF GOD AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 

The mind of man rises to its highest dignity when 
viewed as the object through which, and through 
which alone, his unassisted reason can ascend to the 
knowledge of a God. 

The Deity is not an object of immediate contempla- 
tion ; as existing and in himself, he is beyond our 
reach ; we can know him only mediately through his 
works, and are only warranted in assuming his exist- 
ence as a certain kind of cause necessary to account 
for a certain state of things, of whose reality our fac- 
ulties are supposed to inform us. The affirmation of 
a God being thus a regressive inference, from the 
existence of a special class of effects to the existence 
of a special character of cause, it is evident that the 
whole argument hinges on the fact, — Does a state of 
things really exist such as is only possible through 
the agency of a Divine Cause ? For if it can be shown 
that such a state of things does not really exist, then 

246 



AN OUTLINE OF HAMILTON* S PHILOSOPHY. 247 

our inference to the kind of cause requisite to account 
for it is necessarily null. 

We must, first of all, then, consider what kind of 
cause it is which constitutes a Deity, and what kind 
of effects they are which allow lis to infer that a Deity 
must be. 

The notion of a God is not contained in the notion 
of a mere first cause ; for in the admission of a first 
cause Atheist and Theist are at one. Neither is this 
notion completed by adding to a first cause the attri- 
bute of Omnipotence ; for the atheist who holds mat- 
ter or necessity to be the original principle of all that 
is, does not convert his blind force into a God, by 
merely affirming it to be all-powerful. It is not until 
the two great attributes of Intelligence and Virtue 
(and be it observed that Virtue involves Liberty) — I 
say, it is not until the two attributes of intelligence 
and virtue or holiness are brought in, that the belief 
in a primary and omnipotent cause becomes the be- 
lief in a veritable Divinity. But these latter attri- 
butes are not more essential to the divine nature than 
are the former. For as original and infinite power 
does not of itself constitute a God, so neither is a God 
constituted by intelligence and virtue, unless intelli- 
gence and goodness be themselves conjoined with this 
original and infinite power. For even a Creator, 
intelligent and good and powerful, would be no God, 
were he dependent for his intelligence and goodness 
and power on any higher principle. On this supposi- 
tion, the perfections of the Creator are viewed as lim- 
ited and derived. He is himself, therefore, only a 
dependency, — only a creature ; and if a God there 



248 AN OUTLINE OF 

be, he must be sought for in that higher principle, 
from which this subordinate principle derives its attri- 
butes. Now, is this highest principle (ex hypothese, 
all-powerful) also intelligent and moral ; then it is 
itself the veritable Deity. On the other hand, is it, 
though the author of intelligence and goodness in 
another, itself unintelligent ; then is a blind Fate con- 
stituted the first and universal cause, and atheism is 
asserted. 

The peculiar attributes which distinguish a Deity 
from the original omnipotence or blind fate of the 
atheist being thus those of intelligence and holiness 
of will, and the assertion of theism being only the 
assertion that the universe is governed not only by 
physical but by moral laws, we have next to consider 
how we are warranted in these two affirmations : (1.) 
that intelligence stands first in the absolute order of 
existence, in other words, that final preceded efficient 
causes ; and (2.) that the universe is governed by 
moral laws. 

The proof of these two propositions is the proof of 
a God ; but before considering how far the phenom- 
ena of mind and of matter do and do not allow us to 
infer the one position or the other, I must solicit your 
attention to the characteristic contrasts which these 
two classes of phenomena in themselves exhibit. 

In the compass of our experience, we distinguish 
two series of facts, — the facts of the external or ma- 
terial world, and the facts of the internal world or 
world of intelligence. These concomitant series of 
phenomena are not like streams which merely run 
parallel to each other ; they do not, like the Alpheus 



SIX WILLIAM HAMILTON' S PIIIZOSOPHY. 249 

and Arethusa, flow on side by side without a com- 
mingling of their waters. They cross, they combine, 
they are interlaced ; but notwithstanding their inti- 
mate connection, their mutual action and reaction, 
we are able to discriminate them without diffi- 
culty, because they are marked out by characteristic 
differences. 

The phenomena of the material world are subjected 
to immutable laws, are produced and reproduced in 
the same invariable succession, and manifest only the 
blind force of a mechanical necessity. 

The phenomena of man are, in part, subjected to 
the laws of the external universe. As dependent 
upon a bodily organization, as actuated by sensual pro- 
pensities and animal wants, he belongs to matter, and, 
in this respect, he is the slave of necessity. But what 
man holds of matter does not make up his personality. 
They are his, not he ; man is not an organism, — he 
is an intelligence served by organs. For in man there 
are tendencies — there is a law — which continually 
urge him to prove that he is more powerful than the 
nature by which he is surrounded and penetrated. 
He is conscious to himself of faculties not comprised 
in the chain of physical necessity ; his intelligence 
reveals prescriptive principles of action, absolute and 
universal, in the Law of Duty, and a liberty capable 
of carrying that law into effect, in opposition to the 
solicitations, the impulsions, of his material nature. 
From the coexistence of these opposing forces in man, 
there results a ceaseless struggle between physical 
necessity and moral liberty, — in the language of Rev- 
elation, between the Flesh and the Spirit ; and this 



250 AN OUTLINE OF 

struggle constitutes at once the distinctive character 
of humanity, and the essential condition of human 
development and virtue. 

In the facts of intelligence we thus become aware 
of an order of things diametrically in contrast to that 
displayed to us in the facts of the material universe. 
There is made known to us an order of things, in 
which intelligence, by recognizing the unconditional 
law of duty and an absolute obligation to fulfil it, rec- 
ognizes its own possession of a liberty incompatible 
with a dependence upon fate, and of a power capable 
of resisting and conquering the counteraction of our 
animal nature. 

Now, it is only as man is a free intelligence, a 
moral power, that he is created after the image of 
God, and it is only as a spark of divinity glows as the 
life of life in us, that we can rationally believe in an 
Intelligent Creator and Moral Governor of the uni- 
verse. For, let us suppose that in man intelligence 
is the product of organization, that our consciousness 
of moral liberty is itself an illusion ; in short, that 
acts of volition are results of the -same iron necessity 
which determines the phenomena of matter ; on this 
supposition the foundations of all religion, natural and 
revealed, are subverted. The truth of this will be 
best seen by applying the supposition of the two posi- 
tions of theism previously stated. 

I. In regard to the former, how can we attempt to 
prove that the universe is the creation qfajree original 
intelligence, against the counterposition of the atheist, 
that liberty is an illusion, and intelligence, or the 
adaptation of means to ends, only the product of a 



sm William Hamilton's philosophy. 251 

blind fate? As we know nothing of the absolute 
order of existence in itself, we can only attempt to 
infer its character from that of the particular order 
within the sphere of our experience ; and as we can 
affirm naught of intelligence and its conditions except 
what we may discover from the observation of our 
own minds, it is evident that we can only analogically 
carry out into the order of the universe the relation in 
which we find intelligence to stand in the order of the 
human constitution. If in man intelligence bo a free 
power, in so far as its liberty extends, intelligence 
must be independent of necessity and matter ; and a 
power independent of matter necessarily implies the 
existence of an immaterial subject, that is, a spirit. 
If, then, the original independence of intelligence 
on matter in the human constitution, in other 
words, if the spirituality of mind in man, be supposed 
a datum of observation, in this datum is also given 
both the condition and the proof of a God. For we 
have only to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, 
that intelligence holds the same relative supremacy in 
the universe which it holds in us, and the first positive 
condition of a Deity is established, in the establish- 
ment of the absolute priority of a free creative intelli- 
gence. On the other hand, let us suppose the result 
of our study of man to be, that intelligence is only a 
product of matter, only a reflex of organization, such 
a doctrine would not only afford no basis on which to 
rest any argument for a God, but, on the contrary, 
would positively warrant the atheist in denying his 
existence. For if, as the materialist maintains, the 
only intelligence of which we have any experience be 



252 AN OUTLINE OF 

a consequent of matter, — on this hypothesis, he not 
only cannot assume this order to be reversed in the 
relations of an intelligence beyond his observation, 
but, if he argue logically, he must positively conclude, 
that, as in man, so in the universe, the phenomena of 
intelligence or design are only in their last analysis 
the products of a brute necessity. Psychological ma- 
terialism, if carried out fully and fairly to its conclu- 
sions, thus inevitably results in theological atheism ; 
as it has been well expressed by Dr. Henry More, 
nullus in microcosmo spiritus, nullus in macrocosmo 
Deus. I do not, of course, mean to assert that all 
materialists deny, or actually disbelieve, a God. For, 
in very many cases, this would be at once an unmer- 
ited compliment to their reasoning, and an unmerited 
reproach to their faith. 

II. Such is the manifest dependence of our theology 
on our psychology in reference to the first condition 
of a Deity, — the absolute priority of a free intelli- 
gence. But this is perhaps even more conspicuous in 
relation to the second, that the universe is governed 
not merely by physical but by moral laws; for God is 
only God inasmuch as he is the Moral Governor of a 
Moral World. 

Our interest, also, in its establishment is incom- 
parably greater ; for while a proof that the universe 
is the work of an omnipotent intelligence gratifies 
only our speculative curiosity, — a proof that there is 
a holy legislator, by whom goodness and felicity will 
be ultimately brought into accordance, is necessary to 
satisfy both our intellect and our heart. A God is, 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON' S PHILOSOPHY. 253 

indeed, to us, only of practical interest, inasmuch as 
he is the condition of our immortality. 

Now, it is self-evident, in the first place, that, if 
there be no moral world, there can be no moral gov- 
ernor of such a world ; and, in the second, that we 
have, and can have, no ground on which to believe in 
the reality of a moral world, except in so far as we 
ourselves are moral agents. This being undeniable, 
it is further evident, that, should we ever be con- 
vinced that we are not moral agents, we should like- 
wise be convinced that there exists no moral order in 
the universe, and no supreme intelligence by which 
that moral order is established, sustained, and regu- 
lated. 

But in what does the character of man as a moral 
agent consist? Man is a moral agent only as he is 
accountable for his actions, in other words, as he is 
the object of praise or blame ; and this he is only in- 
asmuch as he has prescribed to him a rule of duty, and 
as he is able to act, or not to act, in conformity with 
its precepts. The possibility of morality thus depends 
on the possibility of liberty ; for if man be not a free 
agent, he is not the author of his actions, and has 
therefore no responsibility, no moral personality, at 
all. 

Theology is thus wholly dependent on psychology 
or mental science ; and psychology operates in three 
ways to establish that assurance of human liberty 
which is necessary for a rational belief in our own 
moral nature, in a moral world, and in a moral ruler 
of that world. 

1. In the first place, an attentive consideration of 



254 AN OUTLINE OF 

the phenomena of mind is necessary in order to a 
luminous and distinct apprehension of liberty as a da- 
tum of intelligence. 

2. In the second place, a profound philosophy is 
necessary to obviate the difficulties which meet us 
when we attempt to explain the possibility of this 
fact, and to prove that the datum of liberty is not a 
mere illusion. For, though an unconquerable feeling 
compels us to recognize ourselves as accountable, aud 
therefore free agents, still, when we attempt to real- 
ize in thought how the fact of our liberty can be, we 
soon find that this altogether transcends our under- 
standing, and that every effort to bring the fact of 
liberty within the compass of our conceptions only 
results in the substitution in its place of some more or 
less disguised form of necessity. The tendency of a 
superficial philosophy is therefore to deny the fact of 
liberty, on the principle that what cannot be conceived 
is impossible. A deeper and more comprehensive 
study of the facts of mind overturns this conclusion 
and destroys its foundation. It proves to us, from 
the very laws of mind, that, while we can never un- 
derstand how any original datum of intelligence is 
possible, we have no reason from this inability to 
doubt that it is true. 

3. In the third place, the study of mind is neces- 
sary to counterbalance and correct the influence of 
the study of matter ; and this utility of psychology 
rises in proportion to the progress of the natural sci- 
ences, and to the greater attention which they engross. 
An exclusive devotion to physical pursuits exerts an 
evil influence in two ways. In the first place, it di- 



sir tvilliam Hamilton's philosophy. 255 

verts from all notice of the phenomena of moral lib- 
erty, which are revealed to us in the recesses of the 
human mind alone ; and it disqualifies from appreciat- 
ing the import .of these phenomena, even if presented, 
by leaving uncultivated the finer power of psychologi- 
cal reflection, in the exclusive exercise of the faculties 
employed in the easier and more amusing observation 
of the external world. In the second place, by exhib- 
iting merely the phenomena of matter and extension, 
it habituates us only to the contemplation of an order 
in which everything is determined by the laws of a 
blind or mechanical necessity. Now, what is the 
inevitable tendency of this one-sided and exclusive 
study ? That the student becomes a materialist, if he 
speculate at all. For, in the first place, he is familiar 
with the obtrusive facts of necessity, and is unaccus- 
tomed to develop into consciousness the more recon- 
dite facts of liberty ; he is, therefore, disposed to 
disbelieve in the existence of phenomena whose reality 
he may deny, and whose possibility he cannot under- 
stand. At the same time, the love of unity, and the 
philosophical presumption against the multiplication 
of essences determine him to reject the assumption 
of a second, and that an hypothetical, substance, ig- 
norant as he is of the reasons by which that assump- 
tion is legitimated. 

In the infancy of science, this tendency of physical 
study was not experienced. When men first turned 
their attention on the phenomena of nature, every 
event was viewed as a miracle, for every effect was 
considered as the operation of an intelligence. God 
was not exiled from the universe of matter : on the 



256 AN OUTLINE OF 

contrary, he was multiplied in proportion to its phe- 
nomena. As science advanced, the deities were grad- 
ually driven out ; and long after the sublunary world 
had been disenchanted, they were left. for a season in 
possession of the starry heavens. The movement of 
the celestial bodies, in which Kepler still saw the 
agency of a free intelligence, was at length by New- 
ton resolved into a few mathematical principles ; and 
at last, even the irregularities which Newton was com- 
pelled to leave for the miraculous correction of the 
Deity, have been proved to require no supernatural 
interposition ; for La Place has shown that all con- 
tingencies, past and future, in the heavens, find 
their explanation in the one fundamental law of grav- 
itation. 

But the very contemplation of an order and adapta- 
tion so astonishing; joined to the knowledge that this 
order and adaptation are the necessary results of a 
brute mechanism, when acting upon minds which have 
not looked into themselves for the light of which the 
world without can only afford them reflection, far 
from elevating them more than any other aspect of 
external creation to that inscrutable Being who reigns 
beyond and above the universe of nature, tends, on 
the contrary, to impress on them, with peculiar force, 
the conviction, that as the mechanism of nature can 
explain so much, the mechanism of nature can ex- 
plain all. 

Should physiology ever succeed in reducing the 
facts of intelligence to phenomena of matter, philoso- 
phy would be subverted in the subversion of its three 
great objects, God, Free- Will, and Immortality. 



sin william Hamilton's philosophy. 257 

True wisdom would then consist, not in speculation, 
but in repressing thought during our brief transit from 
nothingness to nothingness. For why? Philosophy 
would have become a meditation, not merely of death, 
but of annihilation ; the precept, Know thyself, would 
have been replaced ' by the terrible oracle to CEdi- 
pus : — 

" May'st thou nevei know the truth of what thou art; " 

and the final recompense of our scientific curiosity 
would be wailing, deeper than Cassandra's, for the 
ignorance that saved us from despair. {Led. on 
Metaph., II.) 



FINIS. 
17 



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